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General introduction
Can a demented person be considered competent to make a treatment decision? Competence is 
a complex concept with ethical, legal, and psychological aspects. Discussions about the concept of 
competence can be held on different levels. In the following paragraph we will introduce brieﬂy the 
ethical and legal aspects in order to explain the current position of competence in health care. In 
the section ‘Deﬁnitions and characteristics’ the normative and psychological aspects will be 
discussed, and we raise the question why, in some circumstances, patients with dementia are 
competent enough to make decisions. 
Introduction
Within the context of daily medical practice, competence is usually assessed implicitly. 
However, in some clinical settings competency regularly becomes problematic, especially 
when there raises concern about the cognitive capacities of patients, and in particular 
those of patients with dementia. Not unexpectedly, studies have shown that persons with 
dementia or cognitive impairment were more likely to be incompetent or to have impaired 
decisional abilities than their elderly peers without these diagnoses (Kim et al., 2002). In 
studies conducted in nursing homes high prevalences of decisional impairment were found, 
ranging from 44% to 69% (Royall et al., 1997). Although these results may not be surprising, 
they nevertheless reinforce the important ethical statement that the diagnosis of dementia 
does not automatically imply incapacity. Studies focusing on patients in the early stages of 
dementia underline the great variation in the decision-making capacity of these patients. 
Close inspection of the results of the Marson et al. study (1995) revealed that although all 
the patients with mild-to-moderate Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (mean MMSE 19.4) were 
impaired on the legal standard of ‘understanding’ in making decisions,  28% to 83% still had 
adequate decisional abilities on the other relevant legal standards of ‘appreciation’, 
‘reasoning’, or ‘choice’. Stanley et al. (1988) reported that the quality of the reasoning of 
AD patients and their comprehension of risks and beneﬁts were similar to those of elderly 
control subjects. Two other studies (Bassett, 1999; Kim et al., 2001) reported that the 
performance of 34% of the mild-to-moderate AD patients (mean MMSE 22.9) was above a 
validated threshold on all four standards of decision-making ability. These ﬁgures 
demonstrate that even if the decisional ability of ‘understanding’ is impaired, at the same 
time there can still be unimpaired abilities of ‘appreciation’, and ‘reasoning’. These ﬁndings 
give rise to the question of how can we explain that in patients with dementia a more 
complex decisional ability of ‘appreciation’ is less impaired than the basic decisional ability 
of ’understanding’? Before generating research questions to obtain more insight into this 
issue, the concept of competence will be brieﬂy introduced.
 
Ethical background
Since the nineteen seventies biomedical ethics has been profoundly inﬂuenced by four 
principles: the principle of respect for autonomy, the principle of non-maleﬁcence, the 
principle of beneﬁcence, and the principle of justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). Respect 
for autonomy refers to recognizing the other person’s capacities and perspective and 
treating the other in such a way as to allow or enable him or her to act according to his or 
her perspective (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). Beneﬁcence refers to prevent and remove 
evil or harm, and to promote or do good (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). In present day 
health care respect for autonomy means that patients are allowed to make their own 
decisions, free from the inﬂuence of others, as long as they promote their own well-being. 
When patients are inclined to make decisions which may harm their own well-being 
(according to health care standards or their family), a discussion may arise to determine 
the degree to which the patient is competent to make those decisions. Therefore, 
competence has been described as a hinge between the values of autonomy and 
beneﬁcence.
Attention has to be given to the issue of competence as a condition in the procedure 
of informed consent. Informed consent arose as a concept within the context of human 
experimentation after the Nuremberg trials (Appelbaum & Roth, 1982), although it had 
already been introduced in Germany in 1900 (Vollmann & Winau, 1996). It has become 
inﬂuential in health care research since the nineteen seventies and implies that physicians 
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are obliged to disclose certain information to enable the patient to decide whether to 
consent or to refuse participation in research. It is important that the patient can understand 
the information, is allowed to make the decision voluntarily, and is able to withdraw from 
the experiment whenever he/she wishes. The presumption is that patients are just as 
competent to consent to participate in research as they are to make treatment decisions. 
Although informed consent in research can be seen as a construct to protect people, it has 
now become a cornerstone concept in health care, expressing respect for the patient’s 
autonomy. 
 
Legal background in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands several laws protect patient rights: the Special Admissions to Psychiatric 
Hospitals Act (1992)1, the Contract of Medical Treatment Act (1994)2, the Organ Donation 
Act (1996)3, the Medical-Scientiﬁc Research on Human Subjects Act (1998)4, and the 
Euthanasia Act (2001)5 (Welie et al., 2005). The Contract of Medical Treatment Act (WGBO) 
and the Special Admissions to Psychiatric Hospitals Act (BOPZ) are the guiding principles 
in mental and psycho-geriatric health care.
The Contract of Medical Treatment Act (WGBO) provides a legal basis for the 
(voluntary) care of somatic patients, for the care of psychiatric patients, and also for the 
somatic care of involuntarily committed patients. The Act conceptualizes the relationship 
between the patient and the health care professional as a contract. It explicates the rights 
and duties connected with the informed consent doctrine. It states that 1) the health care 
professional is obliged to provide the necessary information to the patient, in order to 
guarantee that the patient has a choice, 2) the patient must make this choice voluntarily, 
free from any third party interest, and 3) the patient is assumed to be competent. The 
health care professional assesses whether or not the patient is competent and is responsible 
for the possible outcome. In some rare cases however, the competence is assessed in a 
legal procedure, in which all persons are assumed to be competent until evidence of the 
opposite is given and accepted in court. 
The Special Admissions to Psychiatric Hospitals Act (BOPZ) deals with the criterion of 
danger, and not competence. If the patient is deemed to be dangerous as a result of a 
psychiatric disease, the psychiatrist must obtain permission from a civil authority, such as a 
mayor, in order to detain the patient against his/her will. Treatment is justiﬁed if a competent 
patient consents, or in case of incompetent patients, if a representative consents. In case of 
resistance to treatment by the patient or representative, forced treatment is possible if the 
patient is considered to be dangerous or harmful to himself or to others, regardless of the 
patient’s competence or incompetence. 
There are no clear criteria for competence in the Dutch law. Competence in the 
WGBO is deﬁned as follows: a person is competent if he/she is considered to be able to 
make a reasonable judgement in the light of his/her own interests at hand. In 1994 a 
governmental committee, established by the Minister of Justice and the Secretary for Public 
Health, stated in guidelines for the assessment of competence that a person can be 
considered competent “if he/she shows understanding of the information which is attuned 
to his/her comprehension, to such an extent as is necessary in view of the nature and 
scope of the decision at hand” (Ministerie van Justitie, 1994). 
Deﬁnition and characteristics
So far we have discussed several aspects of competence. As mentioned earlier, competence 
is an ethical concept, in the sense that it acts as a hinge between the values of autonomy 
and beneﬁcence. Competence also is a presumption in the concept of informed consent, 
and it is a legal concept, in the sense that it represents a norm which authorizes persons to 
perform acts described by law. We have also explained that there is no clear deﬁnition 
available. However, during decades of discussion an attempt has been made to develop 
criteria to assess competence.  
The core meaning of the concept has been described as the ability to perform a speciﬁc 
task (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). In line with the etymological analysis of competence 
by Welie and Welie (2001), this presumes that the kind of task to be fulﬁlled is known, that 
it is known what it means to fulﬁl this task successfully, that the abilities needed to perform 
the task are known, and that it is known, that the person charged with the task has the 
required abilities. 
The task to be performed can be described as making health care decisions, i.c. decisions 
about medical treatment or research. It is important to note that, according to this 
deﬁnition, competence is not a characteristic of a person. Competence is limited to the 
ability to make a speciﬁc decision (President’s Commission, 1982; Berghmans, 2000). This 
means, in theory, that a person can be assessed as competent to make one decision, and at 
the same time be considered incompetent to make another decision. It also implies that 
incompetence does not have a one-to-one relationship with illness, such as dementia, 
schizophrenia, or depression. Furthermore, competence can ﬂuctuate in time: patients may 
be disturbed to a greater or lesser degree in their abilities to make decisions during certain 
periods, depending on the degree of severity of their illness. 
The second issue concerns what it means to fulﬁl a task successfully, given the 
circumstances (Welie & Welie, 2001). This refers ﬁrst of all to the criteria to assess whether 
or not a task has been performed well enough. Within the context of health care the 
assessment of competence has an ‘all or none’ character (Buchanan & Brock, 1989). In 
other words, competence is a ‘threshold concept’. This means that either a person is able 
to perform the task well enough and might be considered to be ‘competent’, or a person 
does not succeed in performing the task well enough and will be considered to be 
incompetent. Associated with the threshold in the concept of competence is the discussion 
about the sliding scale concept of competence. The sliding scale concept implies that the 
threshold of competence should be higher in decisions which involve the risk of more 
severe consequences for the person in question, in contrast to decisions in a situation in 
which a person runs less risk of severe consequences (Drane, 1985; Buchanan & Brock, 
1989; Wilks, 1997). Opponents of the sliding scale concept propose the use of a minimal 
threshold (Abernethy, 1984, 1991; Culver & Gert 1982, 1990; Wicclair, 1991; Buller, 2001). 
This implies that competence is being considered as an individual characteristic. A 
competency judgement is limited to the abilities of an individual, without considering the 
speciﬁc consequences of a speciﬁc treatment decision. Advantages of the minimal threshold 
above the sliding scale concept are: 1. the judgement of incompetence is independent of 
the judgement of respecting one’s choice (no conﬂation); and 2. the competency judgement 
1  Wet Bijzonder Opnemingen in Psychiatrische Ziekenhuizen (BOPZ); Wet van 29 oktober 1992, Stb. 1992, 669. 
2  Wet op de Geneeskundige Behandelings Overeenkomst (WGBO); Wet van 17 november 1994, Stb. 1994, 
837 jº 838. It takes up the articles 446-468 of book 7BW.
3  Wet op Orgaandonatie; Wet van 24 mei 1996, Stb. 1996, 370.
4  Wet Medisch-wetenschappelijk Onderzoek met mensen (WMO); Wet van 26 februari 1998, Stb. 1998, 161.
5  Wet Toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding; Wet van 12 april 2001, Stb. 2001, 194.
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is not asymmetrical. However, the sliding scale concept has the important advantage that 
persons are not being judged incompetent with respect to all decisions they may want to 
make. Being judged incompetent within the concept of the sliding scale means that the 
incompetency judgement is limited to a speciﬁc situation, providing that someone’s 
autonomy is maximalized (Berghmans, 2000).  
With regard to the abilities to perform the task well enough, many standards have been 
proposed. The fact that different terms like ‘standards’, ‘capacities’ and ‘abilities’ are used 
illustrates that the evaluative and descriptive aspects of the concept of competence overlap. 
The most inﬂuential standards have been developed by analysing jurisdiction on competence 
in the United States, which results in legal standards. Arguments used in legal judgements 
of competence have been transformed into standards of competence (compare Appelbaum 
& Roth, 1982; Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988; Roth, et al., 1977). Consensus has been reached 
with regard to the following legal standards: the ability to understand, the ability to express 
a choice, the ability to manipulate information rationally, and the ability to appreciate the 
situation (Appelbaum & Roth, 1982; Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988; Roth et al. 1977).  The 
standards represent a hierarchy of different levels of assessing competence. Depending on 
the risk/beneﬁt ratio of the situation and the acceptance or refusal of treatment, one single 
standard is chosen to assess competence (Roth et al., 1977). For example, when a decision 
does not have serious consequences for a person, a standard for expressing a choice or 
understanding is chosen. However, when a decision has serious consequences a person 
should be able to reason or to appreciate the situation in order to prove their competence. 
In the United States this development resulted in the above-mentioned sliding scale concept 
of competence. 
With the development of instruments to assess competence, the combination of the 
different standards have started to lead their own life as an entirety of decision-making 
capacity, and not merely as legal standards. The standards were used to indicate decisional 
abilities, and instead of applying one standard depending on the situation, all abilities 
together formed one psychological construct of decision-making capacity (Appelbaum & 
Roth, 1982). By applying the psychological construct of decision-making capacity to a person, 
it is possible to assess whether the person charged with the task has the required abilities.
Relevance of competence of patients with cognitive decline or dementia
The prevalence of dementia in the Netherlands is 6.3% of persons 65 years of age and over, 
with a profound inﬂuence of age: the prevalence is almost 1% in persons aged 65, whereas 
it is 40% in persons over 85 years of age (Health Council of the Netherlands, 2002). In the 
Netherlands the absolute numbers of people with dementia are estimated to be 175,000 in 
2002 and 207,000 in 2010 (Health Council of the Netherlands, 2002). It is also estimated 
that approximately 60,000 of the demented patients are institutionalized, half of them 
residing in homes for the elderly, and the rest in nursing homes (Health Council of the 
Netherlands, 2002). It may be assumed that nursing homes patients with dementia and 
their professional care-givers are often confronted with issues of competence concerning 
decisions about daily medical care. Recent evaluations of the Dutch health care law, in 
particular the WGBO, show that the autonomy of institutionalized elderly people seems to 
be compromised. In many situations, the patient’s representatives are involved in health 
care decision-making, without taking the patient’s opinion into consideration, or at least 
having made an assessment of the patient’s competence (Hertogh, 2004). 
In addition to questions concerning the competence of patients with cognitive decline 
and dementia to make treatment decisions, the question of competence also comes up in 
discussions on informed consent for the treatment of patients with psychiatric illnesses 
(Grisso et al., 1997; Lapid et al., 2003), patients with a chronic physical illness (Dekkers, 
2001) or mentally disabled persons (Biesaart & Hubben, 1997; Cea & Fisher, 2003), and 
discussions on informed consent to participate in medical research (Carpenter et al., 2000; 
Kim et al., 2001), the legal status of the living will (Grifﬁths, 2002; Fazel et al., 1999), and 
euthanasia requests from patients with dementia (Berghmans, 1999). The latter questions 
are beyond the scope of this thesis, which concentrates only on competence with regard 
to health care decisions made by elderly persons with and without cognitive decline and 
dementia. Nonetheless, these questions demonstrate a high societal interest in the concept 
of competence.
Summary and conclusion
In current literature, competence is conceptualized as decision-making capacity. Decision-
making capacity primarily refers to cognitive abilities, and, as such, does not make explicit 
that competence can also be a normative statement about a person.  It has been proposed 
that decision-making capacity should be distinguished from competence (Kim et al., 2001). 
Decision-making capacity should be reserved to determine the cognitive abilities of the 
patient, as assessed by the physician. Competence should be restricted to the legal context 
in which a normative statement is made about a person. In the following of this thesis 
decision-making capacity will be used to refer to the cognitive abilities of a patient. 
Competence will be used to refer to a normative judgement, which incorporates the 
decisional capacities as well as the speciﬁc content and consequences of a treatment 
choice. 
Patients with AD show a great variation in their levels of decision-making capacity. 
Some AD patients remain their decisional abilities, and others are impaired with a rather 
low standard of ‘understanding’, but have adequate decisional abilities on the higher 
standard of ‘appreciation’. How can we explain this confusion? One explanation might be 
that differences in context (or circumstances) result in different levels of decision-making 
capacity. For example, differences in familiarity with treatment situations, in emotional 
factors, and in the levels of disability result in different levels of decision-making capacity. 
Apart from possible explanations however, such differences have to be taken into 
consideration when a physician assesses the competence of a patient. Clinical experience 
shows that demented patients may still have the ability to make decisions about their lives, 
even though they no longer avail of all the abilities that are summed up in the standards 
derived from the legal context. In such cases demented patients can no longer be considered 
as rational decision-making citizens, but it could be assumed that they have a moral capacity 
to make decisions which should be respected by care-givers. 
In the following chapter we will discuss this issue of moral capacity. The philosophical 
considerations will result in an empirical framework, on the basis of which the aim of the 
thesis will be described. The (research) questions that will be answered in this thesis, the 
outline of the thesis and the methods will be described subsequently.
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Knowing Well or Living Well: 
a Philosophical Introduction and 
Empirical Considerations
This chapter is a modiﬁed version of a paper that has been published as: 
Van Leeuwen, E., & Vellinga, A. (2004). Knowing well or living well: is competence relevant 
to moral experience and capacity in clinical decision-making? In: Thomasma, D.C. & Weisstub, 
D.N. (eds.). The variables of moral capacity. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/
London, 187-202. 
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Knowing well or living well: a philosophical introduction and an empirical framework.
In many western cultures, the law now requires that competent patients are allowed to make their 
own decisions in health-care. Incompetent patients need special protection and care, especially 
with regard to participation in medical research. In dealing with cognitively impaired, demented 
patients, however, clinical experience shows that these patients still can have the moral capacity to 
make decisions about their lives, at least within certain boundaries. These cases show that the 
concept of competence is based on socially accepted rules, variable among themselves in different 
situations. The physician has to balance the legal regulations with the moral interests of the patient. 
In this chapter the concepts of competence and moral capacity are discussed from a philosophical 
and an empirical point of view. 
Generating philosophical hypotheses
Moral capacity and competence: overlapping human qualities? 
Authors who write about competence acknowledge that it is impossible to give a clear 
deﬁnition of competence. Like Beauchamp and Childress, they admit that the individual 
perspectives of medicine, psychiatry, law, psychology, and philosophy have given the concept 
‘accumulated layers of meaning connected in diverse ways, but with different purposes and 
protective functions behind the various ideas’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 133). However, 
this acknowledgement is frequently followed by some kind of general description, which is 
used as an instrumental deﬁnition serving the purpose of the argument. Beauchamp and 
Childress, for instance, conﬁne themselves to what they see as the ‘core meaning of 
competence’: ‘the ability to perform a task’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 134). Chell takes 
another perspective by stating: ‘Competency is essentially the ability to make a decision’ 
(Chell, 1998). Both descriptions of meaning or essence omit the normative component that 
is essential in the assessment of competency in medicine and psychiatry. Beauchamp and 
Childress do so in order to restrict the normative component to the criteria of autonomy. 
In their view, ‘Law, medicine, and to some extent philosophy presume a context in which 
the characteristics of the competent person are also the properties possessed by the 
autonomous person’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 135). This presumption seems some-
what odd if we remember that the concept of competence has a much longer history than 
that of autonomy in law, medicine, and psychiatry. Apparently, Beauchamp and Childress 
argue in this way because they want autonomy to precede competence. This becomes clear 
when we look at the hypotheses they postulate, namely that an autonomous person is 
(necessarily) a competent person and that judgements of whether or not a person is 
competent should be based on whether or not the person is autonomous (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 1994: 135). The second hypothesis puts the cart before the horse, and directly 
makes the ﬁrst hypothesis questionable. Later, Beauchamp and Childress even rebut both 
hypotheses by saying: ‘Furthermore, for any person whose competency is in question, it 
seems disrespectful of autonomy to say….’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 141). By using 
this phrase they acknowledge that the normative component of the concept of competence 
does not necessarily coincide with the normative component of the notion of autonomy. 
Appelbaum therefore rephrases a standard of competence that is also inextricably tied to 
the ‘ideal of self-determination in modern Western societies,’ but is drawn from a century long 
tradition of case law and statutory law in the Anglo-American World (Appelbaum, 1998). 
What is startling is the way in which these authors deal with the normative component 
of the concept of competence and the ease they have in using dogmatic reasoning. The 
normative standard is either connected to an ideal, the autonomous person, or to a legal 
tradition of jurisprudence. The outcome of their reasoning does not differ essentially. 
Beauchamp and Childress deﬁne competence in a patient to make a decision ‘if he or she 
has the capacity to understand the material information, to make a judgement about the 
information in the light of his or her values, to intend a certain outcome, and to freely 
communicate his or her wish to caregivers or investigators’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 
135). Appelbaum considers that the components of a standard of competence should be 
the following abilities: to express personal choice, to understand relevant information, to 
appreciate the signiﬁcance of that information for the personal situation, and to reason 
with the relevant information so as to engage in a logical process of weighing options 
(Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988). The common outcome, regardless of the difference in the use 
of ethical or legal dogmatism, reveals what is at stake: the competent person has to be the 
citizen as presumed in the various theories of democracy and law in Western societies. 
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That citizen is considered to be a rational, decision-making individual who can be held 
responsible for his or her actions. The normative standard of competence expresses, 
furthermore, that probably not every human being within those societies will meet this 
standard, and those who do not are considered to be incompetent. They do not possess 
the essential abilities to be accepted as a citizen. Because of the dogmatic insertion of a 
connection with moral responsibility, they cannot be held morally responsible for their 
actions or choices.
All this may sound quite familiar and not at all surprising. However, in order to see what 
is below the self-evident surface, we have to ask ourselves what lies behind the dogmatic 
connection of the concept of citizenship and moral responsibility in legal and ethical 
discourse. In legal discourse the history of the meaning of competence is tied up with 
meanings of authority, qualiﬁcation, discretion, license, jurisdiction, and so on. The roots of 
these ties go back to the protection of property, the authenticity of a will, the legal validity 
of a contract, the permission to get married, and so on. Such judgements of competence 
are social and legal decisions. They are normative in the sense of being speech-acts: they 
construct a social reality. So, whenever an adolescent reaches a certain age, sixteen or 
eighteen, he or she reaches the age of competent adulthood. Not because he/she has 
become an autonomous person or even a reasonable person – he/she might have been that 
for a long time or may never be so – but only because he/she has reached an age which is 
equal to the age of social maturity. At that age, one is accepted as a citizen and henceforth 
allowed to enter into contractual relationships, and so on. The determination of the speciﬁc 
age depends on historical and political contingencies of what is called social maturity. 
Furthermore, it is not unqualiﬁed. Being a competent person does not, for instance, imply 
that someone can drive a car: one needs a special license to do so. To call somebody legally 
competent is therefore a spoken act with a highly institutional character: it is a formal 
social act, resembling a ‘rite de passage’, giving permission to participate in social activities 
laid down by law. 
Like every legal norm, the standard of competence also excludes people from social 
participation. The criteria for exclusion have to be based on factual evidence showing why 
someone is not able to participate in normal social activities and communications. Within 
legal discourse the exclusion will necessarily be based upon reasonable arguments derived 
from jurisprudence and statutory regulations. In the older days in Europe, for instance, such 
a criterion was established by the duty to pay tax, thereby excluding women, workers and 
wanderers. Nowadays we can ﬁnd a similar criterion to exclude refugees, asylum seekers 
and ‘guest-labourers’. We are only able to discover the historical and cultural settings of the 
criteria by examining who is excluded. 
Exclusions based on racism, sexism, or sexual conduct have been prominent in most of 
the legal histories of Western countries corresponding with various religious and moral 
beliefs. The history of legal medicine and psychiatry is no exception in this respect, as 
Foucault and others have shown. In other words, the material conditions of competence 
and incompetence depend on the speciﬁc morality of a society. In the present Western 
societies this morality focuses mainly on cognitive and mental capacities, reﬂected in 
reasonable interests, choice-making, and rational deliberation. This focus postulates that 
someone who is rational will act accordingly, and that his actions will thereby result in what 
is morally and socially good. Although this focus may have a long history in philosophy and 
ethics, it is certainly not without problems or dispute.
An important origin of the focus upon reason when discussing what is morally good 
can be found in Plato’s dialogues. In Protagoras and Gorgias we ﬁnd Socrates arguing that 
someone who does not make a mistake always has good intentions (Protagoras 345d-e), or 
that everybody always acts for the good (Gorgias, 467b). Rationality and reasonableness 
are similar in the quest for the good, while those who seek evil are either ignorant or 
insane, incompetent as we would say. This philosophical belief in a rational good man and 
a rational good society has, of course, not been without dispute. Even for Socrates, and 
for later philosophers, the dispute has been about the possibility of akrasia, or ‘weakness 
of the will’ (Peijnenburg, 1996). Perhaps St. Augustine formulated the human problem 
behind this weakness in the most pregnant terms. Speaking of his youth, he quotes himself: 
‘Give me chastity and continency, but do not give it yet’ (Confessions VIII, vii). Weakness 
of the will means that someone knows what is best at the ﬁrst, second and other levels 
of rational deliberation, but decides not to act accordingly, mainly because of other motives. 
Most people are familiar with this phenomenon of akrasia, and democratic freedom even 
allows us to yield to it in smoking, drinking, and other daily activities, as long as we do not 
harm others.
Still, the acceptance of the phenomenon does not force us to give up the idea that the 
pursuit of good is only made possible by accepting what is socially recognized as rational or 
reasonable. We almost have to stay with our ideas that this rationality alone makes us 
morally responsible beings, because otherwise we are at a loss in our social thinking as well 
as in our morality. Consequently, we have to accept the resulting paradoxes. For instance, a 
drunk driver who has been in an accident is considered to be legally and morally responsible 
for his actions, although we know that a crucial feature of being drunk lies in the fact that 
the person is no longer mentally capable of making rational decisions. Moral responsibility 
is then connected with the state of soberness that presumably preceded that of intoxication. 
This implies that we separate moral responsibility and competence. Being drunk implies a 
state of incompetence, but it does not relieve us from our moral responsibilities. The 
problem of akrasia thus tells us clearly from the time of Socrates to the present, that being 
mentally competent does not imply that our behaviour is morally responsible, yet moral 
responsibility can be maintained in situations of temporary incompetence.
While akrasia can make competent people act willingly in irresponsible ways, we also 
have to acknowledge that human beings who are considered to be incompetent can still act 
morally responsibly. We know that children can retain high morals in situations of stress, 
even when they themselves know that they are not competent to judge the situation 
(Kohlberg, 1984; Colby et al., 1987). The fact that some Western countries, like the USA and 
the UK, have recently put children on trial in special cases, proves that we expect them to 
be able to act according to moral standards. We also know that mentally handicapped 
human beings who are suffering, for instance from Down’s syndrome, are capable of making 
moral decisions about their future way of life. In other words: ‘In practice, judgements of 
competency go beyond semantics or straightforward applications of legal rules; such 
judgements reﬂect social considerations and social biases as much as they reﬂect matters 
of law and medicine’ (Roth et al., 1977). 
From these examples – and the list can be extended to patients in psychiatric wards, 
geriatric clinics, and so on – it becomes clear that by assessing competence we are making 
a normative distinction between two groups of people: the competent and the incompetent. 
Both groups may act morally responsibly or may, at some moment in time, fail to do so. Of 
course, we could continue by stating that competence therefore ought to be seen as a 
threshold (Buchanan & Brock, 1989: 18-20, Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 136), but then we 
also have to admit that the distinction signiﬁes a social norm by which we try to protect 
our ideal of good citizenship. Furthermore, restriction of the concept of competence to 
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cognitive and mental capacities tells us that we try to keep up a social norm of rational 
behaviour. The fact that this norm is connected to the concept of moral responsibility has, 
as such, nothing to do with the discriminating power of the norm, but mostly with the 
historical ideal that a good citizen is rational and will intentionally act with good intentions. 
We therefore postulate that competence and moral responsibility are overlapping human 
qualities; while the extent of the overlap depends upon the structure of a society and of 
social judgement.
Turning from a general analysis toward the speciﬁc area of treating the demented 
elderly, the social connection of cognitive functioning and moral responsibility strikes us as 
a paradox. Between care-giver and care-receiver a moral bond of respect for dignity and 
individual life-story is expected, while simultaneously the situation of cognitive impairment 
refutes this bond, replacing it by instrumental reasoning of what is considered by institutional 
practices to be the best. The result of this paradox is often that we treat demented persons 
as ‘would be’ persons, as if their mind is set for a long and perhaps ﬁnal vacation. We talk 
with them as if they are morally responsible, but disregard what they say. If we accept the 
mutual implication of competence and autonomy, as Beauchamp and Childress suggest, 
then the only way out of this problem is to establish a practice of advanced directives. But, 
if we consider moral responsibility as only partly overlapping with cognitive competence, it 
becomes possible to discuss ways in which the features of cognitive impairment can be 
dealt with by care-givers and signiﬁcant others. In order to demonstrate this possibility we 
postulate some elements derived from phenomenological thinking, especially the work of 
Alfred Schutz (Schutz & Luchman, 1974). 
Following the later work of Husserl, Schutz has argued that each individual is uniquely 
structured by social norms, including morality in daily life. The uniqueness follows from the 
speciﬁc events that occur in the life world. The encounter with real life in the process of 
coping with the social norms and structures thus accounts for differences, even between 
identical twins. Within the life world we act and think in complex ways, combining memories, 
paradigmatic events, stories, emotions, and reﬂected experience. Part of our life we engage 
ourselves in institutional practices that are governed by rational thinking. As such, the 
problem of akrasia rises when we decide not to follow the rational directions of these 
institutions, but when we try to realize the hopes, ideals, or even illusions originating in the 
history of our lives, including that of parents, friends and beloved ones. 
Apart from akrasia, other factors also play a role. Processes of remembering and 
forgetting, virtues and character also belong to what we usually call ‘our self ’, as it depends 
upon what we are and how we came to be. In matters of morality, the distinction that is 
made between our personal life world and institutional thinking has a clear signiﬁcance. 
When asked by a social institution, be it law or medicine, we have to recapitulate the pre-
reﬂective complex morality that accompanies our acts. We rationalize according to the 
speciﬁc standards of our society in order to state speciﬁc facts, and by doing so we 
transgress the world of our personal beliefs and hopes and put them into reasons that are 
acceptable in public, institutional life. Moral capacity covers this ongoing process, resulting 
in a moral responsibility that is connected with the history of our selves.
In the case of cognitive impairment, the balance changes between public rational 
accountability and pre-reﬂective morality. The processes involved are still not exactly clear, 
but at least the ability to account for one’s actions in rational or reasonable terms 
diminishes. Patients suffering from mild dementia are still able to make judgements of their 
own situations, which can be morally valuable, although they do not ﬁt into the schemes of 
rational deliberation. If patients are still able to discuss relevant features of their lives, to 
tell parts of the history, to experience some form of self-awareness, and to enjoy meaningful 
relationships, we might postulate that they also have a sense of moral deliberation and 
responsibility, although they can be incompetent to participate in public life. In other words, 
someone who is unable to buy a ticket from a computerized machine or to ﬁnd the way in 
the underground could still be morally responsible in discussions concerning family matters 
or possible treatments for somatic illness. On the other hand, someone who is still able to 
rationalize in public matters, may no longer be able to cope with the symptoms of a disease, 
repressing them in utter despair. 
In order to sort these issues out, we need to carry out empirical research to ﬁnd out if 
and how the rationalized medical account of disease and treatment is understood by the 
demented person and what role concepts such as meaning of life, self-awareness and 
meaningful relationships play in their world. In the following section we will translate these 
philosophical hypotheses into empirical considerations, which form the framework on 
which this thesis is based.
From philosophical hypotheses to empirical considerations
Based on the above considerations, we will search for a method that may empirically clarify 
the possible distinctions between moral capacity and competence. We have chosen to 
consider medical treatment. Do competent patients signiﬁcantly differ in their deliberations 
from patients suffering from cognitive impairment when they have to decide to undergo an 
operation or an internal examination? If there are differences, do we ascribe them to 
differences in cognitive skills or to other factors, such as anxiety, depression, or the experienced 
meaning of life? These research questions will be addressed in an empirical study.
Competence and decision-making capacity
Several scales have been developed to assess decision-making capacity (Grisso & Appelbaum, 
1991; Janofsky et al., 1992; Martin & Glancy, 1994; Grisso et al., 1997; Kitamura et al., 1998). 
Most of these scales are based on legal standards: the ability to evidence a choice, the 
ability to understand, the ability to manipulate information rationally, and the ability to 
appreciate a situation. Not one of these methods is completely satisfying, because they all 
seem to reveal only a few aspects of the concept of competency or decision-making 
capacity. Yet, there are also researchers who have recommended a strictly individual 
assessment, mainly based on extensive psychiatric screening (Haekens, 1998). Because most 
assessment instruments are based on the legal standards, and presuppose that the relevant 
medical information has already been given to the patient, we have chosen one of these 
methods: the vignette method. 
The clinical vignette has been used in various studies (Stanley et al, 1988; Sachs et al, 1994; 
Marson et al, 1995; Fazel et al., 1999). A vignette is a short story about a clinical (hypothetical) 
choice. The advantages and disadvantages of the choice are explained. The vignette is read 
aloud and is followed by some questions assessing the following abilities: evidencing a 
choice, understanding, reasoning, and appreciation of the situation. Although these questions 
also reﬂect the earlier mentioned legal standards, these abilities are not considered to be 
hierarchical, and are augmented with a question about the reason why the participant 
makes a certain choice. In other words, extra attention is paid to appreciation, which will also 
be reﬂected in the scoring of the vignette. Not only cognitively ‘good’ reasons or reasons 
mentioned in the vignette will be valued, but also (emotional) reasons in line with personal 
values. To avoid the possible danger that the vignette becomes strictly a memory test, the 
participants are allowed to obtain information from the vignette during questioning.
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Since there has been much discussion about whether or not competence should be a 
sliding scale concept (Abernethy, 1984; Drane, 1985; see also page 13), we developed two 
different vignettes. The ﬁrst vignette concerns a low-risk choice which we deﬁned as 
performing gastroscopy or coloscopy in cases of anemia or fecal blood loss. The second 
vignette concerns a high-risk situation – a choice with life-threatening consequences – 
deﬁned as whether or not to undergo surgery for colon carcinoma.
Vignettes in previous studies have always been presented as a hypothetical choice.6 
However, it can be argued that people respond differently to medical decision-making in 
real situations. In a real situation, the choice described in the vignette has really to be made, 
but in a hypothetical situation the participant is not suffering from the medical problem 
described in the vignette, so the choice is hypothetical. By distinguishing these aspects it is 
possible to compare the different external inﬂuences on decision-making capacity caused 
by the different circumstances. 
 
Cognition and emotion
For a long time now the discussion on competence has been dominated by the inﬂuence of 
cognition and depression on decision-making capacity. However, during recent decades 
there has been widespread recognition that although mental illness does not invariably lead 
to decision-making incapacity, nevertheless a minimal level of rationality is required.
There have been some studies that have related certain aspects of cognition to level of 
decision-making capacity, as deﬁned by the legal standards. Features that have been reported 
to correlate with loss of decision-making capacity are: word ﬂuency, conceptualization, 
semantic memory, verbal recall, receptive aphasia and severe dysnomia (Marson et al, 1995; 
Marson et al, 1996). Although these cognitive functions are presumed to have a negative 
inﬂuence on decision-making capacity, it is not our aim to focus on the relationship between 
decision-making capacity and speciﬁc loss of cognitive functions. We do assume a certain 
relationship between cognition, decision-making capacity and moral capacity, but other 
factors might be equally relevant.
Several authors have acknowledged that too much attention has been paid to cognitive 
aspects in the assessment of decision-making capacity. Decisions are not taken in an 
emotional vacuum (Appelbaum et al., 1981; Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988). Although the role 
of emotion or mood is acknowledged, the discussion usually concludes that, like declining 
cognition, emotion can only have a negative inﬂuence on competence or decision-making 
capacity. Consequently, depression is assumed to have a negative inﬂuence on competence 
(Haekens, 1998). Because of the assumed role of mood in decision-making capacity, this 
factor will also be measured in our research. The same assumptions have been made for 
the role of anxiety, which will be also taken into account. A positive role of emotion has 
only recently been mentioned by Charland (Charland, 1998; Charland, 1999). Emotion is 
approached by him ‘cognitively’, in accordance with the current emotion theories. In this 
approach, emotions become an essential ingredient of mental competence, when considering 
emotions as recognizable reasons and emotions as a basic for values and goals. This last 
assumption is further outlined in the next section. 
Meaning of life
In the wake of the statements issued by of the President’s Commission, several authors 
have stressed the important role of a consistent pattern of goals and values in a competent 
person. These sets of values or ‘conception of the good’ (Buchanan & Brock, 1989) have 
only been described theoretically. The conviction of the importance of possessing a certain 
set of values has recently been supported by psychological theories on cognitive emotions. 
In these theories, emotions are assumed to form the basis of values and preferences. 
Emotions possess a conceptual evaluative dimension and involve appraisal. By the process 
of appraisal people are able to give personal meaning and signiﬁcance to events and 
situations, and through this process they deﬁne and shape many of their goals and values, 
evaluating new situations, weighing up alternatives, and eventually making choices (Charland, 
1999). Appraisal in this sense is to be distinguished from appreciation as one of the 
decisional abilities. Appreciation is deﬁned as the ability to apply certain information to 
one’s own situation (Grisso et al., 1997). In addition to acknowledging the role of emotions 
in appreciation, it can also be postulated that emotions inﬂuence, for example, understanding 
of and reasoning about a particular situation. As emotions reveal the signiﬁcance of events 
and situations to a person, they can also be presumed to play a role in the selection of 
information (Damasio, 1994). A recent empirical ﬁnding may support this thesis. In a study 
carried out by Cicirelli it became clear that elderly people do not make medical decisions 
by considering all the advantages and disadvantages of every new situation, but rather 
based on some sort of pattern of decision-making (Cicirelli, 1997). Here it can be presumed 
that some set or pattern of values has more importance in (medical) decision-making, than 
(a strictly cognitive) evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages. 
Thus, there are several reasons to incorporate the concept of a set of moral and 
emotional values. One important reason is that the set of values may account for pre-
reﬂexive personal meanings and values. In this way the (medical) decision-making capacity 
can probably be broadened to include moral capacity.
In the vignettes the question about why a certain choice has been made has been added 
to the questions concerning appreciation, in order to evaluate the personal meaning of the 
situation (described in the vignette) for the participant. Further on, apart from the vignette, 
we have operationalized the concept of a consistent set of goals and values as the concept 
of meaning of life. Meaning of life is deﬁned as a set of more or less consistent values or 
convictions that an individual adheres to in thoughts and behaviour. In other words, a 
consistent set of values and goals in life can be translated as the content of the particular 
meaning of life of an individual. Literature on the concept of meaning of life and instruments 
developed to assess this concept can be found in psychology and psychopathology. In this 
study it seems reasonable to assess features of the concept of meaning of life, such as the 
level of the individually experienced set of values, or some general sense of meaning in life. 
Further on, attention will be paid to the content of this feeling. Two features, that are 
presumed to constitute a part of the meaning of life, will be considered in more detail: 
religion and attitude toward death. 
Health, personality traits and social support
Other possible determinants in decision-making capacity include information about the health, 
some personality traits and the social support the participants experienced. These aspects can 
be assumed to inﬂuence the personal meaning and signiﬁcance attached to certain situations. 
With regard to personality traits, in order to restrict the burden of the interview for the 
participants, we selected only those traits that most obviously play a role in decision-making. 
6  See for a more thorough analysis of this problem Chapter 5, which gives an overview of different 
instruments to assess decision-making capacity.
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Although there was a considerable amount of multi-pathology within our study 
population, we registered both objective and subjective health, to make it possible to 
compare the different groups. We assumed that subjective health would probably inﬂuence 
medical decision-making capacity. 
Empirical research on the application of the concept of informed consent revealed 
several times that information given to somatic patients is not well understood and cannot 
be well remembered. It can be assumed that people either cannot understand medical 
information or that people have some kind of apathy for this kind of information. If this is so, 
it may be that individuals with a greater sense of competence or internal locus of control are 
more motivated and less apathetic to medical information and medical decision-making. 
Therefore, they may seem to be more competent in medical decision-making. The concept of 
mastery is also mentioned in the discussion about the competence of children. Developmental 
psychologists relate sense of internal locus of control to ‘attentiveness to the decision’. 
Young children, who possess a more external locus of control, develop with age a more 
internal locus of control in their perception of the world. It is argued that children can only 
be competent once they have achieved an internal locus of control (Buchanan & Brock, 
1989). Furthermore, both competence and locus of control are known to be inﬂuenced by 
somatic diseases and cognitive decline. As we also encountered these features, we hoped to 
obtain a broad understanding of the role they play in decision-making processes.
Finally, as is generally known, social support has signiﬁcant associations with perceived 
well-being, anxiety, depression, etc. In this research the main focus will be on the perceived 
support and the satisfaction with this support. Perceived support can probably also be 
regarded as a motivational factor in medical decision-making.
The family
The literature does not give many clues for answers to the question with regard to the 
values a family attaches to decision-making and moral capacity. There are two central 
themes in the role of the family in decision-making situations. The ﬁrst theme concerns the 
ethical discussion about who should decide and what should be decided for a patient who 
is considered to be incompetent. The differences between substituted judgement and best 
interest are outlined (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Elliott & Elliott, 1991; Martyn, 1994). The 
second theme is investigated in an empirical approach to determine how families decide 
for an incompetent patient (Muncie et al, 1997; Zweibel & Cassel, 1989). The main conclusion 
that can be drawn from these investigations is that proxies make decisions that may by 
chance be related to the wishes of the patient. In other words, although the substituted 
choice is preferred, in reality little more can be achieved than a best interest decision. In 
line with these empirical ﬁndings are some research data which reveal that proxies have 
even more protective standards for their decision about the patient than they have for 
themselves and, above all, that they consider a patient to be incompetent earlier than 
professionals do (Biesaart & Hubben, 1997). The norms and values of proxies in their 
assessment of the decision-making capacity of a patient have not yet been described. In this 
research, interviews will be conducted with the family to investigate their opinions about 
the abilities of the patient, informed consent, the moral responsibilities of the physician, and 
their own moral responsibilities concerning the medical decisions made by and for the patient.
Physicians
The literature reveals that the assessments of competence made by physicians are 
inconsistent, and that they are most inconsistent in their assessment of patients with mild 
and moderate dementia (Marson et al., 1997). Moreover, their experience does not seem to 
approve their ability to assess competence (Naglie et al., 1993). Just like the family, the 
physician can also only make chance decisions about the presumed preferences of the 
patient and the actual preferences of the patient (Schneiderman et al., 1997). Despite these 
empirical ﬁndings, very little attention has been paid to the values according to which 
physicians assess competence, and it is not known how they formulate their responsibility 
with regard to decisional situations and incompetent patients. To explore these issues, 
physicians will also be interviewed. 
Conclusion
We generated hypotheses in a philosophical approach to the concept of competence. The 
discussion about competence in Western societies is profoundly inﬂuenced by various 
democratic and legal theories regarding citizenship. Competent persons are considered to 
be citizens with the capacity to make decisions and bear responsibility. The underlying 
morality postulates that someone who is able to think rationally will act accordingly, and 
that his or her actions will thereby be what is deemed to be morally or socially good. Still, 
the problem of akrasia, or weakness of will, shows that mental competence does not 
guarantee that a person will always act in a morally responsible and rational way. 
On the other hand, we also argued that people who are considered to be incompetent 
can still act morally responsibly. Therefore, from the moral point of view, the distinction 
between competence and incompetence reﬂects not so much a state of being, as a social 
norm according to which behaviour can be judged, but by relating competence to cognitive 
capacities, this social norm becomes a norm that focuses primarily on rational behaviour. 
We therefore postulated that competence and moral responsibility are overlapping human 
qualities, while the extent of overlap depends on the societal structure and social judgement. 
Within the context of mental and psycho-geriatric health-care it must then be clariﬁed 
how cognitive impairment can affect competence, and furthermore to what extent moral 
responsibility can still be maintained. This need for clariﬁcation is evident in clinical practice, 
where demented elderly can sometimes act as morally responsible patients, while at the 
same time institutional practice forces us to consider them as incompetent patients. 
By considering the possibility that moral responsibility partly overlaps with cognitive 
competence, it becomes necessary to reconsider theories of competence in the light of 
ability to act morally. Moral capacity can be deﬁned as the capacity to make decisions based 
on an ongoing process to transgress the world of our personal history and beliefs into the 
moral standards of public institutional life. 
We considered elements which may be connected to moral capacity. Elements 
hypothesized to be connected to the concept of moral capacity are: cognition and emotion, 
the meaning of life, health status, personality traits and social support, and the role of the 
family and physician. To link our hypotheses with existing scientiﬁc research we chose to 
reﬁne a method used to assess decision-making capacity (the vignette method). In 
combination with the earlier described elements, we hope to develop further discussion 
about the issues of competence, decision-making capacity and moral capacity. 
We conclude with the deﬁnitions of the various concepts mentioned in this chapter 
and the way they will be used in this thesis. Moral capacity can be deﬁned as the capacity to 
make decisions based on an ongoing process to transgress the world of our personal 
history and beliefs into the moral standards of public institutional life. A more speciﬁc 
deﬁnition cannot be given as this concept is in development, and therefore also dependent 
on our ﬁndings. Competence will be used to refer to a normative judgement, which 
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incorporates the decisional capacities as well as the speciﬁc content and consequences of 
a treatment choice. Decision-making capacity will be used to refer to the cognitive abilities 
of a patient. 
Aim and Outline
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Aim and Outline
In developing philosophical thinking about competence and moral capacity, we argued that 
the concept of competence mainly plays a role at the level of institutional and legal thinking. 
Moral capacity, however, has a broader signiﬁcance. It encompasses the way in which we 
structure ourselves during our life history, coping with institutional rules and norms. By 
investigating various aspects of this moral capacity in relation to decision-making capacity 
in medical situations, we hope to identify some of the basic elements of moral capacity. 
However, the ﬁrst step is to examine the inﬂuence on decision-making capacity of factors 
that might contribute to moral capacity in elderly patients with cognitive problems. At the 
same time, in doing so we hope to develop a more reﬁned method to assess decision-
making capacity in elderly subjects. Because the empirical framework we sketched is too 
extensive to be tested in one thesis, we started modestly, using only the factors described 
in this chapter. 
In this thesis the main emphasis is on the vignette method, which is a method to assess 
decision-making capacity. In empirical research the crucial point of discussion is the 
operationalization of the concepts that are being studied. In developing further thinking 
about competence and decision-making capacity, we wanted to investigate the inﬂuence of 
different circumstances in the assessment of decision-making capacity with the vignette 
method. Further, we focused on the inﬂuence of cognition as the most distinctive 
characteristic of patients with and without cognitive decline or dementia. These analyses 
are essential before investigating issues such as personality factors, social support and 
meaning of life, which have not been addressed in this thesis. Finally, we focused on the 
relationship between the assessment with the vignette method and competence judged by 
family members and physicians. These points of attention lead to the following outline of 
this thesis.
Chapter 4 describes the design and methods of the research, guided by the empirical 
framework mentioned in Chapter 2. Apart from a description of the study sample and the 
different questionnaires that we have used, the main focus is on the vignette, a method to 
assess decision-making capacity. By using this method to assess decision-making capacity 
under different test circumstances we have tried to reﬁne philosophical thinking about 
competence, decision-making capacity and moral capacity.
Chapter 5 presents a review of the literature on methods to assess decision-making 
capacity. Various instruments have been developed in the ﬁeld of psychiatry and psycho-
geriatrics, and in this overview we analyse the characteristics of these instruments and 
investigate the differences between the instruments developed in these two ﬁelds. The 
conclusions reﬂect the validity of methods to assess decision-making capacity, and form a 
basis for the following empirical chapters.
In Chapters 6 and 7 we analyse the inﬂuence of the treatment choice on the decision-
making capacity. The central question is: is the assessment of decision-making capacity 
affected by the content of treatment choice? In Chapter 6 two vignettes with a different 
content were tested in two groups of comparable elderly patients (with and without 
cognitive impairment). In Chapter 7 we investigate whether providing hypothetical or 
realistic information inﬂuences the assessment of decision-making capacity. By comparing 
the decisional capacity of both cognitively impaired and cognitively non-impaired patients 
in different treatment choice contexts, we can analyse the cognitive and emotional aspects 
of decisional capacity. 
In Chapter 8 we analyse the relationship between decisional capacity and competency 
judgements by physicians and family members. In the absence of a gold standard for 
competence, we analyse the differences between decision-making capacity as assessed by 
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Design and Methods
the vignette and the competency judgements made by family members and physicians. We 
analyse the degree of agreement between these judgements, as well as the associations of 
the three different judgements with patient characteristics (such as cognition, depression, 
physical functioning) and patient demographics. Hypotheses are generated about the factors 
underlying the differences between the different assessments.
In the General Discussion the results are examined in a broader context. After taking 
the methodological limitations of this study into consideration, we focus on some theoretical 
and societal implications. Do the results contribute to the proposed concept of moral 
capacity, and are, indeed, moral capacity and competence overlapping qualities? 
The Summary is followed by an Appendix, which consists of a case-report. It describes 
the actual assessment of the competence of a psychiatric patient with somatic problems. 
We analyse the psychiatric arguments from a theoretical framework of competence, and 
this illustrates one of the major problems of assessing competence: the inter-relatedness of 
the assessment of the capacity of a patient and the consequences of the choice of the 
patient. 
Chapters 5 till 8 have been written as separate articles. Therefore, each article can be read 
separately, but consequently the methodology sections overlap in these chapters. For 
reasons of consistency within this thesis, spelling and layout have been standardized. 
Consequently, the chapters may differ slightly from the original articles. 
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Design and methods 
This chapter describes the methodology underlying this thesis. First the sample and selection 
procedure of the sample are described, followed by a more detailed outline of the vignette method. 
Subsequently, the questionnaires used to assess the different patient characteristics are described 
in more detail. The variables that are described refer to the empirical considerations, presented in 
Chapter 2: Knowing well or living well. The data-collection resulted in a great variety of ﬁndings that 
could not be analysed within the scope of this thesis. Therefore, this chapter only discusses the 
questionnaires that were actually considered in this thesis. 
Sample
The sample was selected from patients, 65 years of age and older, visiting geriatric wards 
for a one-day somatic and psychiatric screening. Only newly-admitted patients were 
included. Excluded were patients who were not able to participate in the interview, such as 
blind patients, patients who were not native (Dutch) speakers, and patients with severe 
dementia. Patients who had received the treatment described in the vignette (endoscopy) 
less than a year prior to the interview were also excluded, because they could have been 
biased by their actual experience.
Initially, the aim was to include 240 patients, subdivided into four groups: a hypothetical 
group consenting to undergo endoscopy, a hypothetical group consenting to undergo 
surgery for colon cancer, a realistic group offered endoscopy and a realistic group offered 
surgery for colon cancer. 
A study of the incidence of anaemia and endoscopy in the participating geriatric ward 
revealed a lower incidence of anaemia and endoscopy than expected. In 1996 and 1997 the 
diagnosis of anaemia was reported respectively 32 and 35 times (in a total population of 
respectively 356 and 516 new patients each year). In 1998 the incidence of endoscopy was 
38 (in a total population of 657 new patients). Because we wanted to include 60 patients in 
the realistic endoscopy group we decided to collect additional data from three other 
geriatric wards and a gastroenterology ward. During the data-collection we found it was 
difﬁcult to collect data on realistic endoscopy situations and we found no patients who 
were actually undergoing surgery for colon cancer. Therefore the data-collection was 
amended to include patients in the realistic endoscopy situation and to exclude patients in 
the realistic situation of surgery for colon cancer.
A total of 245 patients were approached and invited to participate, 34 (14%) of whom 
refused to participate, 35 (14%) indicated that they were too ill or too tired, and 24 (10%) 
could not be interviewed due to logistical problems, such as lack of time during the one-
day screening. Eventually, 152 patients were included, and these patients were subdivided 
into three groups. The ﬁrst group consisted of 39 patients who were actually scheduled to 
undergo endoscopy. The remaining 113 patients were randomly divided into two groups. 
They were given a hypothetical treatment vignette, representing either endoscopy or an 
operation for colon cancer.
Most of the patients (n=139) were recruited in the Slotervaart Ziekenhuis, because this 
clinic has more geriatric patients (in 1998: 657 patients) than the other participating clinics. 
Our interview protocol was speciﬁcally developed for the logistical structure of this day-
clinic. Especially those patients who were confronted with the realistic choice of undergoing 
endoscopy were selected in other wards (N=13). Table 1(see page 38) shows the distribution 
of patients over the different hospitals, the different vignettes groups, and the distribution 
of the missing questionnaires among the 152 patients. 
Physicians judged the patient’s competence after they had discussed the results of the 
clinical investigations and the treatment options with the patient. Eventually, 124 judgements 
were collected from 35 different physicians; 28 judgements were missing due to logistical 
problems. 
Family members who accompanied the patient to the hospital were interviewed before 
the physician discussed the treatment options with the patient. A total of 96 judgements 
made by family members were collected; 56 patients came alone to the ward.
Informed consent was obtained from all respondents: patients and family members. In 
some cases it may be questionable whether the patients could be considered competent 
enough to give informed consent for participation in this study. However, it would be 
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impossible to include only patients who are competent, because a study of competence 
and incompetence can only be performed including patients with an arguable degree of 
competence (in order to contrast those who are competent with those who are 
incompetent). Our threshold for competence was low: a patient’s consent was enough for 
participation. To avoid any possible harm, we tried to give patients as much information as 
possible about the study procedures, and provided an information folder. We also 
approached family members to obtain proxy consent, and stopped the procedure as soon 
as a patient seemed to be hindered by the interview. The study protocol was approved by 
the local Medical Ethics Committee, who agreed that our study could be qualiﬁed as a 
minimal harm study.
The vignette method
The vignette method I: the context of social psychological research
The vignette method was originally developed and used in sociological and experimental 
social psychological research. In general, this method has mainly been used to study 
normative beliefs. This technique can help to uncover the underlying collective preference 
schedules in order to unravel choice behaviour (Rossi, 1979). 
A vignette consists of a short description of a person or a social situation, with precise 
references to what are thought to be the most important factors in the decision-making or 
judgement making processes of the respondents. The aim of this kind of questionnaire is to 
present a stimulus that is as concrete and as detailed as possible. Such a stimulus would 
more closely approximate a real-life decision-making or judgement making situation, than 
other, more abstract, questionnaires that are designed to determine human attitude or 
behaviour (Alexander & Becker, 1978). In this way the vignette method analyses people’s 
judgements by systematically varying the characteristics used in the description of the 
situation. The presumptions are that meanings are social and that morality may well be 
situation-speciﬁc (Finch, 1987).
The vignette method can be applied in several ways, mainly varying in the amount of 
different characteristics to which the respondent has to react. The common element in its 
various applications is its hypothetical character. It is argued that the object of study is not 
what the respondent actually would do under the presumed circumstances, but the publicly 
accessible morality (Finch, 1987). This hypothetical character ensures that the respondent 
reacts from his or her own situation, while at the same time the vignette describes a 
situation that is realistic and concrete enough to provoke a general normative reaction. 
However, this advantage is also the major disadvantage of the vignette method: what do the 
responses to the vignette tell us? 
The vignette method II: the context of medical research.
The vignette method has also been used in medical research. It is important to underline 
the different meanings of the word ‘vignette’ in the ﬁeld of medicine. Instead of a 
methodological technique to assess normative judgements or preferences, the word 
‘vignette’ is also used as an alternative for the word ‘case’ or ‘case-study’. In psychiatry, in 
particular, a vignette is used in this way. However, ‘vignette’ as a case-study is also used in 
reference to medical historical articles.
A vignette, as an instrument to assess attitudes as described above, can be applied in 
various ways. First, in medical decision-making analysis, the vignette is regularly used to 
assess patient preferences regarding health status/treatment alternatives. These analyses 
are performed to test utility theories, to investigate the determinants of patient preferences, 
or to study patient preferences with regard to their desire to participate in treatment 
decisions.
Secondly, the vignette technique can also be used to assess treatment decisions, made 
by physicians and nurses. In this respect, two themes can be distinguished. The ﬁrst is 
characterized by emphasis on the competence of physicians or nurses with regard to 
medical technical decisions. A study of activities recommended by physicians for patients 
with chronic low back pain used three vignettes of work-disabled patients with chronic low 
back pain (Rainville et al., 2000). It was concluded that the recommendations reﬂected 
personal attitudes of the physicians as well as factors related to the patients’ clinical 
symptoms. The second theme is characterized by emphasis on normative characteristics of 
health care workers. For example, Green et al. (2000) studied several circumstances under 
which medical residents were likely to deceive a colleague. In another study the physician’s 
willingness to deceive third party payers was assessed (Freeman et al. 1999). In psychiatry 
the vignette has been used to investigate the thoughts, beliefs and expectations of the 
general population with regard to patients with certain mental disorders. Speciﬁc attention 
has been paid to the stigmatization of mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, and its 
relationship with dangerous behaviour (Link et al., 1999; Penn et al., 1999). 
The vignette method III: the context of competency judgements7
The aim of the vignette used to assess decision-making capacity is fundamentally different to 
that in the previously described research. Instead of unravelling normative beliefs, the aim 
of this method is to test decision-making abilities. Consequently, the respondent is 
Table 1:  Data acquisition: total number of patients recruited, the numbers of vignettes and 
clinimetric questionnaires acquired, and the number of competency assessments of 
family members and physicians. 
Total
Vignette A
hypothetical
Vignette B
hypothetical
Vignet A
realistic
Hospital:
- Slotervaart  139  60  47  32
-  Other  
(MCA, Gooi-Noord,  
VU geriatrics,  
VU gastroenterology)
 13  1  5  7
Vignette  152  61  52  39
MMSE > 16  142  56  49  37
GDS  151  61  52  38
ADL  126  52  45  29
IADL  133  56  47  30
Family members  96  38  36  22
Physicians (n=35)  124  50  44  30
 
7  A more thorough introduction of different methods to assess decision-making capacity is given in Chapter 5.
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confronted with only one vignette instead of several vignettes describing different 
characteristics of a particular situation. The vignette describes the nature of a disease, as 
well as the nature of the treatment alternatives and their advantages and disadvantages. A 
similarity with the vignette methods used in sociological research is the hypothetical 
character of the presented treatment choice. Subsequently, the emphasis in the questions 
that are asked after the vignette has been read, focuses on decision-making abilities: the 
ability to evidence a choice, the ability to understand facts, the ability to manipulate 
information rationally, and the ability to appreciate the nature of the situation. 
The vignette method IV: the Amsterdam vignette study
The method to assess decision-making capacity which is evaluated in this thesis was 
developed in an earlier study (Gouwenberg et al., 1997; Schmand et al., 1999), the aim of 
which was to evaluate the reliability and validity of a vignette method to assess decision-
making capacity in elderly people with cognitive impairment. In this population-based study, 
240 elderly people (64 of whom were demented) were questioned on the basis of ﬁve 
vignettes, two representing a hypothetical treatment situation, and three representing a 
research situation. 
It was concluded that the reliability of the vignette method was satisfactory (Cronbach’s 
alphas of .76 and .80).
Validity was tested by correlating the vignette scores to both the physician’s judgement 
and to scales representing the level of cognitive impairment. The correlation between the 
physician’s judgement and the vignette scores was reasonably high (treatment vignette: r = 
.65 and research vignette: r = .60). This means that the correlation was high enough to 
conclude that the vignette scores and the physician’s judgement concerned the same 
characteristic. It was also low enough to conclude that the vignette scores were additional 
to the physician’s judgement, because they differed (Gouwenberg et al., 1997). 
Decision-making capacity was found to decrease signiﬁcantly with increasing severity of 
the dementia, and associations were found between decision-making capacity and several 
cognitive functions. Cognitive functions that best explained decision-making capacity were 
recent memory, expressive language, and abstract thinking (Schmand et al., 1999). Further, 
decision-making capacity was only slightly correlated with education and verbal intelligence, 
which implies that the vignette method is relatively unbiased with respect to education 
(Schmand et al., 1999). 
A multidisciplinary expert panel was questioned about the vignette in order to test its 
face validity. This panel consisted of 154 experts and included people with a legal background, 
psychologists, psychiatrists, geriatricians, general practitioners, people with an ethical 
background, nurses, nursing home physicians and elderly people. Many members of this 
expert panel stated that they had been confronted with the assessment of competence 
(70.8%), and that an instrument to assist such an assessment would be helpful (86%). The 
vignette method was considered by most of them to be a useful instrument (74%). No 
differences were found between the opinions of people with different backgrounds 
(Gouwenberg et al., 1997). 
Overall it was concluded that the vignette method can be a useful method to assess decision-
making capacity in the elderly persons (Gouwenberg et al., 1997; Schmand et al., 1999). 
The vignette method V: the context of this thesis
The content of the vignette used in this study was determined in collaboration with 
experienced geriatricians and psychiatrists. The content of the vignette should reﬂect a 
rather common treatment choice, which would also be experienced as a choice. In general, 
the opportunity to have a blood test, for example, does not represent a choice for most 
people. We presumed that the need for a choice is clear when there are serious advantages 
and disadvantages involved, which should be weighed up before a choice can be made. In 
collaboration with the specialists, the choice of endoscopy in the case of unknown blood 
loss was considered to be suitable for this purpose. 
We wanted to compare the same choice in both a hypothetical and a realistic situation. 
Therefore the choice of treatment in the vignette should reﬂect a choice with an adequate 
incidence. A literature search showed that anaemia related to gastro-intestinal disease is a 
problem with a high incidence in an elderly population (Joosten et al., 1992; Pentimone et 
al., 1992). The vignettes describe the choice to undergo endoscopy for anaemia with an 
unknown cause (Box I), and the choice to undergo an operation for colon cancer (Box II).
After the vignette had been read, the participants were asked questions to assess their 
decision-making capacity. Their abilities were based on the following standards: factual 
understanding, evidencing a choice, reasoning, and appreciation of the situation. During the 
reading and the interview, the participants were allowed to read the vignette. Answers to 
the questions were scored as follows: 0 points for no answer or an incorrect answer, 1 
point for a more or less satisfying answer, and 2 points for a satisfying answer (Box III).
Inter-rater reliability
To examine inter-rater reliability, the vignettes of 45 participants were rated by a research 
assistant and one of the authors (AV). Kappa was computed for the total vignette score, 
which was divided into tertiles for this purpose. Reliability results (kappa = 0.64) for the 
total vignette score reﬂect a good inter-rater agreement (Altman, 1999). 
Cognition and emotion
Cognition was operationalized in two different ways. The diagnosis of dementia was made 
according to DSM-IV criteria (DSM-IV, 1994). Further, a global impression of cognitive 
functioning was acquired with the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 
1975). The MMSE consists of 20 items, with scores ranging from 0-30, higher scores 
indicating better cognitive functioning. The sum-score consists of the following elements: 
orientation in time and place, memory, attention, language and visual construction. 
Emotion was converted in two concepts: depression and anxiety. Depression was 
assessed with the Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) (Brink et al. 1982) (Dutch translation: 
Kok, 1994). The GDS has a yes-no format and contains less somatic items than other 
depression scales. Both aspects reduce bias in an older population (due respectively to 
cognitive or concentration problems and somatic complaints). The scale consists of 30 
items, higher scores indicating more depression. 
Health 
Physical functioning was operationalized in three different ways. First, the number of chronic 
diseases was registered. These were dichotomised in no disease or one disease, and two or 
more diseases. Secondly, activities of daily living (ADL) were registered with the Barthel 
index, with scores ranging from 0-20. Higher scores indicate a higher level of functioning in 
daily activities such as eating or dressing (Mahoney & Barthel, 1965). Thirdly, the instrumental 
activities of daily life (IADL) were registered with the Fillenbaum index, with scores ranging 
from 0-14. Higher scores indicate a lower level of functioning in IADL such as making a 
phone call or shopping (Fillenbaum, 1985). 
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Judgements of physicians and family members.
The physicians and family members made a dichotomous judgement of competence: 
competent or incompetent. The physicians were given no instructions for the assessment 
of competence, in order to reﬂect the assessments made in daily practice as much as 
possible. It was explained to family members that nowadays patients have the right to make 
their own medical decisions, but that one of the conditions is that the patients are 
competent to make these decisions. The ability to make medical decisions may, for instance, 
be inﬂuenced by a deteriorating health status (somatic or cognitive). Subsequently, the 
family members were asked whether they thought that the patient was able to make a 
medical decision or not. The type of relationship between the family members and the 
patient and the frequency of contact were registered, as well as the following demographic 
characteristics: gender, age, and total years of education. 
Vignette A – Endoscopy 
Let’s assume you have anaemia. This could 
be caused by a stomach disorder. Your doctor 
has suggested that he or she can carry out 
an examination to ﬁnd the cause. During 
this examination the doctor will pass a tube 
containing a small camera down your throat 
and into your stomach. You are free to decide 
whether or not you want to undergo this 
examination. Whatever your decision, you 
will still receive treatment for your anaemia.
One beneﬁt of this examination is that it of-
ten reveals the cause of the blood loss. The 
most common cause is a gastric ulcer, which 
is not particularly serious and can easily be 
treated by medication. This is therefore an 
effective treatment for the underlying cause 
of the blood loss.
However, it is sometimes necessary to remove 
a small piece of tissue from the stomach, for 
a detailed examination. This does not hurt. 
The tissue is examined in the laboratory. 
There is a slight chance that it will show that 
you have stomach cancer. The doctor will 
give you the results of these laboratory tests 
several weeks after your examination, when 
he or she will also explain how the results of 
these tests will affect you.
One drawback of this examination is that it 
does involve a degree of discomfort. The sto-
mach can only be examined when it’s empty. 
Starting on the evening of the day before 
your examination, you must eat nothing until 
the examination has been completed. During 
the examination, a small tube (containing a 
camera) will be put into your mouth, down 
your throat and into your stomach. At the 
beginning, you will have to actively swallow 
the front end of this tube. During the exami-
nation itself, which takes about 10-30 minu-
tes, you will be lying on your side. This proce-
dure very seldom causes any complications.
The advantage of not undergoing the exami-
nation is that you can avoid the associated 
discomfort, but the disadvantage is that the 
cause of the blood loss remains unknown. 
This means that a possible stomach ulcer or 
stomach cancer will remain untreated. Also, 
the bleeding may continue, which means 
that the anaemia will take longer to cure.
Box 1: 
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Vignette B – Surgery for colon cancer
Let’s assume you have cancer of the intestine. 
The doctor has just explained what this 
means, and has asked you to decide whether 
or not you wish to have treatment.
The most common form of treatment 
involves surgery. The extent and duration of 
the operation will depend on the size of the 
tumour itself. The aim of this operation is to 
cure your cancer. The size of the tumour is 
important too, because this affects the 
chances of the operation being successful.
Depending on where the tumour is, it may 
be necessary to make an ostomy. This is an 
artiﬁcial opening in the skin of your belly. 
Faeces are drained from the body through 
this opening and into a small bag. Several 
months after the ﬁrst operation, another 
operation can be carried out to remove the 
ostomy and join the ends of the intestine up 
again. Other forms of treatment may sub-
sequently be required, but this will be 
discussed with you after the operation.
It will take you some time to recover from 
this operation. At ﬁrst, you may have some 
problems with diarrhoea, but this will pass in 
time. You may also feel tired for some 
considerable time, either as a result of the 
cancer or the treatment.
You are also free to refuse the treatment. 
This would spare you the burden of 
undergoing surgery, but it would probably 
shorten your life. 
Box 1I: 
Standards of decision-making capacity
Ratings as follows: 
- 2 = adequate
- 1 = partially adequate
- 0 = inadequate
Understanding (0-6)
-  Can you tell me something about your 
disease? (0-2)
-  Can you tell me something about the 
proposed treatment? (0-2)
-  Can you mention some advantages and 
disadvantages of the treatment? ( 0-2)
Evidencing a choice (0-2)
-  Can you say whether or not you want to 
be treated?
Reasoning (0-8)
-  Can you give some reasons why you 
(don’t) want to be treated?
 (0-2)  patient mentions consequences of 
treatment 
 (0-2)  patient compares treatment 
alternatives 
 (0-2)  patient mentions consequences in 
addition to those mentioned in the 
vignette
 (0-2)  patient’s choice logically follows 
from his or her own explanations 
Appreciation (0-4)
-  What kind of effect does your choice 
have on your health?
-  How does this situation affect you and 
your family?
 (0-2)  patient acknowledges that the 
described treatment affects him/her
 (0-2)  patient acknowledges the 
treatment’s potential beneﬁts
Resulting in a total score: 0-20
Box III: 
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Instruments to assess decision-making capacity: an overview
The main objective of this article is to evaluate and describe instruments for assessing decision-
making capacity in psychiatry and psycho-geriatrics, and to evaluate them for use in daily practice. 
The instruments were selected in Medline articles. We focus on the relationship between these 
instruments and the concept of competence, represented in the following elements: context in 
which an instrument is developed, disclosure of information, standards to assess decision-making 
capacity, the scale or threshold model, and validity and reliability. The developmental context 
inﬂuences how information is provided and standards deﬁned. Although it is not clear how decision-
making capacity relates to competency judgements, most instruments provide good reliability. 
Comparison of the different instruments opens directions for future research. Although instruments 
can never replace a physician’s judgement, they may provide a clear starting point for a discussion 
on competence. In daily practice assessments, attention should be given to information disclosure, 
the inﬂuence of our own normative values in evaluating standards of decision-making capacity, and 
the relation between decision-making capacity and competence. 
Introduction
Competence is a complex concept with ethical, legal, social, and psychological dimensions 
(Glass, 1997). Assessment of competence is an issue in many disciplines: psychiatry, psycho-
geriatrics, ethics, and law. This article deals only with questions of competence regarding 
consent to treatment and consent to scientiﬁc research programs. 
Studies suggest that physicians ﬁnd it difﬁcult to assess decision-making capacity in 
older adults and psychiatric patients, and to distinguish between mental status examinations 
and competency assessments (Fitten et al., 1990; Kitamura & Kitamura, 2000). Moreover, 
experienced clinicians frequently disagree on their competency assessments for patients 
with Alzheimer’s disease (Marson et al., 1997). Many instruments have been developed to 
provide a more objective standard for these assessments. 
The aim of this article is to categorize existing instruments. We selected articles 
containing reports of instruments through Medline searches using the keywords: 
‘competence,’ ‘decision-making capacity,’ and ‘informed consent,’ in combination with 
‘instruments.’ Instruments were identiﬁed by reviewing references in these articles. The 
central selection criterion was the description of an instrument to assess competence in 
consent to treatment or research. Excluded was literature on competence or decision-
making capacity of children and mentally disabled persons (Cea & Fisher, 2003), as well as 
literature on legal capacities such as ﬁnancial capacity (Marson et al., 2000b), capacity to 
choose a place of residence, draw up a will, assign power of attorney (Rutman & Silberfeld, 
1992; Silberfeld, 1994), execute a healthcare proxy (Mezey et al., 2000), or to stand trial 
(Hoge et al., 1997). Also excluded was literature on instruments to assess general mental 
competence (Wang & Ennis, 1986; Alexander, 1988).
The term competence was deﬁned as decision-making capacity in the instruments 
(Drane, 1984; Buchanan & Brock, 1989), and it will only be used to refer to legal or ethical 
dimensions (see also Kim et al., 2001). The instruments were developed in two contexts: 
psychiatry and psycho-geriatrics. The characteristics of the instruments are evaluated by 
contrasting these (medical) contexts. Legal perspectives on instruments were not examined.
Situation speciﬁc character
Decision-making capacity is speciﬁc to a particular decision (President’s Commission, 1982). 
This is expressed in instruments by focusing on a speciﬁc decision. Three different types of 
decisions were recognized: 1) decision-making capacity to consent to treatment decisions, 
2) decision-making capacity to consent to participate in research, and 3) decision-making 
capacity to execute an advance directive. 
Assessing decision-making capacity in psychiatry 
Table 1 shows that a major concern in psychiatry is decision-making capacity to consent to 
treatment. Some instruments speciﬁcally focus on consent to voluntary admission by 
newly-admitted psychiatric patients (Appelbaum et al., 1981; Appelbaum et al., 1998; 
Kitamura et al, 1998). These instruments are applied to a general psychiatric population. 
Other instruments focus on the decision to undergo electroconvulsive treatment (Bean et 
al., 1994; Martin & Glancy, 1994) or on patients diagnosed with psychosis, schizophrenia, or 
major depression (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991; Grisso et al., 1997; Appelbaum et al., 1999; 
Carpenter et al., 2000; Palmer et al., 2002; Lapid et al., 2003).
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Assessing decision-making capacity in psycho-geriatrics 
Within psycho-geriatrics instruments show more variation in types of decisions. Table 2 
shows most instruments focus on decision-making capacity to consent to participate in 
research, whereas others assess decision-making capacity to consent to treatment or write 
advance directives (also: Molloy et al., 1996). The elderly are perceived as vulnerable with 
regard to competence (Stanley et al., 1984), especially nursing home residents (Fitten et al., 
1990) or hospitalized elderly (Fitten & Waite, 1990). Among the elderly, there is also special 
attention to those with major depression (Stanley et al., 1988), patients with Parkinson’s 
disease and cognitive impairment (Dymek et al., 2001), and patients with Alzheimer’s disease 
or dementia (Stanley et al., 1988; Sachs et al, 1994; Marson et al., 1995a, 1995b; Fazel et al., 
1999; Schmand et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2002). 
Information disclosure
The concept of informed consent requires that patients be given relevant information 
about a treatment before their consent can be considered valid (Meisel et al., 1977; 
Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). To fulﬁll this, all instruments include information about the 
purpose and nature of the treatment (or research procedure), its risks and beneﬁts, and 
alternative treatments. Information is given in either a hypothetical or realistic manner, 
which inﬂuences the structure of the disclosure.
Information disclosure in psychiatry 
Table 1 reveals that psychiatric instruments mainly provide information about realistic 
decisions. The information is disclosed in a semi-structured way, enabling a situation speciﬁc 
assessment. Information is presumed to be provided in everyday practice (Appelbaum et al., 
1981) or as part of the instrument (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991; Grisso et al., 1997; 
Appelbaum et al., 1998; Appelbaum et al., 1999).
For example: the MacCAT-T guides clinicians and patients through a process of information 
disclosure, assessing patients’ capacity for decision-making (Grisso et al., 1997). Before the 
interview the clinician selects relevant information by reviewing the patient’s symptoms, 
diagnosis, and treatment needs from the hospital chart. This information is recorded in 
appropriate sections of the MacCAT-T form and is disclosed at the beginning of the 
interview. Similarly, the Disclosure Content Check List is used to check the relationship 
between information given to the patient and the way the patient uses and reﬂects this 
information (Kitamura et al., 1998). 
Information disclosure in psycho-geriatrics 
Table 2 shows that psychogeriatric information generally centers on hypothetical decisions 
disclosed in a standardized way. The term ‘vignette’ is used for this format (Fitten et al., 
1990). A vignette provides a hypothetical description of a situation (treatment or research), 
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8  Abbreviations used in this table: CIS = Competency Interview Schedule; CSA = California Scale of 
Appreciation; EC = Expressing a Choice; ECT = Electro Convulsive Therapy; HCAT = Hopkins 
Competency Assessment Test; MacCAT-CR = MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool – Clinical 
Research; MacCAT-T = MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool – Treatment; MUD = Measuring 
Understanding Disclosure; POD = Perceptions of Disorder; SICIATRI = Structured Interview for 
Competency and Incompetency Assessment Testing and Ranking Inventory ;  TRAT = Thinking Rationally 
About Treatment ;  UTD = Understanding Treatment Disclosures. 
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including elements such as the nature of a disease, recommended treatment, and its risks 
and beneﬁts. Vignettes, presented to subjects on a sheet of paper and read aloud by the 
examiner, are used to assess decision-making capacity for consent to treatment, participation 
in research, and writing advanced directives. During the interview subjects are permitted 
to consult the written text or sections are reread to the subjects if necessary (Fitten & 
Waite, 1990, Schmand et al., 1999; Dymek et al., 2001).
Realistic or hypothetical situations?
The effect of hypothetical or realistic information disclosure on the assessment of decision-
making capacity is unclear. One study considered the effects of presenting information 
realistically and hypothetically (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991). The Measuring Understanding 
Disclosure (MUD) consists of four standardized disclosures about treatment 
recommendations for schizophrenia, depression, ischemic heart disease, and deep venous 
thrombosis. The disclosures were presented to groups of patients with schizophrenia, 
depression, or ischemic heart disease, and to a healthy control group. The study evaluated 
the differences in understanding information related and unrelated to the participant’s own 
disorder. Patients understood information related to their own disease better than 
hypothetical information. 
Disclosure of realistic information is preferred within psychiatry. Appelbaum argued 
that standardized methods to assess competence are appropriate for research, but not for 
clinical use (Appelbaum, 1997). This is conﬁrmed by Kitamura et al., who argue that no two 
patients have the same illness characteristics or are recommended exactly the same 
treatment (Kitamura et al., 1998). The patient’s understanding and rational manipulation of 
medical information, however, are functions of the quality and quantity of the information 
given prior to testing. A predetermined set of information may achieve better validity and 
reliability for the measuring instrument (Kitamura et al., 1998). 
Within psycho-geriatrics it is argued that vignettes can satisfactorily approximate real 
physician-patient assessment situations (Marson et al., 1995b). Concrete vignettes are more 
useful than general questions for eliciting patients’ values or research preferences (Sachs et 
al., 1994). However, it is also acknowledged that deciding about a real, personal medical 
problem is different from decision-making in a hypothetical medical situation (Marson et al., 
1999; Dymek et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2002). Because advance directives consider hypothetical 
future situations by deﬁnition, the hypothetical character of vignettes is very similar in concept. 
Assessing decision-making capacity: standards 
After information is disclosed, decision-making capacity is tested through several questions 
representing different standards derived from the legal concept of competence. Consensus 
has been established on the following standards: 
a) ability to evidence choice,
b) ability to make a reasonable outcome of choice, 
c) ability to understand information, 
d) ability to manipulate information rationally,
e)  ability to appreciate the situation and its consequences (Roth et al., 1977; Appelbaum 
& Roth, 1982).
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Table 3: Standards used in psychiatric instruments
Author Instrument Standards of competence Scoring 
range
Cutoff
Appelbaum (1981) Questionnaire min. required clinical criteria
broad clinical criteria
legal criteria
clinical-legal criteria
0-30 - 
(scale)
Grisso (1991) MUD understanding 0-10 - 
(scale)
Bean (1994) CIS evidencing choice
understanding issues related to 
treatment
manipulating information rationally 
and giving rational reason for 
treatment decision
appreciation of the nature of the 
situation and its consequences
(feeling of voluntarism)
4 x (1-7)
3 x (1-7)
2 x (1-7)
5 x (1-7)
1 x (1-7)
- 
(scale)
Martin (1994) ECT ques-
tionnaire
evidencing choice
factual understanding
manipulate info rationally
appreciation
 
Grisso (1995c) UTD
POD
TRAT
EC
paraphrased recall and recognition
nonacknowledgment of disorder 
(NOD)
nonacknowledgment of treatment 
potential (NOT)
seeking information (deleted in  
TRAT 2)
consequential thinking
comparative thinking
complex thinking
generating consequences
weighting consequences (deleted in 
TRAT-2)
transitive thinking
probalistic thinking
 
0-10
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-3
0-3
0-3
0-2
Grisso (1997) MacCAT-T understanding
reasoning
appreciation
evidencing choice
0-6
0-8
0-4
0-2
-
(scale)
Kitamura (1998) SICIARTI awareness of being informed
evidencing choice
does not waive
understanding
wants to get better
insight
level 0
level 1
level 2
level 3
level 4
Appelbaum (1998) MUD-VH understanding 0-4 scale
Appelbaum (1999) MacCAT-CR understanding
appreciation
reasoning
evidencing choice
0-26
0-6
0-8
0-2
Carpenter (2000) MacCAT-CR understanding
appreciation
reasoning
evidencing choice
0-6 (0-26)
0-6
0-8
0-2
-
(scale)
Moser (2002) MacCAT-CR
evaluation to 
sign consent
understanding
appreciation
reasoning
evidencing choice
understanding
0-26
0-6
0-8
0-2
(scale)
cutoff
Palmer (2002) MacCAT-T
HCAT
understanding
appreciation
reasoning
ability to communicate choice
understanding durable power of 
attorney
0-6
0-4
0-8
0-2
0-10
scale
scale
Saks (2002) CSA appreciation: patently false belief 
standard
0-36 scale
Lapid (2003) MacCAT-T understanding relevant information
reasoning about potential risks and 
beneﬁts
appreciation of the nature of the 
situation and consequences of 
alternative choices
ability to express choice.
0-6
0-8
0-4
0-2
scale
Palmer (2002) MacCAT-T
HCAT
understanding
appreciation
reasoning
ability to communicate choice
understanding durable power of 
attorney
0-6
0-4
0-8
0-2
0-10
scale
scale
Saks (2002) CSA appreciation: patently false belief 
standard
0-36 scale
Lapid (2003) MacCAT-T understanding relevant information
reasoning about potential risks and 
beneﬁts
appreciation of the nature of the 
situation and consequences of 
alternative choices
ability to express choice.
0-6
0-8
0-4
0-2
scale
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Table 4: Standards used in psychogeriatric instruments
Author Instrument Standards of competence Scoring range Cutoff
Stanley (1984) research vignettes reasonable outcome
quality of reasoning
comprehension
consistency with degree 
risks/beneﬁts
1-7
1-4
-
(scale)
Stanley (1988) capacity assessment (vignette) comprehension
quality of reasoning
1-4
1-5
-
(scale)
Fitten (1990) clinical vignettes understanding
choice
reasoning
0-3 (1 / vignet) (< 3 and < 2)
Fitten & Waite (1990) clinical vignettes understanding
(procedure, purpose,risk/beneﬁts)
reasoning
3 x (0-2)
0-2
99.5% conﬁdence limit of controls
Janofsky (1992) HCAT understanding 0-10 (6 Q) incompetent < 4
sensitivity ~forensic psychiatrist
Sachs (1994) research vignettes willingness to participate
reasoning
-
(qualitative analysis)
-
Marson (1995a) CCTI (vignettes) evidencing choice
reasonable outcome
appreciation 
provide rational reasons
understanding
categorical scale
categorical scale
interval scale
interval scale
interval scale
< 2 SD of the mean in a control group for each standard. 
Etchells (1999) ACE understanding
appreciation
evidencing choice
Yes, unsure, no deﬁnitely incapable, probably incapable, probably capable, deﬁnitely 
capable.
Fazel (1999) Vignettes understanding 
evidencing choice
provide rational reasons
appreciation
0-4
0-2
0-1
0-3
incompetent < 6
Schmand (1999) research and treatment vignettes evidencing choice
understanding
manipulate info rationally
appreciation
? < 95% control group
Dymek (2001) CCTI (vignettes) evidencing choice
reasonable choice
appreciating consequences
providing rational reasons
understanding
0-4
0-1
4 = capable, 3 = marginally capable, 0-2 = incapable
1 = capable, 0 = incapable
capable > 1.5 SD below control mean
marginally capable 1.5-2.5 SD control mean
incapable < 2.5 SD below control mean
Kim (2001, 2002) MacCAT-CRV understanding
appreciation
reasoning
evidencing choice
0-26 
0-6
0-8
0-2 
sensitivity/speciﬁcity, gold standard:
expert clinical judgement (cut offs
respectively: 18,5,6)
incapable if patients failed any of the three standards (2002)
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As no speciﬁc patterns were discovered in the standards for either context, the meaning 
of standards was evaluated for both contexts (tables 3 and 4).
a) Evidencing choice 
Evidencing choice means that a patient either consents to or refuses medical treatment 
or research participation. This standard focuses on the presence or absence of a decision 
(Roth et al., 1977). Although it has been argued that consistency of choice in time is 
important, this aspect is not considered in the instruments. 
Within the psychiatric context this standard is part of most instruments (Appelbaum et 
al., 1981; Bean et al., 1994; Martin & Glancy, 1994; Grisso et al., 1997; Kitamura et al., 1998; 
Appelbaum et al., 1999; Carpenter et al., 2000; Moser et al., 2002; Palmer et al., 2002; Lapid 
et al., 2003). Several studies conﬁrm that this standard requires fewest demands on patients’ 
abilities. Psychiatric patients were fully capable of expressing choice about a treatment 
decision, and were as able as control groups to evidence choice (Kitamura et al., 1998; 
Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995b; Grisso et al., 1997). Patients with recurrent major depression 
were also able to communicate choice about consent to participate in research (Appelbaum 
et al., 1999). Although not statistically signiﬁcant, patients with schizophrenia performed 
slightly worse than the control group on this aspect (Carpenter et al., 2000; Moser et al., 
2002). 
Evidencing choice is also included for the instruments in the psychogeriatric context 
(Marson et al., 1995b; Schmand et al., 1999; Dymek et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2001). This 
standard was met by 60-69% of patients with dementia (Sachs et al., 1994). Other studies 
showed that even patients with mild or moderate Alzheimer’s disease retained the capacity 
to elect choices about treatment and research participation (Marson et al., 1995b; Kim et 
al., 2001). Patients with Parkinson’s disease, however, performed signiﬁcantly worse on this 
standard than controls (Dymek et al., 2001). 
b) Reasonable outcome
This standard emphasizes decisional outcome rather than how a decision has been reached 
(Roth et al., 1977), but it has been severely criticized because mainstream consensus on 
reasonableness can become an important factor in suppressing personal autonomy. Despite 
the criticism, it has been integrated in several instruments in the psychogeriatric context 
(Stanley et al., 1984; Sachs et al., 1994; Marson et al., 1995b).
Reasonable outcome is deﬁned in instruments as willingness to participate in medical 
research (Stanley et al., 1984; Sachs et al., 1994). ‘Reasonable’ has been deﬁned as a low 
degree of willingness to participate in research with a high risk/beneﬁt ratio, and a high 
degree of willingness to participate in research with a low risk/beneﬁt ratio (Stanley et al., 
1984). The elderly and patients with Alzheimer’s disease were able to reach reasonable 
decisions to the same degree as younger patients or proxies (Stanley et al., 1984; Sachs et 
al., 1994; Dymek et al., 2001). Also Kim et al. (Kim et al., 2002) found no differences in 
willingness to participate in research between subjects with Alzheimer´s disease and 
control subjects. However, another study suggested that with increasing cognitive 
impairment, elderly individuals tended to opt for treatment interventions (Fazel et al., 
2000). One study deﬁnes reasonable outcome as a congruence between decisions by 
patients and decisions by ‘reasonable’ people. Patients with mild or moderate Alzheimer’s 
or Parkinson’s disease showed no differences from a control group on this standard 
(Marson et al., 1995b; Dymek et al., 2001).
c) Factual understanding
The ability of understanding requires that individuals understand relevant information. 
Although general ability to understand has been proposed as a standard to assess competence 
(Roth et al., 1977), most instruments use factual understanding as their standard (Roth et 
al., 1977; Appelbaum & Roth, 1982). Relevant elements are: the proposed treatment, its 
risks and beneﬁts, and the possibilities of alternative treatment (Stanley et al., 1984; Stanley 
et al, 1988; Fitten et al., 1990, Fitten & Waite, 1990; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991; Bean et al., 
1994; Martin & Glancy, 1994; Marson et al., 1995b; Grisso et al., 1997; Kitamura et al., 1998; 
Etchells et al., 1999; Schmand et al., 1999; Carpenter et al., 2000; Palmer et al., 2002; Lapid et 
al., 2003). Psychiatry augments these with issues like comprehension of the reason or 
purpose of admission to a psychiatric ward (Appelbaum et al., 1981, 1998), or patient 
comprehension of the right to decide (Kitamura et al., 1998). Psycho-geriatrics sometimes 
considers only the nature of the informed consent procedure (Janofsky et al., 1992).
Factual understanding for schizophrenic patients was signiﬁcantly compromised (Grisso 
& Appelbaum, 1995b). They also performed worse than medically ill patients, HIV positive 
patients, and patients with depression (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991; Grisso et al., 1997; 
Carpenter et al., 2000; Moser et al., 2002). Patients with depression perform quite well: 90% 
obtained full credit on most items of the understanding scale (Appelbaum et al., 1999). 
Another study, however, revealed that depressed patients performed worse than a healthy 
control group, although there were no differences between them and a group of patients 
with angina (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995b).
Within psycho-geriatrics older patients (mean age 69) showed signiﬁcantly less 
understanding than younger ones (mean age 34) (Stanley et al., 1984), which was not 
explained by differences in intelligence, years of education, or level of attention (Fitten et 
al., 1990). Scores for the depressed elderly were similar to those of the control group 
(Stanley et al., 1988). Hospitalized elderly, cognitively impaired patients, patients with mild 
or moderate Alzheimer’s disease, and patients with Parkinson’s disease demonstrated 
poorer performance in understanding (Stanley et al., 1988; Fitten & Waite, 1990; Marson et 
al., 1995b; Dymek et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2001). 
Understanding does not depend exclusively on patients’ abilities, but also on the extent 
of information disclosed by physicians. Data showed that psychiatric patients generally 
received less information than medical in-patients (Kitamura et al., 1998). Moreover, both 
psychiatric and medical patients performed better when the information was disclosed in 
several units, with the appropriate question following each unit (Grisso & Appelbaum, 
1991). Also, education about the recommended treatment or the research proposal 
inﬂuences the level of understanding (Wirshing et al., 1998; Carpenter et al., 2000; Dunn et 
al., 2002; Lapid et al., 2003). Therefore, assessing understanding in relation to giving 
information seems reasonable (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Kitamura et al., 1998).
d) Manipulating information rationally
The standard of manipulating information rationally relates to using logical processes to 
compare beneﬁts and risks for various treatment options (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988). 
Although requiring logical consistency between conclusions and starting premises seems 
straightforward, it can pose considerable practical problems. It is difﬁcult to distinguish 
between rational and irrational reasons (Roth et al., 1977; Kitamura et al., 1998). The process 
of logical manipulation should be central, not the rationality of a decision’s outcome.
Within psychiatry manipulating information rationally is related to concern for personal 
well-being, desire to recover, and hope for future recovery (Bean et al., 1994; Martin & 
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Glancy, 1994). Other researchers determine this through questions examining the patient’s 
explanations for his or her choices: whether the patient mentions consequences of 
treatment alternatives, compares alternatives, expresses thoughts about consequences 
besides those offered in the disclosure, and whether the ﬁnal choice logically follows from 
the patient’s explanation (Grisso et al., 1997). Patients with schizophrenia have a signiﬁcantly 
lower mean score than control groups (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995b; Grisso et al., 1997; 
Carpenter et al., 2000). Patients with major depression perform worse than control groups 
on reasoning measures as well (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995b; Appelbaum et al., 1999), 
although depressed patients’ reasoning improved after education (Lapid et al., 2003)
Psycho-geriatrics deﬁnes the standard of rational manipulation of information as the 
capacity to use logical processes to compare risks and beneﬁts of treatment options and to 
weigh this information to reach a decision (Stanley et al., 1988). Patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease and cognitively impaired patients with Parkinson´s disease performed worse on 
this standard than cognitively non-impaired elderly controls (Marson et al., 1995b; Dymek 
et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2001). Hospitalized patients were not found to perform worse than 
healthy controls (Fitten & Waite, 1990). Interestingly, Stanley et al. found that while 
depressed and cognitively impaired elderly subjects did not differ from the control group, 
the quality of reasoning is not very high in all three groups (Stanley et al., 1988). They did 
not weigh thoroughly risks and beneﬁts (Stanley et al., 1988), which may accord with the 
ﬁnding that both demented patients and elderly controls give similar reasons to participate 
in research (Sachs et al., 1994). Also Marson et al. (Marson et al., 1995a) suggested that 
rational reasoning depends more on general reasoning ability than on reasoning based on 
speciﬁc factual recall.
e) Appreciation
The standard of appreciation emphasizes the consideration of facts relevant to an individual’s 
situation. Because appreciation requires an element of self awareness, it differs from rational 
manipulation, in which information must merely be weighed (Appelbaum & Roth, 1982).
Appreciation in psychiatry centers on questions that determine whether a patient 
acknowledges that information is personally applicable and the treatment beneﬁcial (Grisso 
et al, 1995c, 1997). Other elements include: awareness of illness, need for treatment, and 
the doctor’s role (Bean et al., 1994; Martin & Glancy, 1994). The California Scale of 
Appreciation focuses on the concept of ‘patently false belief ’ (Saks et al., 2002). Adequate 
appreciation summary ratings were obtained from more than 80% of schizophrenic patients; 
10% had low ratings (Grisso et al., 1997). Other studies revealed that schizophrenic patients 
scored signiﬁcantly lower than comparison groups (healthy, or patients with depression or 
angina, or HIV positive patients) (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995b; Carpenter et al., 2000; Moser 
et al., 2002). Like factual understanding, appreciation improved after an educational program 
(Carpenter et al., 2000). 
A small subgroup of patients with depression performed poorly on the appreciation 
scale. Patients with prior research experience obtained full credit, whereas only one-half 
of  the patients without this experience obtained full credit on the appreciation scale 
(Appelbaum et al., 1999). Another study found that although patients with depression 
acknowledged their illness as readily as patients with angina, they were signiﬁcantly less 
likely to acknowledge the value of treatment (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995b). Appreciation of 
depressed patients also improved after education (Lapid et al., 2003). 
Appreciation has been deﬁned in psycho-geriatrics as the capacity to evaluate the 
emotional and cognitive consequences of treatment choice. This standard emphasizes 
patient awareness of the consequences of a treatment decision: its emotional impact, 
rational requirements, and future consequences (Marson, 1994). A control subgroup 
performed signiﬁcantly better on appreciation than patients with Alzheimer’s disease: over 
60% of those with moderate Alzheimer’s disease and 33% with mild Alzheimer’s were 
marginally competent or incompetent (Marson et al., 1995b). This ﬁnding was recently 
conﬁrmed (Kim et al., 2001). Patients with Parkinson’s disease were also found to perform 
signiﬁcantly worse on appreciation than a control group (Dymek et al., 2001). 
Determining competence: scale or threshold?
The ongoing discussion about whether to operationalize competence as a threshold or 
gradual model reﬂects the difference between decision-making capacity and competence. 
While decision-making capacity is a matter of shades of difference (gradual model), 
competence is either present or not (threshold model) (Buchanan & Brock, 1989).  Although 
a gradual model may be more consistent with clinical practice, a deﬁnitive judgement on 
competence is often required in a particular situation. The question is: how are decision-
making capacity and competence related?
Within psychiatry most instruments were designed to be scored using a scale (table 3) 
(Appelbaum et al., 1981; Bean et al., 1994; Grisso et al., 1995; Palmer et al., 2002). Each standard 
of decision-making capacity, usually deﬁned as the sum of the different abilities, is scored 
separately, although it is argued that the scores of different abilities should not be added 
(Grisso et al., 1997; Palmer et al., 2002). One study described a cut-off based on scores two 
standard deviations below the mean score of all subjects (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a). 
Table 4 shows that most psychogeriatric instruments use a separate scoring system for 
each ability, although one threshold is determined for most instruments. Fitten et al. chose 
to use passing two of three vignettes as the threshold (Fitten et al., 1990). Others based 
thresholds on statistical arguments. Incompetence has been deﬁned as two standard 
deviations below the mean score in the control group (Marson et al., 1995b; Dymek et al., 
2001), or scoring below the ﬁfth centime of the control group (Schmand et al., 1999). The 
threshold of competence is also regarded a normative judgement, which should be 
determined by experts (see also Fazel, 1999). Other methods to determine a cut-off were 
based on raters’ judgements, test-retest study results, and correlation with another 
competency instrument (Fazel et al., 1999).
Validity and reliability
Different forms of validity have been discussed for assessing decision-making capacity: face-
validity, construct validity, and content validity. Face-validity is demonstrated by the focus in 
instruments on a treatment choice (Fitten et al., 1990). Further, the abilities being assessed 
should relate closely to appropriate (legal) standards of competence (Appelbaum & Grisso, 
1995). Most instruments use standards equal to the legal construct of competence (see 
tables 3 and 4). 
Several studies found the construct validity satisfactory (Fitten et al., 1990; Fazel et al., 
1999; Schmand et al., 1999) because of the high correlations between decision-making 
capacity instruments (Fazel et al., 1999), between decision-making capacity and other 
variables (e.g., cognitive screening tests) (Fitten et al., 1990), and between decision-making 
capacity and dementia severity and physicians’ judgements of competence (Bean et al., 1994; 
Schmand et al., 1999). 
In medicine sensitivity and speciﬁcity characterize an extra dimension of validity. 
Determining these aspects of decision-making capacity and competence is difﬁcult, because 
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there is no gold standard, but using expert judgements (e.g., old age or forensic psychiatrists) 
is one way to address the issue (Fazel et al., 1999). Based on sensitivity and speciﬁcity, a 
speciﬁc test determines competence better than brief mental screenings.
Reliability is expressed in inter-rater reliability and test-retest reliability. Table 5 shows 
many studies have reported inter-rater reliability (e.g., research interviewers or 
psychiatrists). Fazel et al. reported raters’ ﬁndings (geriatric psychiatrists) correlated highly 
with each other (r = 0.94) and also with the interviewer (r = 0.95) (Fazel et al., 1999). 
Etchells et al. correlated judgements of experts, clinicians, and research nurses (Etchells et 
al., 1999). Table 5 shows inter-rater reliability is satisfactory in all studies, both for different 
subscales and the total scale.
Table 5: Reliability of instruments assessing decision-making capacity
Authors  
(year of publication)
Instrument Inter-rater reliability
Stanley (1988) research vignettes .87 quality of reasoning
.97 comprehension
Janofsky (1992) HCAT .95
Bean (1994) CIS .95
Marson (1995a) CCTI (vignettes) R > .83 (LS3-LS5)
> 96 % agreement (LS1 and LS2)
Grisso (1995c) UTD
TRAT
Kappa: >.84 (subtests)
Kappa > .85
Grisso (1997) Mac-CAT .99 understanding
.87 appreciation
.97 evidencing a choice
Etchells (1999) ACE experts: agreement 82% Kappa 0.63
clinician/research nurse: agreement 93%, 
Kappa 0.79
SMMSE/experts: 0.89 agreement
Fazel (1999) vignettes .94 and .95
Carpenter (2000) MacCAT-CR .52 choice
.98 understanding
.84 reasoning
.84 appreciation
Kim (2001) MacCAT-CRV .94 understanding
.90 appreciation
.80 reasoning
Palmer (2002) MacCAT-T .85 understanding
.87 appreciation
.75 reasoning
Saks (2002) CSA .85 appreciation (patients)
Test-retest reliability is only reported in three studies (Bean et al., 1994; Grisso et al., 
1995; Fazel et al., 1999). Moderate consistency in test-retest reliability was found in a 
mentally healthy control group (Fazel et al., 1999). Within a group of psychiatric patients, 
Pearson correlations computed separately for each item between 0.43 to 0.98 (Bean et al., 
1994). Grisso et al. reported low consistency in the mentally ill groups, which may 
be explained by changes in psychiatric status. These ﬁndings support the idea that decision-
making capacity is inﬂuenced by relatively stable cognitive abilities, but is sensitive to 
changes in mental status (Grisso et al., 1995). 
For practical applicability, an instrument should be performed easily and not be very 
lengthy. Most studies ﬁnd satisfying inter-rater reliability, which suggests that a method to 
assess decision-making capacity can easily be learned by non-specialists. Further, it was 
found that when experienced physicians were guided by standards of decision-making 
capacity, there was more agreement (Marson et al., 2000a). Administrating the instrument 
and assessment takes approximately 15-20 minutes (Janofsky et al., 1992; Grisso et al., 1997; 
Etchells et al., 1999; Fazel et al., 1999), which seems appropriate in light of the consequences 
of a competency assessment. 
Discussion
An instrument’s clinical value is largely determined by its validity, which depends on the 
relationship between concept and the characteristics of a measuring instrument. The 
discussion of clinical value will therefore reconsider some conceptual issues of instrument 
characteristics. 
The question of competence arises in speciﬁc situations, and is reﬂected in the central 
position of decisions within the instruments. Our analysis shows that instruments were 
developed within speciﬁc patient populations. While similar words are used to describe 
decision-making capacity in psychiatry and psycho-geriatrics, there are several important 
differences. Differences exist in the way information is provided (hypothetical or realistic) 
and in the deﬁnition of standards used. 
All studies considered stress the importance of providing relevant information before 
assessing decision-making capacity. The effects of providing hypothetical or actual 
information on assessing decision-making capacity are unknown. Although a speciﬁc choice 
is given in the (hypothetical) vignettes, the question of competence arises for situations 
different from the hypothetical one. Competence in one situation does not imply 
competence in another, which throws doubt on the value of information from hypothetical 
instruments. Nevertheless, hypothetical situations are similar to clinical ones, and do 
provide insight into a patient’s ability to make clinical decisions. 
The past three decades have seen many discussions on standards to assess competence. 
Although the standards have a legal origin, they are now used for assessing abilities to make 
decisions. One effect of this is that decision-making is perceived as a process, and 
reasonableness of choice is no longer accepted as a standard for competence; the internal 
logical structure of reasons is more important than rationality of reasons. Nevertheless, 
the content dependent character of rational manipulation of information cannot be totally 
denied. While it is true that reasonableness of choice should not determine assessment of 
competence, we should not make judgements without being aware of our normative values 
about rational argumentation or appropriate appreciation. 
Perhaps the standards of competence (and decision-making capacities) overemphasize 
the cognitive side, as emotion plays a role in decision-making (Charland, 1998; 1999). 
Modern emotion theory views emotions as containing basic values and goals, which are 
important in making competent decisions (President’s Commission, 1982; Buchanan & 
Brock, 1989). Emotions may make a difference in assessing decision-making capacity in 
hypothetical or realistic situations. Although discussed, the empirical grounds for the role 
of emotion in assessing decision-making capacity have not been studied.
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There is a need to reconsider the relationship between the different standards, the 
presumed hierarchy (criticized in Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a), and the relation between 
standards and competence. Should the different standards be considered separately, even 
though they may overlap in important ways? If it is possible to distinguish different decisional 
abilities, what is their relation to competence? One recent study on the relation between 
decision-making capacity and competence stressed the importance of distinguishing 
between a clinical impression of decision-making capacity (as a scale) and dichotomous 
judgement of competence, which should also take into account the risk and beneﬁts of the 
speciﬁc situation (Kim et al., 2001). Instruments cannot replace the judgement of a physician, 
they can only provide an approximation of decision-making capacity. Because assessment of 
competence is normative, a statistical solution is not satisfactory.
The above discussion focused on issues that may inﬂuence the validity of instruments. 
While most instruments provide a more reliable assessment than physicians’ judgements 
that do not use instruments, future research should focus on enhancing the validity of such 
instruments. They can be improved by: 1) testing a single instrument on different populations; 
2) evaluating the effect of providing hypothetical or realistic information; 3) reconsidering 
the deﬁnition and use of standards by reexamining the emphasis on cognition and our 
normativity in assessing them; and 4) reconsidering the relation between decision-making 
capacity and competence.
Finally, competency assessments in clinical practice cannot wait for future discussions 
because we need to know how to judge competence now. We need to consider ﬁrst the 
situation speciﬁc character of competence. Decision-making capacity can only be 
determined after the patient is provided with relevant information. Education may also 
improve decision-making capacity. Equally important, there is more or less consensus on 
standards: ability to evidence choice, to understand relevant information, to manipulate 
information rationally, and to appreciate a situation. These standards may provide insight 
into a patient’s decision-making capacity. Final judgement on competence should take into 
account the overemphasis on cognition, the evaluator’s normativity, and an evaluation of 
the risks and beneﬁts of the speciﬁc situation (Kim et al., 2001; Palmer et al., 2002). 
Instruments that address these features may provide a starting point for discovering a good 
trade-off between personal autonomy and well being. 
Treatment Situation inﬂuences 
Decision-making Capacity 
of Cognitively Impaired Persons
An earlier version of this chapter was published in Dutch: 
Vellinga, A., Smit, J.H., van Leeuwen, E., van Tilburg, W., & Jonker, C (2002). De beoordeling 
van ouderen met en zonder cognitieve stoornissen: de vignetmethode nader bekeken. 
Tijdschrift voor Gerontologie en Geriatrie, 33: 207-211.
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Treatment situation inﬂuences decision-making capacity of cognitively impaired 
persons
This article focuses on decision-making capacity of elderly persons (n = 105) both with and 
without cognitive impairment (MMSE ≥ 16) in two treatment situations differing in severity of 
health consequences. Decision-making capacity was assessed with two clinical vignettes, 
representing respectively a hypothetical treatment situation with severe consequences (operation 
for colon cancer) and mild consequences (endoscopy). The following abilities were evaluated: 
evidencing a choice, understanding, reasoning and appreciating a situation. In general the vignette 
with severe consequences was better understood than the vignette with mild consequences. In the 
vignette with mild consequences elderly persons with cognitive impairment performed signiﬁcantly 
worse on understanding, reasoning and appreciation than elderly persons without cognitive 
impairment. In the vignette with severe consequences elderly persons with cognitive impairment 
performed signiﬁcantly worse only on understanding as compared to elderly persons without 
cognitive impairment. Decision-making capacity is less limited by cognitive impairment when 
assessed in a treatment situation with severe consequences. When circumstantial factors affect the 
assessment, the use of hypothetical vignettes should be reconsidered. Assessing decision-making 
capacity in realistic situations can adjust more for the complexity and consequences of a particular 
decision in which the question about an individual’s decision-making capacity emerges. 
Introduction
Within psycho-geriatrics clinical vignettes have been proposed to facilitate assessments of 
decision-making capacity (Stanley et al., 1988; Fitten et al., 1990; Sachs et al., 1994; Marson et 
al., 1995b; Schmand et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2002). Vignettes describe a particular hypothetical 
medical situation. Relevant information is provided to enable a person to consent to a 
speciﬁc medical treatment or research procedure. Several abilities are evaluated to assess 
decision-making capacity: the ability to evidence a choice, to understand, to reason, and to 
appreciate a situation. Evidence is found that elderly persons with cognitive impairment 
perform worse on these abilities than elderly controls without cognitive impairment (Sachs 
et al.,1994; Marson et al., 1995a, 1995b; Schmand et al., 1999).
The situation speciﬁc character of competence stresses that a person may be competent 
or incompetent depending on the situation, which may differ in terms of complexity and 
severity of consequences (President’s Commission, 1982;  Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Lowe 
et al., 2000). In this respect complexity refers to the requirements posed to decisional 
abilities of a subject. It has been argued as well that the severity of consequences of a 
particular choice should be used to determine the threshold of competence. According to 
the sliding scale model more serious consequences of a particular decision require higher 
standards of competence, resulting in higher requirements for a treatment refusal than for 
treatment consent (Drane, 1985; Buchanan & Brock, 1989). 
Thus far few studies have evaluated the effect of different situations on decision-making 
capacity. In these studies severity of consequences was expressed in risk/beneﬁt ratios of 
hypothetical research protocols (Stanley et al., 1984; Sachs et al., 1994; Kim et al., 2002). In 
comparison to elderly persons without cognitive impairment, elderly with cognitive 
impairment were equally able to make reasonable decisions about research participation, 
even though their comprehension was diminished (Sachs et al., 1994). Fitten suggested that 
the higher the complexity (deﬁned in this study as more risks than beneﬁts), the higher the 
percentage of elderly with cognitive impairment who would fail on decision-making capacity, 
which was only partly conﬁrmed (Fitten et al., 1990). Unfortunately, no relation has been 
studied between the complexity of a treatment situation, its consequences, and standards 
of understanding, reasoning, and appreciation. 
This article focuses on the assessment of decision-making capacity in two different 
hypothetical treatment situations. We formulated the following question: “In what way is 
decision-making capacity of elderly patients with and without cognitive impairment 
inﬂuenced by treatment situations differing in degree of severity of consequences?” We 
distinguish a situation with mild consequences, the choice whether or not to undergo an 
endoscopy, from a situation with severe consequences, the choice of whether or not to 
undergo an operation for colon carcinoma. In line with the theoretical concepts and the 
empirical ﬁndings we expect that a situation with severe consequences will require more 
of a person’s abilities – and therefore be more complex – to exhibit a competent choice, 
especially of patients with cognitive impairment. This will have consequences for the use of 
hypothetical vignettes to assess decision-making capacity in clinical practice.
Methods
Study sample
The study group was selected among patients, aged 65 +, visiting geriatric wards for a 
somatic and psychiatric screening (July 1999 to December 2000). Inclusion was based on 
newly-admitted patients. Men were approached ﬁrst, as men are underrepresented in this 
geriatric population. 
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Excluded were patients who were not able to participate in the interview: blind patients, 
patients who were no native speakers, and patients with severe dementia. Patients who 
obtained the treatment described in the vignette within one year before our interview 
were excluded as well. Their performance on competence may differ from other patients, 
because their actual experience may interact with the hypothetical character of the vignette. 
For the same reason patients with a serious chance for a proposal for a gastro-or 
colonoscopy were excluded from this study. However, this group was interviewed with a 
vignette about their actual situation (Vellinga et al., 2005, see also Chapter 7). 
A total of 245 patients were approached to participate. Of this population 34 (14%) 
refused to participate, 35 (14%) indicated they felt too ill or exhausted, 10 (4%) had a 
MMSE score lower than 16, and 24 (10%) could not be interviewed due to organisational 
problems. Eventually, 142 patients were included, of which 37 patients had been proposed 
an endoscopy in reality. 
This study focuses on the remaining 105 patients. They were randomly divided in two 
groups. One group was confronted with a hypothetical vignette with mild consequences, 
the other was confronted with a hypothetical vignette with severe consequences. 
Approval for this study was given by the local medical ethics committee. Written 
consent was obtained from all participants. 
Interview procedure
Interviews were performed by the researcher (physician, ﬁrst author), research nurses, and 
psychologists. They were thoroughly trained, especially in recognising and coping with the 
possible confusion that may be caused by confronting cognitively impaired patients with 
hypothetical situations. Interviews were audio taped in order to monitor the quality of the 
data collection.
Decision-making capacity: the vignette method
Decision-making capacity was assessed with a clinical vignette. The structure of the 
vignettes is in line with earlier described vignettes (Sachs et al., 1994; Schmand et al., 1999). 
The subject and content of the vignettes were developed in collaboration with experienced 
geriatricians and psychiatrists. 
Vignette A describes a situation with mild consequences, namely the choice of 
undergoing an endoscopy for anaemia with unknown cause (box I). Vignette B describes a 
situation with severe consequences, namely the choice of undergoing an operation for 
colon cancer (box II). This vignette was regarded as having severe consequences, since 
refusing an operation may have direct life-threatening consequences, unlike refusing an 
endoscopy.
The vignette was read aloud followed by some questions. The questions reﬂect the 
following standards: evidencing a choice, understanding, reasoning, and appreciation of the 
situation (box III). During reading and the interview, the participant could read the vignette 
as well. Answers to the questions were scored as follows: 0 points for no answer or a 
wrong answer, 1 point for a more or less satisfying answer and 2 points for a satisfying 
answer (for more details, see box III). 
Cognitive performance
General cognitively functioning was measured by the Mini-Mental Scale Examination 
(MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1975). Dementia was diagnosed according to DSM-IV criteria (DSM-
IV, 1994). Despite the limitations, the MMSE is a widely used screening tool to determine 
the level of cognitive functioning in patients with dementia and is often used with this 
purpose in studies on decision-making capacity (Fitten et al., 1990; Janofsky et al., 1992; 
Sachs et al., 1994; Marson et al., 1995b; Fazel et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2001, 2002). However, it 
was stressed that the MMSE is not a valid instrument to assess decision-making capacity 
(Fitten et al., 1990; Janofsky et al., 1992; Rutman & Silberfeld, 1992; Etchells et al., 1999; 
Feinberg & Whitlach, 2001). An advantage of the MMSE is that it provides insight in the 
actual cognitive functioning. This is important, as it is well known that decision-making 
capacity may ﬂuctuate in time due to ﬂuctuations in the severity of the disease, like dementia 
(Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988). 
The MMSE consists of 20 items and scores range from 0-30, higher scores indicating 
better cognitive functioning. The sum score consists of the following elements: orientation 
in time and place, memory, attention, language and visual construction. Patients with scale 
scores < 16 were regarded as severely demented patients who would not be able to 
participate in the interviews. Included were patients with a score ≥ 16, of which patients 
with scale score of 16-23 were considered as cognitively impaired (Tombaugh & MacIntyre, 
1992; Etchells et al., 1997). 
Demographics and control variables
The demographic variables age, gender education, marital status, and domestic situation 
were assessed, to evaluate possible differences between the two randomly selected groups. 
Education was assessed by a question about the highest educational level completed. These 
data were converted into total years of education. Marital status was deﬁned as single, 
married, divorced or widow, dichotomised in married and not (or no longer) married. The 
domestic situation was distinguished in living totally independently and (semi-) dependently.
Data analysis
Baseline characteristics were compared for subjects from both groups. Differences between 
the two groups were tested with the t test for independent samples and the χ 2 test as 
appropriate.
Differences in decision-making capacity between the two vignettes were evaluated by t 
test for independent samples for the ability to evidence a choice, to understand, to reason, 
and to appreciate a situation. These tests were performed for both groups in total as well 
as for cognitively impaired and non-impaired subjects in each group. All differences were 
tested two-sided.
Associations between cognitive functioning and decision-making capacity were 
controlled for demographic characteristics with (co) variance analyses (ANCOVA).
Results
Two groups of elderly patients, each including patients with MMSE scores ranging from 16-
30, were compared with respect to two treatment situations characterized by different 
levels of severity in consequences. In table 1 the characteristics of the sample are given. No 
signiﬁcant differences between the two groups were found for mean age, gender, education, 
marital status, living situation, diagnosis dementia, and cognition. Overall, the highest 
percentage of participants was female, widow, low educated, and lived independently. 
Differences in demographic characteristics were tested between cognitively impaired 
and non-impaired patients in both groups (table 2). In the group confronted with the 
vignette with mild consequences a signiﬁcant difference between cognitively impaired and 
non impaired patients was only found for domestic situation. Patients with cognitive 
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impairment lived relatively more semi-dependently than non-impaired patients. In the group 
confronted with the vignette with severe consequences a signiﬁcant difference between 
cognitively impaired and non-impaired patients was only found for gender. Cognitively 
impaired patients consisted relatively of more women than non-impaired patients. No 
signiﬁcant differences were found in demographic characteristics, diagnosis dementia, and 
cognitive functioning between the groups (vignette A and B) for either cognitively impaired 
or non-impaired patients. 
Table 1: Sample characteristics
Vignet A
 n (%) / M (sd)
Vignet B
 n (%) / M (sd)
P-values
Gender
- Male
- Female
 21 (37.5)
 35 (62.5)
 22 (44.9)
 27 (55.1) 0.442
Age  81.3 (6.5)  81.1 (6.9) 0.832
Years of education  8.26 (3.0)  8.98 (3.5) 0.281
Marital Status
- Married
- Not married
 21 (37.5%)
 35 (62.5)
 19 (38.8%)
 30 (61.2) 0.893
Domestic situation
- Independent
- (Semi-)dependent
 43 (76.8%)
 13 (23.2%)
 35 (71.4%)
 14 (28.6%) 0.531
Diagnosis dementia
- no dementia
- cognitively impaired or dementia
Missing
 40 (71.4%)
 16 (28.6%)
 1 (1.8%)
 32 (71.4%)
 12 (24.5%)
 5 (10.2%)
0.886
MMSE 
16-30
 24.5 (3.5)  23.8 (4.0) 0.414
Table 2:  Differences in demographical characteristics, diagnosis dementia and cognitive 
functioning (MMSE) of cognitively impaired and non impaired subjects in vignettes 
with mild or severe consequences.
Mild consequences
Endoscopy anaemia e.c.i
 MMSE≤23 MMSE>23 P-values*
 (n = 19) (n=37)
 M (sd) M (sd) 
Severe consequences
Operation colon cancer
 MMSE≤23 MMSE>23 P-values*
 (n = 21) (n = 28) 
 M (sd) M (sd)
Gender:
- Male
- Female
 7 (36.8%)
 12 (63.1%)
 14 (37.8%)
 23 (62.2%) 0.781
 5 (23.8%)
 16 (76.2%)
 17 (60.7%)
 11 (39.3%) 0.010
Age  81.0 (7.0)  81.5 (6.3) 0.781  82.3 (6.1)  80.1 (7.5) 0.289
Years of education  8.0 (3.1)  8.4 (3.0) 0.667  8.8 (3.6)  9.1 (3.6) 0.769
Marital status:
- married
- not married
 6 (31.6%)
 13 (68.4%)
 15 (40.5%)
 22 (59.5%) 0.512
 8 (38.1%)
 13 (61.9%)
 11 (39.3%)
 17 (60.7%) 0.933
Domestic situation:
- independent
- (semi-)dependent
 11 (57.9%)
 8 (42.1%)
 32 (86.5%)
 5 (13.5%) 0.016
 16 (76.2%)
 5 (23.8%)
 19 (67.9%)
 9 (32.1%) 0.523
Diagnosis dementia:
- no dementia
- dementia
Missing
 6 (31.6%)
 13 (68.4%)
0
 34 (91.9%)
 3 (8.1%)
 1 (2.7%) 0.000
 7 (33.3%)
 12 (57.1%)
 2 (10.5%)
 25 (89.3%)
 0
 3 (10.7%) 0.000
MMSE
(16-30)
 20.2 (2.1)  26.6 (1.6) 0.000  19.8 (2.2)  26.9 (1.9) 0.000
*t-test for two independent samples, level of signiﬁcance p<0.05
Table 3:  Mean scores of decision-making capacity in the vignettes with mild or severe 
consequences.
Mild consequences
Endoscopy anaemia e.c.i
(n = 56)
 M (sd)
Severe consequences
Operation colon cancer
(n = 49)
 M (sd)
P-values*
Evidencing a choice
(0-2)
 1.85 (0.41)  1.86 (0.46) .976
Understanding
(0-6)
 4.16 (1.70)  4.80 (1.38) .038
Reasoning
(0-8)
 3.36 (1.19)  3.43 (0.91) .758
Appreciation
(0-4)
 3.15 (1.06)  3.29 (0.98) .487
Total score
(0-20)
 12.38 (3.48)  13.37 (2.88) .118
* t-test for two independent samples, level of signiﬁcance p<0.05
Table 4:  Mean scores of decision-making capacity of cognitively impaired and cognitively 
non-impaired subjects in vignettes with mild or severe consequences.
Mild consequences
Endoscopy anaemia e.c.i
 MMSE≤23 MMSE>23 P-values*
 (n = 19) (n = 37)
 M (sd) M (sd) 
Severe consequences
Operation colon cancer
 MMSE≤23 MMSE>23 P-values*
 (n = 21) (n = 28) 
 M (sd) M (sd)
Evidencing a  
choice
(0-2)
 1.72 (0.58)  1.92 (0.28) .183  1.90 (0.30)  1.82 (0.55) .533
Understanding
(0-6)
 3.37 (1.77)  4.57 (1.54) .011  4.10 (1.67)  5.32 (0.82) .001
Reasoning
(0-8)
 2.67 (1.61)  3.70 (0.74) .017  3.48 (0.93)  3.39 (0.92) .755
Appreciation
(0-4)
 2.56 (1.20)  3.43 (0.87) .003  3.24 (1.37)  3.32 (0.86) .772
Total score
(0-20)
 9.95 (3.92)  13.62 (2.48) .000  12.71 (3.44)  13.86 (2.32) .171
* t-test for two independent samples, level of signiﬁcance p<0.05
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In table 3 the mean scores are shown of the vignette with mild or severe consequences. 
It can be concluded that the situation with severe consequences was better understood 
than the situation with mild consequences. No signiﬁcant differences were found for 
evidencing a choice, reasoning, appreciation, and total scores between both groups.
The association between severity of consequences, decision-making capacity, and 
cognitive functioning is shown in table 4. Within the group of the vignette with mild 
consequences signiﬁcant differences between cognitively impaired and non-impaired were 
found for understanding, reasoning, appreciation, and the total vignette score. Cognitively 
impaired participants performed worse on these abilities than cognitively non-impaired 
participants. Domestic situation did not inﬂuence the association between decision-making 
capacity and cognitive functioning. Within the group confronted with the vignette with 
severe consequences cognitively impaired participants only performed signiﬁcantly worse 
on understanding. Gender was not found to inﬂuence the association between decision-
making capacity and cognitive functioning.
Comparing the two treatment situations for each subgroup of either cognitively 
impaired or non-impaired, it was found that subjects without cognitive impairment only 
showed a signiﬁcant difference on understanding (mean vignette A: 4.57 vs. mean vignette 
B: 5.32, p = 0.022). No signiﬁcant differences between the two treatment situations were 
found for evidencing a choice, reasoning, appreciation, and the total vignette score. However, 
within the group of subjects with cognitive impairment a signiﬁcant difference was found 
for the total vignette score (mean vignette A: 9.95, mean vignette B: 12.71, p = 0.023). While 
not signiﬁcant, there was some indication that the situation with severe consequences 
scored better on both reasoning (mean vignette A: 2.67 vs. mean vignette B: 3.48, p = 
0.071) and appreciation (mean vignette A: 2.56 vs. mean vignette B: 3.24, p = 0.076). 
Discussion
This study evaluates the inﬂuence of different contexts and consequences on assessing 
decision-making capacity in a population of elderly subjects with (and without) cognitive 
impairment. Decision-making capacity was assessed with clinical vignettes in two comparable 
groups. It was found that the performance in the treatment situation with severe 
consequences was better than in the situation with mild consequences. This effect was 
especially found in elderly with cognitive impairment. These ﬁndings contrast with our initial 
presumption that a treatment situation with severe consequences would require more of 
patients’ abilities with regard to decision-making than a situation with mild consequences. 
How can these ﬁndings be explained? We assumed that the random selection constituted 
two comparable groups, which was conﬁrmed for demographic characteristics and degree 
of cognitive impairment. Furthermore, the methodology to assess decision-making capacity 
was equal in both groups. Explanations of the differences must thus be found in the speciﬁc 
content of the vignettes differing in their complexity and severity of consequences. 
With regard to this complexity it can be concluded that, in contrast to earlier statements, 
situations with more severe consequences should not necessarily be considered as more 
complex choices (Fitten et al., 1990). Our study shows that the situation with severe 
consequences was signiﬁcantly better understood than the situation with mild consequences. 
This ﬁnding is in agreement with the theoretical consideration of Beauchamp and Childress, 
who argue that many non-risky situations require more ability than many risky situations 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). 
With regard to the inﬂuence of cognition, signiﬁcant differences between impaired and 
non-impaired in all standards were found, especially in the situation with mild consequences. 
This ﬁnding is consistent with earlier studies on the relationship between decision-making 
capacity and cognitively impaired elderly (Marson et al., 1995a, 1995b; Schmand et al., 1999). 
In case of severe consequences, only understanding was negatively inﬂuenced by cognitive 
impairment. The group of subjects with cognitive impairment understood the situation 
with severe consequences better than the situation with mild consequences. This suggests 
that the situation with mild consequences may be considered as more complex, in terms of 
requiring more of the individuals’ abilities associated with decision-making capacity. 
When the severity of consequences does not determine the complexity of a situation, 
what makes a decision more complex than another decision? Theories of decision-making 
have mentioned heuristic tools like representativeness and availability of information to 
explain people’s decision-making (Kahneman, et al., 1982). People intuitively evaluate choices 
by the degree in which a situation resembles other known situations, or by the ease with 
which known situations come to mind (situations people are familiar with). In other words: 
choices not resembling known situations, like for instance an endoscopy, may be experienced 
as more complex than choices resembling known situations. In this study elderly patients 
are probably more familiar with knowledge about cancer and operations, than with the 
speciﬁc methods of a stomach investigation. This might explain that the situation with mild 
consequences was more difﬁcult to understand than the situation with severe consequences.
Another explanation for the differences in the assessment of decision-making capacity 
can be found in the severity of consequences of the vignettes. Our ﬁndings can perhaps be 
connected to the discussion on emotion and competence (Charland 1998, 1999). Damasio 
has argued that emotions are essential to practical reasoning and decision-making (Damasio, 
1994, 2000). Nowadays a central idea in cognitive emotional theory is that emotion involves 
appraisal. Appraisal is regarded as a process whereby one interprets and evaluates the 
signiﬁcance of events and situations in the environment in light of learned or pre-set goals 
and expectations (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). The particular context of a choice with life-
threatening consequences may in general provoke more feelings of personal relevance than 
a choice with less severe consequences. The choice of whether or not to undergo an 
operation for colon cancer may provoke more feelings of personal relevance than a choice 
to undergo an endoscopy with mild consequences. 
Although this study raises some interesting questions about decision-making capacity 
and a decision’s complexity and its consequences, there are some limitations to be 
mentioned as well. First, the effects of a particular treatment situation on one’s decision-
making capacity are clearer when two situations are tested in one person. In this study we 
only tested one situation in one participant to avoid burden. To compare two situations we 
had to rely on the comparability of the two groups. Demographic characteristics were 
comparable for the two groups, as well as in the subgroups of cognitively impaired and 
non-impaired subjects. When demographic characteristics could not be compared, the 
effect of the variable on the association cognition and decision-making capacity was tested. 
However, no signiﬁcant effects were found. Secondly, the MMSE was used to assess the 
degree of cognitive functioning. An important limitation of the MMSE is the educational 
bias. However, variance analyses did not show signiﬁcant inﬂuence of education on the 
association between cognitive functioning and decision-making capacity (results not shown). 
Thirdly, although decision-making capacity in psycho-geriatrics has earlier been assessed 
with the vignette method (Stanley et al., 1984, 1988; Fitten et al., 1990; Sachs et al., 1990; 
Marson et al., 1995b; Fazel et al., 1999; Schmand et al., 1999), questions can nevertheless 
be  asked about the validity and reliability of the method. It was argued that face-validity 
is demonstrated by the element of a particular treatment situation (Fitten et al., 1990; 
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Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995). Face-validity can also be demonstrated in the standards used 
to assess competence. Standards used in the vignettes are based on legal standards, which 
have been discussed for decades (Roth et al., 1977; Appelbaum & Roth, 1982; Appelbaum & 
Grisso, 1988). With regard to reliability: several studies, including our own, have reported 
satisfying inter-rater reliability (Marson et al., 1995a, Grisso et al., 1997; Fazel et al., 1999; 
Carpenter et al., 2000).
Our ﬁndings have consequences for another element of validity, namely the hypothetical 
character of the vignettes. The question of decision-making capacity always comes up in 
real treatment situations. What do reactions towards a hypothetical choice predict about 
the actual situation and its consequences as experienced by patients? How can we safeguard 
comparability of the complexity and consequences of the hypothetical situation to the 
actual situation of the patient? Especially when the comparability is not only determined by 
medical technical arguments, but is largely determined by a patient’s personal value system. 
Until now only one study evaluated the effect of information about hypothetical and 
realistic situations on the process of understanding (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991). It was 
suggested that patients understood information easier when it was related to their disease, 
as compared to general information not related to their personal situation. It seems 
therefore advisable to perform future research on assessing decision-making capacity in 
real life decisions to account for personal experiences of choice situations. Experiences in 
assessing decision-making capacity in actual situations obtained within the context of 
psychiatry may serve as a guide in these studies (Grisso et al., 1997; Kitamura et al., 1998; 
Appelbaum et al., 1999). 
Further discussion is also needed about the sliding scale concept of competence. It has 
been argued that the criteria of competence should be more stringent in situations with 
severe consequences than in situations with mild consequences (Drane, 1985; Buchanan & 
Brock, 1989). Our ﬁndings suggest that people may react differently towards situations 
with a different degree of severity in consequences. Apparently, people are for a longer 
period of cognitive impairment able to make their judgement in a situation with severe 
consequences. It seems therefore doubtful that a causal association exists between the 
severity of consequences as we judge it and the requirements experienced by an individual. 
This association is part and parcel of the sliding scale concept in applying a normative 
judgement of competence on a psychological concept of decision-making capacity. The 
requirements experienced by the individual may depend heavily on earlier experiences and 
personal history. Further evaluation of this problem needs a qualitative analysis of people’s 
choices, their reasons and their connection with personal values and history. Finally, a 
serious discussion is needed about the meaning of competence as decision-making capacity 
and our normative judgements based on our ideas on autonomy and beneﬁcence.
Decision-making Capacity  
of Elderly Patients Assessed with  
the Vignette Method:  
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Decision-making capacity of elderly patients with the vignette method: imagination 
or reality?
This article evaluates whether providing hypothetical or realistic information inﬂuences decision-
making capacity in elderly patients with (and without) cognitive impairment. Decision-making 
capacity was assessed with a clinical vignette, representing the choice of whether or not to undergo 
an endoscopy. The following standards of decision-making capacity were evaluated quantitatively 
and qualitatively: the ability to evidence a choice, to understand, to reason, and to appreciate a 
situation. The vignette was presented to patients either in a hypothetical situation or in a real 
situation. In the hypothetical situation cognitively impaired patients performed signiﬁcantly worse 
than cognitively non-impaired patients on all abilities associated with decision-making capacity 
(with the exception of evidencing a choice). The realistic situation showed the same pattern for the 
ability to understand and the total vignette score. However, cognitively impaired and non-impaired 
patients reasoned about and appreciated the realistic situation equally well. The qualitative analysis 
revealed that patients gave comparable answers in the hypothetical and realistic situation. Patients 
answered indifferently of the standards of decision-making capacity. Also personal circumstances 
were taken as reference point to make a decision, regardless of the situation. Major differences 
between the hypothetical and realistic situation were not found. However, our ﬁndings do raise 
questions about the validity of hypothetical vignettes, especially for the use in cognitively impaired 
persons. 
Introduction
During the last decades many instruments to assess competence have been proposed in 
matters of consent to treatment or to participate in research (Stanley et al., 1984; Stanley 
et al., 1988; Fitten et al., 1990; Janofsky et al., 1992; Martin & Glancy, 1994; Sachs et al., 1994; 
Marson et al., 1995b; Grisso et al., 1997; Kitamura et al., 1998; Etchells et al., 1999; Schmand 
et al., 1999; Dymek et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2001). These instruments have in common that 
competence is operationalized as decision-making capacity. They also share the importance 
given to information disclosure and use the same standards to assess decision-making 
capacity: the ability to evidence a choice, to understand, to reason, and to appreciate a 
situation. One major difference comes up when various instruments are compared. Within 
psychiatry decision-making capacity is determined in realistic treatment situations, whereas 
in psycho-geriatrics decision-making capacity is mainly evaluated in hypothetical research 
situations with vignette methods (Vellinga et al., 2004).
It was argued that the hypothetical vignette method could approximate the ’real-life’ 
physician assessment situation (Marson et al., 1995b). However, a hypothetical situation is 
different from a real-life situation, which may inﬂuence the assessment of decision-making 
capacity. Performances may either be heightened by greater motivation to reach a good 
decision about a personally relevant issue or be reduced by anxiety that attends the 
consideration of one’s own situation (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995).
Until now the effects of hypothetical or realistic methods on the assessment of decision-
making capacity has not been thoroughly investigated. Only one study considered the effect 
of hypothetical or realistic information disclosure on the ability to understand (Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1991). Patients were found to understand information related to their 
psychiatric illness better than hypothetical information about a somatic illness. This ﬁnding 
suggests that providing hypothetical or realistic information may lead to different results in 
assessing the ability to understand. It was not evaluated whether other decisional abilities, 
like evidencing a choice, reasoning, and appreciation, are inﬂuenced as well by information 
disclosure in either a hypothetical or realistic way. 
Within psycho-geriatrics (hypothetical) vignettes have mainly been used to assess decision-
making capacity. Elderly persons with cognitive impairment demonstrated a signiﬁcant 
worse performance than cognitively non-impaired control subjects with regard to the 
understanding of treatment and research situations, to the manipulating of information 
rationally, and to the appreciation of the situation (Stanley et al., 1988; Fitten et al., 1990; 
Marson et al., 1995b; Fazel et al., 1999; Schmand et al., 1999; Dymek et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2001). 
The focus of this study is to evaluate the effect of providing either realistic or 
hypothetical treatment information on the assessment of decision-making capacity in 
elderly patients, comparing cognitively impaired with non-impaired persons. First, the degree 
of decision-making capacity will be quantitatively compared in two similar groups of elderly 
patients. Secondly, the content analysis will be performed of the categories of understanding, 
evidencing a choice, reasoning and appreciation will be qualitatively described. In this way 
we will be able to describe the individual´s level of performance (quantitative scores), and 
may possibly explain that performance by the qualitative analysis (Marson et al., 1999).
Methods
Study sample
The sample was selected among patients, aged 65+, visiting a geriatric ward for a somatic 
and psychiatric screening and patients visiting a gastro-enterology ward. Inclusion was 
based on newly-admitted patients. 
76 To Know or Not to Be
chapter
7
77Decision-making Capacity of Elderly Patients Assessed  
with the Vignette Method: Imagination or Reality?
chapter
7
Excluded were patients who were not able to participate in the interview, like blind 
patients, patients who were not native speakers and patients with moderate and severe 
dementia (Mini-Mental State Examination < 16). These patients were not able to participate 
in the interview, as it consisted of questionnaires which partly required reading in the 
Dutch language and which are only valid in patients with a MMSE above 16. Patients who 
obtained the treatment described in the vignette within one year before the moment of 
our interview were excluded as well. Their performance may be inﬂuenced by their actual 
experience. 
In total 245 patients were approached to participate. Of this population 34 (14%) 
refused to participate, 35 (14%) indicated they were too ill or exhausted, and 24 (10%) 
could not be interviewed due to logistical problems. Ten patients (4%) had a MMSE score 
lower than 16, and did not reach the inclusion criteria. Eventually, 142 patients were 
included, which equals a participation rate of 60%. 
The remaining 142 patients were divided in three groups. The ﬁrst group consisted of 
37 patients who were actually proposed to undergo an endoscopy. Decision-making 
capacity was assessed with a vignette disclosing information about their actual situation. 
The remaining 105 patients were randomly divided in two groups. They were confronted 
with a hypothetical treatment vignette about either an endoscopy or an operation for 
colon cancer (Vellinga et al., 2002). In this study the group of patients confronted with the 
realistic vignette (n = 37) will be compared with the group of patients confronted with the 
hypothetical vignette, representing the choice of whether or not to undergo an endoscopy 
(n = 56).  Approval for this study was given by the local medical ethics committee. Informed 
consent was obtained of all respondents.
Interviewers
A researcher (physician, ﬁrst author), research nurses, and psychologists performed the 
interviews. They were thoroughly trained for performing the interviews in this study. The 
training consisted of an introduction of the questionnaire by the ﬁrst author, a test interview 
performed by the interviewer on the ﬁrst author and an interview of a participant, performed 
in attendance of the ﬁrst author. Extra attention was given to the recognition of possible 
confusion caused by questions about a hypothetical situation in cognitively impaired patients. 
Interviews were audio taped in order to monitor the quality of the data-collection. Feedback 
on the interviews was given to the interviewer during the total period the data-collection.
Decision-making capacity: the vignette method
Decision-making capacity was assessed with a clinical vignette, describing the choice of 
undergoing an endoscopy for anaemia (box I). The structure of the vignette is in line 
with vignettes described in earlier studies (Sachs et al., 1994; Marson et al., 1995b; Schmand 
et al., 1999). The content of the vignette was developed in collaboration with experienced 
geriatricians and psychiatrists. The vignette was presented either in a hypothetical way 
during the interview, or presented after the physician had proposed the choice in reality. 
The vignette was not part of the clinical care of the patients. This means that the patient´s 
consent for the endoscopy had to be assessed by the physician, who was blind for the 
results of the vignette. 
The vignette was read aloud, followed by some questions. The questions represented 
the following abilities: factual understanding, evidencing a choice, reasoning and appreciation 
of the situation (Grisso et al., 1997). During the reading and the interview, the participant 
was allowed to read the vignette. Answers to the questions were scored as follows: 0 points 
for no answer or a wrong answer, 1 point for a more or less satisfying answer (this is an 
answer partially containing elements of the vignette or elements of personal arguments, 
which are not given in the text. For example: ’I don’t want to undergo an investigation’, 
because of my high age) and 2 points for a satisfying answer (box III). The inter-rater 
reliability (Cohen’s Kappa) of the vignettes is 0.64, which represents 78% agreement 
between the raters.10 The content of choice, consent or refusal, was administered in all 
interviews.  All interviews were audio taped. The audiotapes were converted into transcripts 
in order to perform a descriptive analysis.
Cognitive performance
Dementia was diagnosed according DSM-IV criteria (DSM-IV, 1994). Cognitive function was 
measured by the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1975). Despite the 
limitations, the MMSE is a widely used screening tool for establishing the level of cognitive 
functioning in patients with dementia and is often used with this purpose in studies on 
decision-making capacity (Fitten et al., 1990; Janofsky et al., 1992; Sachs et al., 1994; Marson 
et al., 1995b; Fazel et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2002). However, it was often 
stressed that the MMSE is not a valid instrument to assess decision-making capacity (Fitten 
et al., 1990; Janofsky et al., 1992; Rutman & Silberfeld, 1992; Etchells et al., 1999; Feinberg & 
Whitlach, 2001). An advantage of the MMSE is that it provides insight in the actual cognitive 
functioning. This is important, as it is well known that decision-making capacity may ﬂuctuate 
in time due to ﬂuctuations in the severity of the disease, like dementia (Appelbaum & 
Grisso, 1988). 
Patients with scale-scores lower than 16 were regarded as moderately or severely 
demented patients who would not be able to participate in the interview. Included were 
patients with scale-scores greater than or equal to 16. Patients with scale-scores between 
16 to 23 were considered as cognitively impaired (Tombaugh & MacIntyre, 1992). An 
argument in favour for this cut off is based on the ﬁnding that people with a SMMSE scale 
score 16 to 23 have an increased risk of impairment in decision-making capacity, whereas 
people with a score of 24 to 30 can serve as a ‘normal’ control group (Etchells et al., 1997). 
Demographics 
The demographic variables age, gender education, marital status, and domestic situation 
were included in the analyses to assess possible differences between the two selected 
groups. Education was assessed by a question about the highest educational level completed. 
These data were converted into total years of education. Marital status was dichotomised 
in married and not married. Domestic situation was converted into living totally independent 
and living (semi-) dependent. Living (semi-) dependent includes patients who live in nursing 
homes as well as senior homes.
Data analysis
Baseline characteristics were compared for subjects from both groups. Differences in the 
continuous variables age, education, and MMSE were tested two-sided with the t test for 
independent samples. Differences in gender, marital status, domestic situation, and diagnosis 
dementia were evaluated with the χ 2 test. 
10  To examine inter-rater reliability, vignettes of 45 participants were rated by both a research assistant and 
one of the authors (AV). Kappa was computed for the total vignette score, which was divided into tertiles.
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Differences in decision-making capacity between the hypothetical or realistic situation 
were evaluated by the t test for independent samples (two-sided). These tests were 
performed for the total sample as well as for cognitively impaired and non-impaired subjects 
in each group. For all statistical test p < 0.05 is adopted as level of signiﬁcance.
Twenty randomly selected transcripts from both the hypothetical and realistic situation 
were qualitatively compared. The analysis consisted of two parts: a content analysis and a 
frequency score of subjects selected by the content analysis in both the realistic and 
hypothetical situation. The content analysis was performed by distinguishing topics out of 
the patients´ answers with respect to the questions about understanding, evidencing a 
choice, reasoning and appreciating a situation.
Results
Two groups of elderly patients, with and without cognitive impairment, were compared 
with respect to hypothetical or realistic vignettes containing a treatment proposal. Table 1 
shows most of the participants are female, single, and live independently. No signiﬁcant 
differences were found for gender, age, education, marital status, domestic situation, 
diagnosis dementia and cognitive functioning between the groups confronted with either 
the realistic or the hypothetical vignette. Except for domestic situation no signiﬁcant 
differences were found between cognitively impaired and non-impaired subjects (results 
not shown). In the group confronted with the hypothetical vignette a signiﬁcantly higher 
percentage of participants with cognitive impairment lived (semi-) dependently (Pearson 
Chi-square: 5.757, P = 0.016). No signiﬁcant differences between the hypothetical and 
realistic situation were found for cognitively impaired persons (results not shown).
Table 1: Sample characteristics
Hypothetical
(n=56)
 n (%) / M(sd)
Realistic
(n=37)
 n (%) / M(sd)
P-values
Gender
- Male
- Female
 21 (38%)
 35 (63%)
 11 (30%)
 26 (70%)
0.440
Age (y)  81.3 (6.47)  82.0 (7.63) 0.681
Education (y)
Missing
 8.3 (3.03)
 3
 8.0 (2.53)
 1
0.668
Marital Status
- Married
- Not married
 21 (38%)
 35 (63%)
 8 (22%)
 29 (78%)
0.106
Domestic situation
- Independent
- (Semi-)dependent
 43 (77%)
 13 (23%)
 25 (68%)
 12 (32%)
0.326
Diagnosis dementia
- no dementia
- dementia
Missing
 40 (71%)
 16 (29%)
 0
 21 (57%)
 9 (24%)
 7 (19%)
0.889
MMSE (y)
16-30
 24.5 (3.54)  23.3 (3.74) 0.147
The process of decision-making capacity: a quantitative approach
Table 2 shows the mean scores of decision-making capacity in the hypothetical and realistic 
treatment situations. No signiﬁcant differences were found between the two situations. 
With exception for reasoning, the scores on the different abilities tended to be somewhat 
higher in the realistic situation.
Table 2: Mean scores of decision-making capacity in the realistic and hypothetical situation.
Hypothetical
(n=56)
 M (sd)
Realistic
(n=37)
 M (sd)
P-values*
Evidencing a choice
(0-2)
 1.85 (0.41)  1.97 (0.16) 0.055
Understanding
(0-6)
 4.16 (1.70)  4.54 (1.41) 0.263
Reasoning
(0-8)
 3.36 (1.19)  3.35 (0.95) 0.958
Appreciation
(0-4)
 3.15 (1.06)  3.38 (0.76) 0.223
Total score
(0-20)
 12.38 (3.48)  13.24 (2.23) 0.146
*t-test for two independent samples, level of  signiﬁcance p < 0.05 
Table 3 shows the effect of hypothetical or realistic information disclosure on the 
assessment of decision-making capacity in cognitively impaired and non-impaired patients. 
Cognitively impaired patients performed signiﬁcantly worse in the hypothetical situation 
with respect to the ability to understand, to reason, and to appreciate the situation. Also 
their total vignette score was signiﬁcantly lower in comparison to cognitively non-impaired 
patients. In the realistic situation signiﬁcant differences between cognitively impaired and 
Table 3:  Mean scores of decision-making capacity of cognitive impaired and cognitive non-
impaired subjects in the hypothetical and realistic situation.
Hypothetical
 MMSE≤23 MMSE>23 P-values*
 (n = 19) (n=37)
 M (sd) M (sd) 
Realistic
 MMSE≤23 MMSE>23 P-values*
 (n = 16) (n = 21) 
 M (sd) M (sd) 
Evidencing a choice
(0-2)
 1.72 (0.58)  1.92 (0.28) 0.183  1.94 (0.25)  2.00 (0) 0.333
Understanding
(0-6)
 3.37 (1.77)  4.57 (1.54) 0.011  3.94 (1.29)  5.00 (1.34) 0.021
Reasoning
(0-8)
 2.67 (1.61)  3.70 (0.74) 0.017  3.13 (0.72)  3.52 (1.08) 0.210
Appreciation
(0-4)
 2.56 (1.20)  3.43 (0.88) 0.003  3.31 (0.87)  3.43 (0.68) 0.651
Total score
(0-20)
 9.95 (3.92)  13.62 (2.48) 0.000  12.31 (1.99)  13.95 (2.18) 0.024
*t-test for two independent samples, level of signiﬁcance p<0.05
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non-impaired patients were found for the ability to understand and the mean total vignette 
score. No signiﬁcant differences were found for the abilities to reason and to appreciate 
the situation. Cognitively impaired patients appreciated the realistic situation better than 
the hypothetical situation (respectively 3.31 and 2.56, p=0.042) and obtained a signiﬁcantly 
higher mean total score (respectively 12.31 and 9.95, p=0.036). 
The content of decision: a qualitative approach
After content analysis of the transcripts of both the hypothetical situation and the realistic 
situation two general remarks can be made. First, analysis of the answers in the different 
categories (understanding, choice, reasoning, and appreciation) was difﬁcult, because 
patients answered the questions indifferent of the categories. For example, when questions 
about understanding the proposed treatment were posed, patients immediately answered 
by giving their treatment preference and accompanying reasons. Questions reﬂecting 
different abilities of decision-making are rather artiﬁcial in comparison to the way decisions 
are actually made. An example to clarify this remark:
 I:  Can you tell something about the proposed treatment? (hypothetical)11
 R (61):  That examination, of course I want to undergo it. I would like to know the cause of my 
complaints.
 I:  But can you tell something about that examination?
 R (61):  It is a tube to watch the stomach. Of course I´ll do it. I would like to know what is the 
matter.
Second, patients referred to their own circumstances in both the hypothetical and 
realistic situation. They mentioned for instance their actual complaints instead of the 
described hypothetical complaints, or described personal experiences or experiences of 
friends or family to underline their arguments:
 I:  Can you mention advantages and disadvantages of the proposed treatment? 
(hypothetical)
 R (76):  (advantage: appropriate treatment can be given). A disadvantage is that everything 
remains untreated. And the anaemia will stay longer. All these circumstances and 
treatment. I can´t handle it no longer. I´m getting tired only to think about it. I have had 
little, how can you call it, I have had little too much lately. Something like, don´t bother, 
I don´t see the meaning of it anymore…I´m getting tired of everything. If I would have 
been 20 years younger, I would have consented immediately.
 I: Can you tell something about the disease? (hypothetical)
 R (25):   That I know the cause, an ulcer of the stomach. I know that it causes pain. My husband 
had two ulcers of the stomach. He died because of them.
Answers reﬂecting personal experiences were especially found in the category of 
understanding. In the hypothetical situation the interviewer often had to emphasize that 
the respondent should imagine to be in the situation as described, after which the 
respondent correctly answered the question in the second instance. In the hypothetical 
situation many subjects mentioned the possibility that the complaints may be caused by 
cancer, instead of describing the illness or complaints as given in the vignette (anaemia or 
faecal blood loss). With regard to the proposed procedure, in both situations patients 
described the procedure. However, patients in the hypothetical situation tended to mention 
more often their own situation and reasons whether or not they want to undergo the 
procedure. The advantages of undergoing this examination of the stomach were similar in 
both situations (table 4). Advantages mostly mentioned were to increase the knowledge 
about one’s health situation and the possibility of curing the underlying disease. Disadvantages 
mostly mentioned were a painful or distressing examination procedure (table 4). In the 
hypothetical situation some patients mentioned that not undergoing the examination may 
have negative consequences for one´s health. In the realistic situation some patients 
expressed the disadvantage of the possibility of being confronted with a malignant disease 
(which can be judged as a correct disadvantage, but is not described in the vignette).With 
respect to evidencing a choice one important aspect regards that some patients stressed 
they actually don’t feel have a choice. They experienced their situation as beyond their 
control (regardless of a hypothetical or realistic situation):
 I:  Can you express whether or not you want to be treated? (realistic)
 R (147):  Yes, I´ll have to. I´ll have to do this examination. Yes, I do not have another choice.
This feeling was also expressed by the subject of ´necessity´ as an important reason to 
undergo the examination and which was also mentioned as an appreciation of the situation. 
An analysis of the choice content of all patients (n = 93) revealed that an equal amount of 
patients refused the proposed examination (hypothetical situation: 23% refusals, realistic 
situation 24% refusals, Chi square: 0.034, p=0.853).
Reasons to consent to an endoscopy were the security of knowledge about the medical 
cause and the expectation that the underlying disease may be treated (table 4). In 
comparison of the hypothetical and realistic situation a difference appeared with regard to 
the subject of experienced complaints. In the realistic situation the experienced complaints 
were a reason to undergo the proposed examination, and the absence of complaints was 
mentioned as reason for not undergoing the examination as well. However, the subject of 
complaints was not mentioned as reason to consent or refuse further examination by 
patients in the hypothetical situation. 
With regard to appreciation (table 4), both the hypothetical and the realistic group 
appreciated the situation as fearful or stressful. However, patients in both groups also 
acknowledged that an examination may eventually improve their health. In the realistic 
situation patients seemed to be more uncertain: they expressed more often the attitude of 
’wait and see’ and were less secure about the inﬂuence of the examination on their health 
and the opinion of the family than patients in the hypothetical situation. In both situations 
patients expected that the opinion of the family will be in concordance with their decision 
and it was also emphasized that the family will have the opinion that the choice is up to the 
patient herself.
Discussion
In comparing two groups of elderly patients in a vignette study on an optional treatment 
with an endoscopy for anaemia, no signiﬁcant quantitative differences were found between 
the hypothetical and realistic situation. In this study the ﬁndings of Grisso et al. (1991) 
could therefore not be replicated. However, although they found signiﬁcant group-by-form 11 (in italics) are remarks of the author.
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interactions, the group means only showed a small tendency for mentally ill patients to 
perform somewhat better on the form representing their actual psychiatric illness than on 
the forms representing a hypothetical somatic illness (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991). This last 
ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by our study outcomes. 
Our ﬁnding could indicate that hypothetical vignettes can be used equally well as 
realistic treatment situations to assess decision-making capacity. This is underlined by our 
qualitative analysis, which shows that regardless of the test situation participants give 
comparable answers. With respect to understanding, the description of advantages and 
disadvantages is comparable. Reasons mentioned in both groups are to gain knowledge 
about the medical cause and the possibility of treating the underlying disease. Both groups 
appreciate the situation as fearful and stressful. In this respect hypothetical vignettes seem 
to approximate real life decisions rather well (Marson et al., 1995b). Further, in both the 
hypothetical and the realistic situation patients express the feeling of not having a choice. 
This ﬁnding also deserves more attention in future discussions on the concept of informed 
consent.
However, because decision-making capacity is especially affected in elderly persons with 
cognitive impairment (Fitten et al., 1990; Marson et al., 1995b; Schmand et al., 1999), we 
expected to ﬁnd more differences between the hypothetical and realistic situation in 
comparing cognitively impaired persons with non-impaired elderly patients. Although 
severely impaired patients were excluded in our study, signiﬁcant quantitative differences 
regarding understanding and the total vignette score were found in both the hypothetical 
and realistic situation between cognitively impaired and non-impaired patients. In contrast 
to the hypothetical situation, no signiﬁcant differences were found for the ability to reason 
and to appreciate the situation in the realistic situation. Cognitively impaired elderly also 
performed better on appreciation in the realistic situation as compared to the hypothetical 
situation and attained a signiﬁcant higher total vignette score. This ﬁnding compromises 
somewhat the validity of competency assessments by using vignettes with hypothetical 
situations. It seems that especially patients with cognitive impairment proﬁt from an 
evaluation of decision-making capacity in a realistic situation. 
The qualitative evaluation of the answers revealed an important argument in favour of 
assessments in actual situations as well. Regardless of the test situation, participants took 
their own situation as starting point to reﬂect about the proposed treatment. Although this 
behaviour was labelled before as an error (Marson et al., 1999), namely ‘loss of detachment’, 
we believe the error is not so much in the behaviour of the participants, but in the method 
of the assessment. This point of view is strengthened by the theoretical considerations of 
the concept of competence, especially in the situation speciﬁc character of competence. 
This view holds that one may be competent for a decision, and at the same moment be 
incompetent for another (President’s Commission, 1982). Both the complexity of the 
decision and its consequences may inﬂuence the assessment of decision-making capacity 
(Lowe et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2001;  Vellinga et al., 2002).
Further, some differences appeared in the arguments patients give in either the realistic 
or hypothetical situation. With respect to reasons to undergo an investigation, patients in 
the real situation mention their complaints. This seems a rather straightforward ﬁnding, 
though may be of importance in assessing decision-making capacity of a demented patient. 
To consider reasons hypothetically may be much more complex, than experiencing the 
actual complaints.  Another important difference is found in the appreciation of the situation. 
Patients in the realistic situation tend more to a wait and see attitude. This is probably, as 
well as the former ﬁnding, a reﬂection of daily medical practice: mostly decisions or not 
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black or white at one speciﬁc moment. Mostly alternatives may be found, or time may play 
an important role as well.
With regard to the standards of decision-making capacity, our qualitative results indicate 
that people do not make decisions as hierarchical as the model of competence suggests. 
This was also being conﬁrmed by our quantitative ﬁndings: although the ability to understand 
is affected by cognitive impairment, no differences are found between cognitively impaired 
and non impaired patients for the ability to reason and to appreciate. Apparently, reasoning 
and appreciation do not require a profound understanding of the speciﬁc situation. The 
content analysis reveals that topics mentioned in these both categories are rather general, 
which is in line with earlier ﬁndings (Stanley et al., 1988).
An important strength of our study is the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis with regard to decision-making capacity. Especially the qualitative analysis can give 
insights, which remain unknown by a quantitative approach (Marson et al., 1999). An other 
strength is that the quantitative analysis could be based on two different situations with an 
equal content and an equal amount of standardization, as the same vignette was used both 
in a realistic and hypothetical situation. 
Our study also has some limitations. First, the effect of a situation on decision-making 
capacity could have been shown more reliably when all participants would have been 
confronted with both an actual and a hypothetical situation. However, besides an ethical 
argument to avoid burden, also logistical problems accompany this procedure. Second, the 
participants who received the actual information disclosure could – ethically – only be 
interviewed after they had spoken to the physician about the treatment proposal. In 
contrast to the hypothetical group, they received the information twice. However, as our 
interview immediately followed after the conversation with the physician, it is unlikely that 
a patient could have more thoroughly deliberated about the proposed treatment than 
patients in the hypothetical situation. Besides, a possible learning effect would have affected 
understanding probably more than reasoning and appreciation, as the information given 
twice was especially about the procedure of the examination. 
What is the main conclusion? The aim was to evaluate the effect of two different 
situations on measuring decision-making capacity of elderly patients. It has been stressed 
that a hypothetical vignette simulated the realistic situation fairly well to assess decision-
making capacity (Marson et al., 1995b). Our ﬁndings indicate that a hypothetical situation 
may not resemble an actual situation well enough for the assessment of decision-making 
capacity. The quantitative analysis revealed that the ability to reason and the ability to 
appreciate the situation were only affected by cognitive impairment in the hypothetical 
situation. Our point of view is strengthened by the ﬁnding of the quantitative analysis that 
people take their actual situation as starting point of their treatment considerations. 
Therefore, we encourage realistic treatment situations, instead of hypothetical vignettes, to 
assess decision-making capacity in elderly patients. 
Competence to Consent to 
Treatment of Geriatric Patients: 
Judgements of Physicians, Family 
Members and the Vignette Method
Vellinga, A., Smit, J. H., van Leeuwen, E., van Tilburg, W., & Jonker, C. (2004).
International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 19, 645-654.
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Competence to consent to treatment of geriatric patients: judgements of 
physicians, family members and the vignette method
In absence of a gold standard of methods to assess competence, three judgements of competency 
of geriatric patients are evaluated: the judgements of a physician, the judgement of a family 
member, and the judgement of an instrument. Competence of 80 geriatric patients was judged 
both by a physician and a family member. Decision-making capacity was assessed with a vignette. 
A vignette describes a treatment choice, after which the following abilities are evaluated: evidencing 
a choice, understanding, reasoning and appreciating a situation. Cognitive functioning was measured 
with the Mini-Mental State Examination. Most of the geriatric patients were judged competent by 
all three methods. Disagreement between the three judgements was found for 25 patients. 
Agreement about incompetence was only reached for one patient. Physicians appeared to be most 
lenient in their incompetency judgements: only three patients were judged incompetent. These 
patients scored signiﬁcantly lower than competent patients on cognitive functioning, the decisional 
ability of understanding, and the total vignette score. Family members appeared to be most 
stringent in their judgements: they considered 22 patients incompetent. Incompetent patients 
scored signiﬁcantly lower than competent patients on cognitive functioning, reasoning and the total 
vignette score. The disagreement between the judgements suggests a difference in factors given 
emphasis by the three methods. The ﬁnding that both the judgements of physicians and family 
members are associated with the assessment of the vignette, suggests that the vignette method 
has more than a legal theoretical base and is associated with daily life experience and knowledge 
as well. Physicians can be helped to assess competence by the vignette method to evaluate 
decisional abilities and by family members who can provide more information about patients´ 
values. 
Introduction 
The need for an instrument to assess competence12 to consent to treatment will presumably 
increase by the growing number of elderly persons with a high prevalence of both (chronic) 
illnesses and cognitive decline. Within the legal context competence has clear deﬁnitions. In 
the Netherlands competence is deﬁned as the ability to make a reasonable appreciation of 
a treatment decision. Still, within clinical practice the search for a single test of competency 
or gold standard is comparable with the search for a Holy Grail (Roth et al., 1977). In 
clinical practice three potential judges can be assumed to give valid and reliable judgements 
about patients´ competency to consent to treatment: the physician, an instrument, and/or a 
family member. All three judgements have their strengths and weaknesses.
First, physicians are directly confronted with competency in everyday practice. They 
often (implicitly) assess patients´ decision-making capacity. They judge with their clinical 
experience and can weigh their impression of decision-making capacity along with other 
clinical and contextual information of patients (Grisso et al., 1997). Although sometimes 
(expert) physicians are regarded as provisional `gold standard´ (Janofsky et al., 1992; Fazel 
et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2001), studies have shown that different (expert) physicians give 
different judgements about the same patients, questioning their ability to give reliable 
judgements (Marson, 1994; Marson et al., 1997; Kitamura and Kitamura, 2000)
Second, many instruments have been developed to assess decision-making capacity 
(Stanley et al., 1988; Fitten et al., 1990; Sachs et al., 1994; Marson et al., 1995b; Grisso et al., 
1997; Kitamura et al., 1998; Schmand et al., 1999). By the use of clearly described standards, 
instruments help to make a more objective judgement about decisional abilities of the 
patient. Most of the instruments evaluate the following four standards with a legal origin: 
the ability to evidence a choice, the ability to understand relevant information, the ability to 
reason about the choice, and the ability to appreciate the situation (Meisel et al., 1977). 
Although the use of clear standards raises the reliability of judgements, instruments can not 
take into account contextual information of the speciﬁc choice. Instruments using the four 
standards, for instance, leave aside emotions and personal values, factors that presumably 
play sometimes a signiﬁcant role in competency as well. 
Third, the family is rarely mentioned as a possible actor in the competency judgement. 
Two important arguments can be given to evaluate the competency judgements of family 
members. First, the family´s impression of a patient´s competency may be expected to be 
based on a shared history. With this knowledge family members can test whether the 
patient´s arguments are in concordance with the life the patient (has) live(d) (Appelbaum 
& Grisso, 1988; Kuczewski, 1996). Second, consulting of family members, who are supposed 
to be ignorant of the theoretical legal discussion, could shift the frame of reference from a 
legal orientation to one based on common knowledge (Berlin & Canaan, 1991). Emotion or 
personal values may be better represented in the family judgement than those of physicians 
or instruments. Although it has been argued that family members should have a more 
12  The terms competency and decision-making capacity should be distinguished from each other. Recently, 
a tendency is visible that competence is reserved for the legal context, whereas decision-making capacity 
refers to the judgements made by physicians in daily clinical practice. It can also be argued that decision-
making capacity is a (psychological) conceptualisation of the broader (legal and ethical) concept of 
competence. In this article the term competence will be used to describe the dichotomous judgements 
of physician, family member, and vignette. The term decision-making capacity will be used to describe the 
scale assessment of the vignette.
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central role in medical decision-making (Lindemann Nelson, 1992; Blustein, 1993; Kuczewski, 
1996), the entwining of interests of family and patients is often described as well, which may 
lead to invalid judgements of competency.
The focus of this article is to evaluate three judgements of competency of geriatric 
patients: the judgements of a physician, the judgement of a family member, and the judgement 
of an instrument. Competence of geriatric patients is evaluated, as these patients are at risk 
both for complex medical decision-making and cognitive decline, which may impair decision-
making capacity. A vignette method is used to assess decision-making capacity. The main 
hypothesis is that when a vignette is supposed to have value in clinical practice, a relation 
should exist between the assessment of decision-making capacity by the vignette and 
competency judgements of both physician and family members. To unravel this relation 
three judgements will be compared in terms of the frequencies of incompetent and 
competent judgements and the degree of agreement between them. The judgements of 
physician and family will also be compared with respect to decision-making capacity scores 
of the vignette and patient characteristics associated with diminished decision-making 
capacity to explain expected differences in the judgements. 
Methods
Study sample
The patient sample was selected among patients, aged 65+, visiting geriatric wards for a 
one day somatic and psychiatric screening (July 1999 to December 2000). Inclusion was 
based on newly-admitted patients. Excluded were patients who were not able to participate 
in the interview, like blind patients, patients who were no (Dutch) native speakers and 
patients with severe dementia. In total 245 patients were approached to participate. Of 
this population 34 (14%) refused to participate, 35 (14%) indicated they were too ill or 
exhausted and 24 (10%) could not be interviewed due to logistical problems. Eventually, 
152 patients were included.
Physicians gave their judgement about the patient’s competence after they discussed 
the results of the clinical investigations and the possibilities of treatment with the patient. 
Eventually, 124 judgements were collected of 35 different physicians; 28 judgements were 
missing due to logistical problems. Family members or acquaintances who accompanied the 
patient to the hospital were interviewed before the physicians discussed the possibilities of 
treatment with the patient. In total 96 judgements of family members were collected; 56 
patients came alone to the ward. This study evaluates patients (n=80) of whom three 
judgements were available.
Informed consent was obtained of all respondents: patients and family members. 
Approval for this study was given by the local medical ethics committee.
Decision-making capacity: the vignette method
Decision-making capacity was assessed with a clinical vignette. A vignette describes a 
hypothetical treatment choice, after which questions are posed to evaluate decision-making 
capacity. The abilities are based on standards: factual understanding, evidencing a choice, 
reasoning and appreciation of the situation. During the reading and the interview, the 
participant was allowed to read the vignette. Answers to the questions were scored as 
follows: 0 points for no answer or a wrong answer, 1 point for a more or less satisfying 
answer and 2 points for a satisfying answer (box III). The structure of the vignettes is in line 
with earlier described vignettes (Sachs et al., 1994; Schmand et al., 1999). The subject and 
content of the vignettes were developed in collaboration with experienced geriatricians 
and psychiatrists. Important criterions in subject choice were the fact that the medical 
condition and treatment procedure should have a considerable incidence and the fact that 
the proposal should constitute a signiﬁcant choice, with a relevant risk/beneﬁt comparison. 
For instance a blood examination is probably not experienced as a signiﬁcant choice, as 
most people will estimate the beneﬁts much higher than the risks. The vignettes described 
either the choice of undergoing an endoscopy for anaemia with unknown cause or the choice 
to undergo an operation for coloncarcinoma (see also box I and II). The vignettes were 
presented either in a hypothetical way during the interview (n = 61), or presented after the 
physician had proposed the choice in reality (n = 19). The inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s 
Kappa) of the vignettes is 0.64, which represents 78% agreement between the raters. 
Physicians‘ and family members’ judgements
The physicians and family members gave a dichotomous judgement about competence: 
competent or incompetent. Physicians were not given instructions for the assessment of 
competence, in order to approach the judgements in daily practice as much as possible. 
Family members were explained that nowadays patients have the right to make their own 
judgements in medical decisions. One of the conditions is that patients are able to make 
these decisions. The ability of making medical decisions may be inﬂuenced by for example a 
deteriorating health state (somatic or cognitive). Subsequently, family members were asked 
whether they thought the patient could make a medical decision or not. The type of relation 
between family members and patients and the frequency of contact were registered, as well 
as the following demographic characteristics: gender, age, and total years of education. 
Cognition, depression, physical functioning, and patient demographics 
Cognitive functioning was assessed both by a clinical diagnosis of dementia and by the 
Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein et al., 1975). Despite its limitations, the MMSE is 
a widely used screening tool for establishing the level of cognitive functioning in elderly 
patients and is often used with this purpose in studies on decision-making capacity (Fitten 
et al., 1990; Janofsky et al., 1992; Rutman & Silberfeld, 1992; Sachs et al., 1994; Marson et al., 
1995b; Etchells et al., 1999; Fazel et al., 1999; Feinberg & Whitlach, 2001; Kim et al., 2001; 
Kim et al., 2002). The MMSE consists of 20 items and scores range from 0-30, higher scores 
indicating better cognitive functioning. The sum-score consists of the following elements: 
orientation in time and place, memory, attention, language and visual construction. 
Depression was registered by the Geriatric Depression Scale (Brink et al., 1982). The 
GDS has an yes-no format to exclude possible bias due to cognitive or concentration 
problems with which elderly may cope. The GDS consists of 30 items, higher scores 
indicating a higher degree of depression. The GDS has relatively few somatic items, which 
diminishes bias of somatic complaints without a relation with depression in elderly 
persons. 
Physical functioning was operationalized in three different ways. First, the number of 
chronic diseases was registered. These were dichotomised in no or one disease and two or 
more diseases. Second, activities of daily living were registered with the Barthel index, with 
a scale score of 0-20. Higher scores indicate a higher level of functioning in daily activities, 
like eating or dressing (Mahoney & Barthel, 1965). Third, the instrumental activities of daily 
life were registered by the Fillenbaum index, with a scale score of 0-14. Higher scores 
indicate a lower level of functioning in instrumental daily activities, like making a phone call 
or shopping (Fillenbaum, 1985).
The demographic variables age, gender, education, marital status, and domestic situation 
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were registered. Education was assessed by a question about the highest educational level 
completed and converted into total years of education (range 5-18 years). Marital status 
was deﬁned as single, married, divorced or widow, dichotomised in married or not married. 
The domestic situation was distinguished in living totally independently, living (semi)-
dependently.
Data analysis
Frequencies were computed for the judgements of physician, family member and vignette 
method. The vignette score was dichotomised by using a 95% criterion cut off score of the 
population of patients without cognitive impairment or dementia (Schmand et al., 1999). 
Degree of agreement was computed by kappa. T-tests and chi-square tests were performed 
to evaluate differences in cognitive functioning, depression, physical functioning, decision-
making abilities, and demographic characteristics between patients who were judged either 
competent or incompetent by physician, family or vignette. 
Results
Sample
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of patients 
Patients (n = 80)
 Freq. (%) / M (SD)
Age (years)  82.60 (6.26)
Gender
- Males
- Females
 34 (42.5%)
 46 (57.5%)
Education (years)  8.66 (3.28)
Marital status
- married
- not married
 32 (40%)
 48 (60%)
Living situation
- independent
- (semi) dependent
 62 (77.5%)
 18 (22.5%)
Cognition
Dementia:
- yes
- no
- missing
MMSE (0-30)
 30 (37.5%)
 47 (58.8%)
 3 (3.8%)
 22.94 (4.69)
      (n=79) 
Depression
GDS (0-30)  10.71 (6.34)
Table 1 shows demographic characteristics of the patients, their mean cognitive functioning, 
and mean degree of depression. Most of the patients were female, not married and lived 
independently. Almost one third of them had a diagnosis of dementia. Table 2 shows 
demographic characteristics of the family members and provides information about their 
relation with the patients. Most of the family members were female, they were most often 
a spouse or child of the patients, and mostly had a daily or weekly contact. 
Table 2: Demographic characteristics of family members
Family members (n = 80)
 Freq. (%) / M (SD)
Age (years)  60.33 (12.59)
Gender
- Male
- Female
 26 (32.5%)
 54 (67.5%)
Education (years)  11.14 (3.21)
Type of relation
- spouse
- child
-  other (family second or third degree,  
family in law or acquaintance)
 16 (20.0%)
 49 (61.3%)
 15 (18.9%)
Frequency of contact
- daily
- weekly
- monthly
 41 (51.3%)
 28 (35.1%)
 11 (13.8%)
Frequencies of incompetence, judged by physician, family member or vignette method
Table 3 shows the frequencies of patients judged either as competent or incompetent by 
their physician, their family member or the vignette method. Physicians judged most of the 
patients as competent, only 3 patients were judged incompetent. The family judged more 
stringent: 22 patients were incompetent according to their opinion. The total score of the 
vignette method considered 12 patients incompetent. Appreciation was the most stringent 
standard: judging 19 patients incompetent. 
Table 3:  Frequencies of incompetent and competent judgements of 
physician, family member and the vignette method. 
Total population (n = 80)
Competent
N (%)
Incompetent
N (%)
Physician  77 (96%)  3 (4%)
Family member  58 (72%)  22 (28%)
Vignette:
- Understanding
- Reasoning
- Appreciation
- Total score
 65 (81%)
 63 (79%)
 61 (76%)
 68 (85%)
 15 (19%)
 17 (21%)
 19 (24%)
 12 (15%)
Agreement between the three judgements
Table 4 shows the agreement between physicians, family members and the vignette judgements. 
Total agreement between the three judgements exists for 1 incompetent patient and for 54 
competent patients. In 25 patients one of the judgements about competence differs from 
two other judgements. Degree of agreement was also computed by kappa. Agreement 
between physician and family: 0.101 (p = 0.121); between physician and vignette: 0.220 (p = 
0.011); and between family member and vignette: 0.343 (p = 0.001).
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Table 4: Agreement of the judgements made by physician, family and vignette.
Vignette: incompetent Vignette: competent
Physician: incompetent Family:  incompetent 
competent
1
1
1
0
Physician: competent Family:  incompetent 
competent
7
3
13
54
Differences in cognition, depression, and decisional abilities between incompetent and competent 
patients
No differences were found in demographic characteristics between competent and 
incompetent patients for both physician and family members judgements. Table 5 shows 
differences in cognition, depression, and decision-making capacity between competent and 
incompetent patients. The three patients judged incompetent by the physician scored 
signiﬁcantly lower on cognitive functioning and were less depressed than the competent 
patients. Two of the three incompetent patients had a diagnosis of dementia (in contrast to 
28 of the 74 competent patients). The three incompetent patients all had no or one chronic 
disease (of the competent patients 30 had two or more chronic diseases). No signiﬁcant 
differences between competent and incompetent patients were found for ADL or IADL. 
Although for the most part not signiﬁcant, incompetent patients had lower scores for 
decisional capacities than competent patients.  
Patients judged incompetent by their family members had a signiﬁcant lower score on 
cognitive functioning, and had a signiﬁcant higher proportion of patients with dementia or 
cognitive impairment than competent patients (12 of 20 incompetent patients had a 
diagnosis of dementia, opposed to 18 of 57 competent patients, Pearson chi square: 5.03 (df 
1), p=0.025). No signiﬁcant differences between competent and incompetent patients were 
found for depression. No signiﬁcant difference in number of chronic diseases were found 
between competent and incompetent patients (5 of the incompetent patients had two or 
more chronic diseases, 25 of the competent patients had two or more chronic diseases, 
Pearson chi square: 2.83 (df 1), p=0.093). In contrast to ADL, a signiﬁcant difference was 
found in IADL between competent and incompetent patients. Incompetent patients had a 
higher mean score on IADL, indicating that those patients had a lower degree of instrumental 
daily functioning. Incompetent patients scored signiﬁcantly lower on the decisional abilities 
understanding, reasoning and the total score than competent patients. Although not 
signiﬁcant, this tendency was also seen for evidencing a choice and appreciation. 
Discussion
This article evaluates the competency judgements of physicians, family members and the 
vignette method in a population of geriatric patients, part of which had cognitive impairment 
or dementia. In order to gain knowledge about reliable and valid judgements of competency, 
we focused on the relation of the three judgements and the predictive value of the standards 
for the judgement of the physician and the judgement of the family. In general, it can be 
concluded that most geriatric patients, especially those with impaired cognitive functioning, 
were judged as competent in medical decision-making, regardless of the method of 
judgement (physician, family member or vignette). 
First, in line with earlier ﬁndings, physicians gave more lenient judgements than family 
members or the vignette method (Kim et al., 2001). Despite their knowledge about the T
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diagnosis dementia, physicians tended to judge patients incompetent in relatively few cases. 
How can this be explained? One explanation may be the idea that a person is competent 
unless proven otherwise. In case of incompetency a physician should have strong evidence, 
which may prevent them to judge this too easily. A second argument may be the problem 
of proportionality. Physicians should balance the harms of an incompetency judgement by 
the potential risk and beneﬁts for a patient. When the risks of a treatment are relatively 
low, an incompetency judgement may cause more harm in terms of overruling someone, 
than beneﬁt. In our study, many of the patients´ decisions concerned low risk decisions, like 
a change in medication or a consult at different medical specialist.  Also in some cases there 
was no change in therapy. Because relatively few treatment proposals implied serious risks 
for the patients involved, physicians probably expected no harm in considering these 
patients as competent. 
Family members judged most stringent about the competency status of patients. This 
ﬁnding is consistent with earlier ones. It was argued that family members, who are 
responsible for the care of their beloved ones, tend to a more protective attitude to avoid 
risks as much as possible (Biesaart & Hubben, 1997). This protective attitude is also found 
proxy decision-making for patients to consent to participate in research protocols (Sachs 
et al., 1994).
Second, the three judgements showed a low degree of agreement. The judgements 
coincide in only one incompetent patient (and 54 competent patients), while one third of 
the patients were incompetent according to one or two judgements. This lack of agreement 
can probably be subscribed to the different aspects in judgement. An important difference 
between the physician and family is that the physician makes a judgement based on his 
impression of the patient during the day of investigation, while a family member probably 
judges the patient´s behaviour over a long term period. The current illness and possible 
diminished cognitive functioning may affect the judgement of a family member more than 
the physician, who compares the patient´s performance with others in the same population. 
A difference in judgement may also be caused by the fact that family members are ignorant 
of the speciﬁc legal deﬁnition, while physicians may be presumed to have some knowledge 
of the legal deﬁnition. The vignette differs from the other two judgements in focusing on 
decisional abilities alone. 
Third, patients who were judged as incompetent by the physicians or family mostly had 
a diagnosis of dementia and had a signiﬁcant lower score for cognitive functioning than 
competent patients. Cognitive impairment can be concluded to be an important factor in 
being judged incompetent. No differences in degree of depression were found between 
competent and incompetent patients. Both ﬁndings are in line with earlier studies on the 
relationship between competence and cognition (Marson et al., 1995a; Marson et al., 1995b; 
Marson et al., 1999; Schmand et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2001) or depression (Appelbaum et al., 
1999). No association was found between number of chronic diseases or ADL functioning 
and either the physician´s or the family member´s judgements. Interestingly,  patients judged 
incompetent by the family members had a signiﬁcantly higher mean score on IADL, 
indicating a worse performance in instrumental daily functioning. A possible explanation 
may be that a remarkable increasing dependency on activities like shopping or cooking may 
be extrapolated by family members to abilities like making health care decisions, resulting 
in a judgement of incompetency.
With regard to differences in decisional abilities between incompetent and competent 
patients, both physician and family members´ judgements seem to be associated with the 
assessment of the vignette. The ﬁndings suggest that physicians regard persons incompetent 
who are relatively most vulnerable in terms of decision-making capacity, especially for the 
ability to understand. Although the family members judged more patients incompetent, 
their judgement differentiates in a reasonable way between patients with lower and higher 
vignette scores, especially concerning the ability to reason. This suggests that the vignette 
has more than a legal theoretical base and is associated with daily life experiences and 
knowledge as well.
Two remarks can be made with regard to the ability of family members to assess 
competence. The fact that they judge most stringent may rise suspicion: it may be an 
indication of overprotection of patients by their family members. The association between 
the incompetency judgement and IADL functioning may underline this statement. However, 
the ﬁnding that their judgement seems to be in concordance with the assessment of the 
vignette is reassuring. Family members seem to be able to make a reasonable estimation of 
their relative´s functioning. Therefore, they may reason more from their commitment to 
the patient than from their own interests.
Our study is limited to a relatively low number of patients of whom three judgements 
were available. However, the results of the analyses performed for the group of 80 patients 
are comparable with the results of the analyses performed for the largest groups possible 
(124 physician judgements and 96 family members’ judgements). Therefore, it can be argued 
that our ﬁndings are representative for the total population of geriatric patients with 
and without mild to moderate dementia. A second limitation is the low frequency of 
incompetency judgements of the physician. The small number prevents thorough analyses 
of differences between competent and incompetent patients.  A third limitation is that both 
vignette and family gave a more general judgement about competency, while physicians gave 
a situation speciﬁc judgement. 
An important strength of this study is that the patient selection was randomly performed 
at a geriatric ward.  Advantages of this procedure are: 1) the physicians of whom judgements 
are collected make these judgements regularly in daily practice and 2) the selected patients 
constitute a sample of the ordinary population as the physicians are confronted with on 
daily basis. Until now other studies have mainly focused on expert judgements of (demented) 
patients whose competency was already in question. In other words, this study design is 
developed to represent the daily problem of competency assessments at a geriatric ward.
To conclude, most of the geriatric and even mild to moderate demented patients are 
considered competent for medical decision-making by their physicians, families, and the 
vignette method. Second, there is a substantial level of disagreement between the three 
different judgements. Physicians are most lenient to judge someone incompetent, whereas 
family members have a more stringent attitude. Third, further research will have to unravel 
the elements of importance in judgements of physicians and family. Both the value of 
standards of competence, patient speciﬁc characteristics and choice speciﬁc characteristics 
should be evaluated. Fourth, the standards of competence seem to be based on common, 
everyday knowledge. This may lead to the conclusion that instruments based on these 
competency standards possess validity to assess competence in clinical practice. 
What does this mean for the practical use of instruments to assess competence in 
clinical practice? To prevent that physicians will base their judgement of competence too 
much on contextual clinical information, instruments may provide important information 
about decision-making capacities and encourage the process of appropriate estimation by 
the treatment staff and family involved. As the family seems reasonably able to give a 
judgement about the patients´ competency as well, it should be taken into consideration to 
consult the family in competency judgements. 
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General discussion
The aim of this thesis was to identify some of the basic elements of moral capacity within the 
context of decision-making capacity, by means of empirical research. The ﬁrst step was to examine 
the inﬂuence on decision-making capacity of factors that might contribute to moral capacity in 
elderly patients with cognitive problems. At the same time, in doing so we hoped to reﬁne a 
method to assess decision-making capacity in the elderly. In the General Discussion we present 
a short summary of our ﬁndings, discuss methodological aspects, and the implications of our 
results for the concept of competence and decision-making capacity in future research, and 
assessment of the decision-making capacity and competence of patients with cognitive decline in 
daily practice. 
Summary of the main ﬁndings
Knowing well or living well
We generated hypotheses (Chapter 2) in a philosophical approach to the concept of 
competence. The discussion about competence in Western societies is profoundly 
inﬂuenced by various democratic and legal theories regarding citizenship. Competent 
persons are considered to be citizens with the capacity to make decisions and bear 
responsibility. The underlying morality postulates that someone who is able to think 
rationally will act accordingly, and that his or her actions will thereby be what is deemed to 
be morally or socially good. Still, the problem of akrasia, or weakness of will, shows that 
mental competence does not guarantee that a person will always act in a morally responsible 
and rational way. On the other hand, we also argued that people who are considered to be 
incompetent can still act morally responsibly. Therefore, from the moral point of view, the 
distinction between competence and incompetence reﬂects not so much a state of being, 
as a social norm according to which behaviour can be judged, but by relating competence 
to cognitive capacities, this social norm becomes a norm that focuses primarily on rational 
behaviour. We therefore postulated that competence and moral responsibility are 
overlapping human qualities, while the extent of overlap depends on the societal structure 
and social judgement. Within the context of mental and psychogeriatric health-care it must 
then be clariﬁed how cognitive impairment can affect competence, and furthermore to 
what extent moral responsibility can still be maintained. This need for clariﬁcation is evident 
in clinical practice, where demented elderly can sometimes act as morally responsible 
patients, while at the same time institutional practice forces us to consider them as 
incompetent patients. 
By considering the possibility that moral responsibility partly overlaps with cognitive 
competence, it becomes necessary to reconsider theories of competence in the light of 
the ability to act morally. Moral capacity can be deﬁned as the capacity to make decisions 
based on an ongoing process to transgress the world of our personal history and beliefs 
into the moral standards of public institutional life. In particular, we reconsidered elements 
which may be connected to moral capacity. Central concepts hypothesized to be connected 
to the concept of moral capacity are: the role of cognition and emotion, the meaning of life, 
health status, personality traits and social support, and the role of the family and physician 
in assessing competence. To link our hypotheses with existing scientiﬁc research we chose 
to reﬁne a method used to assess decision-making capacity (the vignette method). In 
combination with the earlier described elements possibly connected to moral capacity, we 
hope to develop further discussion about the issues of competence, decision-making 
capacity and moral capacity.
Instruments to assess decision-making capacity
Until now competence has mainly been operationalized as decision-making capacity. In 
comparing the various different instruments that have been developed to assess decision-
making capacity in the ﬁeld of medicine, the following was concluded (Chapter 5). First, the 
question of competence arises in a speciﬁc situation, which is reﬂected in the instruments 
by the central theme of a speciﬁc choice of treatment. The instruments have been also 
developed for use in speciﬁc patient populations. Secondly, the instruments presuppose 
that adequate medical information about the disease and treatment alternatives has been 
given to the patient. Thirdly, decision-making capacity is deﬁned as the ability to evidence a 
choice, the ability to understand information, the ability to manipulate information rationally, 
and the ability to appreciate the situation. This concept of decision-making capacity has 
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been derived from the current legal standards. Fourthly, most studies report a high inter-
rater reliability for these instruments, which means that different people using the 
instruments come to a comparable assessment of decision-making capacity in the same 
patient. Finally, two important differences appear in comparisons of the psychiatric and 
psychogeriatric context in which the instruments were developed. The ﬁrst difference 
involves the realistic or hypothetical character of the information provided. The second 
difference involves the relationship between the scale-score for decision-making capacity 
and the assessment of competence. We concluded that, in spite of several limitations, most 
instruments to assess competence (e.g. decision-making capacity) appear to have acceptable 
validity and reliability, and therefore they do have added value for the assessment of 
decision-making capacity. 
The vignette: content and character of information 
The content of the vignette appeared to inﬂuence decision-making capacity in two ways. 
First, we compared two hypothetical vignettes which differed with regard to the severity of 
consequences (Chapter 6). Cognitively impaired patients scored lower than cognitively 
non-impaired patients on the vignette with mild consequences, whereas no difference was 
found between the scores of these two groups on the vignette with severe consequences. 
We discussed the possibility that differences in content may inﬂuence the complexity (in 
the meaning of the degree of severity of consequences) of the decision. In general, individuals 
often use heuristic tools such as representativeness and availability of information in making 
decisions. Moreover, the complexity of a choice not only depends on the content of the 
information accompanying the choice, but also on the personal experience and history of 
the person who has to make that choice. We hypothesized that the difference in performance 
with regard to decision-making capacity between different (i.e. complex and non-complex 
choices) hypothetical vignettes might be the result of differences in personal 
characteristics. 
Given the context-speciﬁc character of the concept of competence, we decided to 
compare two vignettes, one with a hypothetical choice and one with a realistic choice 
(Chapter 7). A quantitative analysis showed that in the hypothetical situation cognitively 
impaired patients had lower scores than cognitively non-impaired patients for all decisional 
capacities. In the realistic situation, cognitively impaired patients had lower scores than 
cognitively non-impaired patients for understanding and the total vignette, but the two 
groups performed equally well on reasoning and appreciation. A qualitative analysis showed 
that patients gave comparable answers in hypothetical and realistic situations. The answers 
were not related to the speciﬁc standards of decision-making capacity, which may lead to 
questions about their presumed hierarchy in the concept of decision-making capacity. 
Personal circumstances were taken as a reference point for making a decision, regardless of 
the situation. Therefore, we questioned the validity of using hypothetical vignettes to assess 
decision-making capacity, and argued that the use of vignettes that refer to actual situations 
guarantees more validity. 
Decision-making capacity and competence assessed by family and physician 
Comparisons between decision-making capacity assessed by the vignette method and the 
judgement of competence made by the family and physicians showed a low degree of 
agreement (Chapter 8). The physicians were most lenient in their assessment, and the 
families were most stringent. The disagreement between the assessments suggests a 
difference in the factors emphasized by the three methods of assessment (the vignette 
method, judgement by family members, and judgement by physicians, respectively). 
Incompetence, as judged by physicians was associated with a higher degree of cognitive 
impairment, a lower degree of depression and a lower score for understanding, whereas 
incompetence judged by family members was associated with a lower degree of cognitive 
impairment, a lower level of IADL, and a lower score for understanding, reasoning and 
appreciation of the situation. The ﬁnding that the judgements made by physicians as well as 
the judgements made by family members were associated with standards of decision-
making capacity determined by the vignette method, suggests that the vignette method has 
more than a legal theoretical base and is associated with practical experience and 
knowledge.
Methodological considerations 
Sample
One limitation of our study concerns the selection of the sample from ﬁve different sources: 
one geriatric day clinic, two geriatric wards (long stay), one outpatient geriatric department, 
and one outpatient gastroenterology department. These ﬁve different sources varied in 
that they had either long-stay or outpatient facilities, and can therefore not be compared. 
This may have affected our results. For instance, patients in a hospital ward may lose their 
sense of autonomy, and may be less competent due to severe illness and the fact that they 
are hospitalized, and outpatients may have experienced more illnesses and cognitive decline 
than patients in a gastroenterology ward. 
The possible effects of the sources could not be statistically evaluated because the 
number of patients in each was unequally divided, and small for most sources (most patients 
were selected at the day-clinic). Furthermore, the size of the effect of the source on the 
main results of this study is expected to be small. First, the number of patients selected in 
clinics other than the geriatric day-clinic was small. Secondly, the interview procedure in 
the other clinics was the same as the procedure in the day-clinic. Thirdly, in the analyses in 
which we tested the effects of the content of the vignettes on decision-making capacity, we 
checked for demographical characteristics, the degree of cognitive functioning, and physical 
health. 
Another limitation in the selection of our sample concerns the absence of a group of 
patients who actually do face the decision of undergoing an operation for colon cancer. 
Comparisons can not be made between a hypothetical and a realistic situation, in which the 
choice has severe consequences. We were also unable to analyse the effect of the severity 
of the consequences on decision-making capacity in actual situations. We did not encounter 
such patients for several reasons. Selection was hindered by a relatively low incidence, and 
patients with colon cancer may follow a different route in health care. Instead of visiting a 
geriatric day-clinic, these patients may be treated in departments of internal medicine. Last 
but not least, there are ethical objections against including such patients.
An important strength of our sample selection was the random selection of patients 
from a geriatric ward. This procedure has two advantages with regard to selection bias, 
because it provides a sample of the population that physicians are confronted with on a 
daily basis. Therefore, selection bias due to including only ‘incompetent’ or patients ‘at risk 
of being incompetent’ was prevented. Furthermore, the physicians who made the 
assessments were physicians who make such assessments regularly in daily practice. 
Therefore, there was no bias due to the selection of ‘expert’ physicians, or physicians who 
might have a speciﬁc interest in the assessment of competence. 
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Decision-making capacity: the validity and reliability of the vignette method
The face-validity of the vignette is assessed by the degree to which the vignette represents 
important elements of the concept of competence, and it is satisfactory. It focuses on a 
speciﬁc choice of treatment, about which information is given, and it incorporates standards 
of competence with a substantial theoretical base (Fitten et al., 1990; Chapter 5). 
Expert validity of the vignette and its standards was shown in the pilot study carried out 
by Gouwenberg et al. (1997). They demonstrated that an expert panel of different disciplines 
(people with a legal background, psychologists, psychiatrists, geriatricians, general practitioners, 
people with an ethical background, nurses, nursing home physicians, and elderly people) 
regarded the vignette method as a useful instrument (74%) (Gouwenberg et al., 1997). 
The structure of the vignette used in this study to assess decision-making capacity is in 
line with earlier described vignettes (Fitten et al., 1990, Schmand et al., 1999). It presents a 
treatment choice and provides information about the illness, its treatment and the 
advantages and disadvantages of the treatment. The speciﬁc content of the vignette used in 
this study was developed in collaboration with experienced geriatricians, to reﬂect a 
relevant medical decision. The questions asked to assess decision-making capacity are based 
on standards of competence about which there is a sufﬁcient degree of consensus (Chapter 5).
 Based on the results of Chapters 6 and 7 we argue that the actual treatment choice 
should provide the context to assess decision-making capacity. Hypothetical choices for 
treatment in vignettes may resemble actual choices, but are not sufﬁciently comparable to 
the actual situation of the patient. A hypothetical choice may differ in complexity, which is 
not only determined by the complexity of the content of the choice, but also by the 
personal experience of the patient (Chapter 6). Furthermore, especially patients with 
cognitive impairment had a lower score for speciﬁc decisional capacities when the 
assessment was based on a hypothetical vignette. They performed better in real situations 
(Chapter 7). Qualitative analysis revealed that patients take their own situation as a 
reference point for decision-making (Chapter 7). Combining these ﬁndings with the general 
view that the level of competence is context-dependent, we argue that the assessment of 
decision-making capacity is best performed in real situations. Instruments used for the 
assessment should be structured to guarantee that the necessary information is provided 
(compare Grisso et al., 1997; Kitamura et al., 1998). 
In contrast to the results of the pilot study (Gouwenberg et al., 1997), we did not ﬁnd a 
(reasonably) high correlation between the physician’s judgement and the vignette assessment 
(Chapter 8). Instead, we found a low level of agreement between the vignette assessment 
and the judgements made by family members and physicians (Chapter 8). A possible 
explanation is that the physicians were not given guidelines to assess competence, and 
they were not informed about the patient’s performance on the vignette, unlike the 
situation in the earlier study (Gouwenberg et al., 1997). 
 Construct validity was demonstrated by the fact that a signiﬁcant relationship was 
found between the vignette scores and the degree of cognitive impairment of the elderly 
patients. Vignette scores were signiﬁcantly lower in patients with a higher degree of 
cognitive impairment. These ﬁndings are in line with the results of earlier studies 
(Gouwenberg et al., 1997; Marson et al., 1995a, 1995b).  Also in line with an earlier study, we 
found that level of education was not a signiﬁcant factor in the results of the vignette 
(Schmand et al., 1999). 
The assessments of evidencing a choice and understanding seem to be rather 
straightforward, however, reasoning and appreciation are more subject to the assessor’s 
own normative point of reference. Discussion about the scoring of decisional capacities is 
necessary to reach consensus between the raters. In line with earlier studies we reached a 
good inter-rater reliability (Chapter 4). 
In conclusion, the vignette method seems to be a valid and reliable method to assess 
decision-making capacity. Furthermore, our study indicates that a method reﬂecting the 
realistic situation as a starting point seems to be a more valid way to assess decision-
making capacity than a hypothetical situation.
Cognitive functioning 
In this thesis the MMSE was used to assess the degree of cognitive functioning. The degree 
of cognitive functioning was important in two ways: a cut-off score of 16 was an important 
inclusion criterion and the MMSE score was also used to distinguish between cognitively 
impaired and cognitively non-impaired persons in Chapter 6 and 7. 
Despite its limitations, the MMSE is a widely used screening tool to determine the 
level of cognitive functioning in patients with dementia, and it is often used for this purpose 
in studies on decision-making capacity (Fitten et al., 1990; Janofsky et al., 1992; Sachs et al., 
1994; Marson et al., 1995b; Fazel et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2001, 2002). However, it has also 
been stressed that the MMSE is not a valid instrument to assess decision-making capacity 
(Fitten et al., 1990; Janofsky et al., 1992; Rutman & Silberfeld, 1992; Etchells et al., 1999; 
Feinberg & Whitlach, 2001). One advantage of the MMSE is that it provides insight into the 
actual cognitive functioning. This is important, because it is well known that decision-
making capacity may ﬂuctuate in time, due to ﬂuctuations in the severity of the disease, 
such as in dementia (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988). Patients with scale-scores from 16 to 23 
were considered to be cognitively impaired (Tombaugh & MacIntyre, 1992). An argument 
in favour for this cut-off point is based on the ﬁnding that patients with an MMSE scale-
score of 16 to 23 have an increased risk of impairment in decision-making capacity, 
whereas people with a score of 24 to 30 can serve as a ‘normal’ control group (Etchells et 
al., 1997). 
 
Judgements made by physicians and family members
Our analyses of the three types of judgements were based on 80 patients, instead of the 
total group of 146 patients, because of missing data (we collected 124 assessments made by 
physicians and 96 assessments made by family members). Selection bias is estimated to be 
low, because analyses performed for the largest possible group showed the same results 
with regard to the demographic data of the group of patients and the demographical data of 
the family members. Analysis of the relationship between decision-making capacity and 
judgements of competence on the one hand, and between these judgements and cognition, 
depression, and physical functioning, on the other hand, showed comparable results. 
Ethical questions and empirical ﬁndings
This thesis describes empirical ﬁndings concerning an ethical subject. As such, this study 
belongs to the ﬁeld of empirical ethics. Empirical ethics is based on ﬁve presumptions 
(Borry et al., 2004): (1) research of moral attitudes, intuitions, behaviours, and reasons 
generates information that is meaningful for ethical theory and should be the starting point 
of ethical reﬂection; (2) empirical research based on methodology of social sciences is a 
proper way of describing this reality; (3) the classical distinction between normative and 
descriptive ethics should be more ﬂexible; empirical ethics denies the incomparability 
between those two approaches and beliefs that they are fundamentally complementary; (4) 
empirical ethics is a heuristic term that pleads for integration of research methods and 
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ethical reﬂection; (5) empirical ethics is not anti-normative: if only context determines the 
values of good and wrong, you cannot use the term ethics anymore.
 Our study of competence and decision-making capacity is based on comparable 
presumptions. By using different (quantitative and qualitative) methods we tried to promote 
further discussion on the ethics of competence. Using empirical data at a descriptive level, 
and trying to interpret these data at a more normative level, is a sensible way in which to 
study the subject of competence, because this concept involves both descriptive and 
normative levels (Berghmans, 2000).
The normative starting point in this thesis is a phenomenological view of the concept 
of moral capacity. However, the theory on competence has been mainly inﬂuenced by a 
liberal medical ethical tradition in which autonomy is one of the main values. Within this 
context, competence is operationalized as decision-making capacity. The method we used 
to assess decision-making capacity functions in between a descriptive and normative level. 
By describing the effect of decision-making capacity in different situations, and by comparing 
decision-making capacity with more normative judgements made by physicians and family 
members, we tried to discuss the normative starting point of the liberal medical ethical 
tradition. In the following section we will discuss the signiﬁcance of our empirical ﬁndings 
for the concept of moral capacity. 
Knowing well or living well 
In Chapter 2 ‘Knowing well or living well’ we argued that the fundamental question was 
whether or not moral responsibility and rationality are necessarily related to each other. 
The problem of akrasia, or weakness of will, implies that mental competence does not 
necessarily imply that a person acts morally. Within the context of treating demented 
elderly patients, we found that although cognitive impairment may affect competence, 
moral responsibility may still be maintained. From a phenomenological point of view one 
can argue that each individual is structured by social norms in a unique way. This uniqueness 
is a result of speciﬁc events in our life world that we have to cope with and give meaning 
to. In contact with social institutions we have to transgress our personal beliefs and 
transform them into reasons that are acceptable in public and institutional life. Our 
empirical results provide arguments that conﬁrm our initial hypotheses. 
Instruments developed to assess competence can be considered as representative of 
institutional life. As we have already argued, competence has been operationalized as decision-
making capacity by these instruments (Chapter 5). A feature underlining the institutional 
character of the instruments is the central role of the medical information that is provided 
and the understanding of this information within a speciﬁc context (Chapter 5). The underlying 
presumption is that in order to make a morally responsible choice, patients should understand 
and reason about medical information, i.e. the type of illness, the possible treatment with 
risks and beneﬁts, and any alternative treatments. Even in the decisional capacity of 
‘appreciation’ – which supposes a personal element in medical decision-making –, patients are 
urged to transgress their personal world and to transform their personal hopes and beliefs 
into medically acceptable reasoning. Major criticism resulting from this phenomenological 
view is that the instruments used to assess competence in this way cannot fully evaluate 
moral capacity. Therefore, we would stress that the unique social structure and the 
accompanying personal narratives of individuals are an unavoidable part of their life and their 
competence. Trying to escape these truths would jeopardize their reality as human beings. 
Another feature underlining the institutional character of such instruments lies in their 
legal origin. In early discussions on competence an attempt was made to formulate standards 
of competence, by analysing the jurisdiction on competence. Arguments used in the 
judgements of competency were categorized in standards of competence (Chapter 5, 
compare Roth et al., 1977; Appelbaum et al., 1982), which represent a hierarchy of different 
levels of assessing competence. Depending on the risk/beneﬁt ratio of the situation and the 
acceptance or refusal of the treatment, one standard is chosen to assess competence (Roth 
et al., 1977). With the development of assessment instruments, the standards constitute a 
social reality as a concept of decision-making capacity, thereby suggesting that this capacity 
is a personal (psychological) characteristic. By operationalizing the standards as expression 
of the decision making capacity, it then seems that an attempt is being made to solve a 
normative problem, which is a product of social institution, at a descriptive level as a 
personal characteristic (Berghmans, 2000). But even at a descriptive level we may question 
the validity of the presupposed rationality underlying the concept of decision-making capacity. 
Criticism can be directed at two different levels: external and internal rationality 
(Charland, 2002). In the context of decision-making capacity, internal rationality refers to 
the hierarchical structure of cognitive abilities. The idea is that one should comprehend 
information, after which rational manipulation and appreciation can follow. From the results 
of our analysis this hierarchical structure of decision-making capacity can be questioned. 
Cognitively impaired patients and cognitively non-impaired patients were equally able to 
reason and appreciate the situation, although the cognitively impaired were less able 
to understand the information (Chapter 7). The qualitative analysis showed that the answers 
given to the questions do not represent the categories of decision-making capacities 
(Chapter 7). 
External rationality refers to the evaluation of the content of an argument according to 
socially accepted norms, and is a process of ‘rationalisation’. In medical institutions an 
individual with his/her personal history is urged to interact with this institution and its own 
rationality. Our analyses of the three different judgements of competence (physician, family 
members, and vignette method) demonstrate that different sources provide different 
judgements of the same individual. These different sources have different concepts of reality 
and probably express different expectations in their rational judgement. When judging 
competence, physicians are probably inﬂuenced by factors such as the type of treatment 
decision and the severity of its consequences for the patient: patients are held responsible 
as long as the consequences of their choice do not seem to be harmful from a medical 
point of view. Family members probably think that patients are not acting rationally in 
decision-making if they have impairments in other domains of their life world. In both cases 
the decision-making capacity functions as a concept within a broader institutional reality. 
We wonder if the rationality contained in that institutional reality, and henceforth in the 
concept of decision-making capacity, fully reﬂects the moral self of the patient. In the next 
paragraph we will discuss the relationship between decision-making capacity and moral 
capacity. 
In assessing cognitively impaired patients with the vignette method, we found some 
indirect evidence that decision-making capacity and moral capacity do not completely 
overlap or coincide. First, the majority of demented patients were assessed as competent 
by physicians, family members, and the vignette method. Cognitive impairment does not 
lead straightforwardly to an assessment of incompetence. Secondly, we hypothesized that 
personal life history and emotion inﬂuence the assessment of decision-making capacity. 
Presenting different vignettes (differing in severity of the consequences, or the hypothetical 
or realistic character of the vignette) resulted into different degrees of decision-making 
capacity (Chapters 6 and 7). The qualitative analysis demonstrated that patients respond 
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primarily from their own personal point of view to the vignette (Chapter 7). Based on 
these ﬁndings, we conclude that moral capacity overlaps with decision-making capacity, but 
is not necessarily fully contained by it. Cognitively impaired elderly people may still be able 
to make morally responsible decisions, based on different degrees of decision-making and 
on their personal history. By introducing the concept of moral capacity we were able to 
question the validity of the concepts of competence and decision-making capacity within 
the context of respect for autonomy. This may result in rejecting replacement of the 
concept of competence by the concept of decision-making capacity, favouring in this way 
the enhancement of moral capacity. However, we would stress that the medical dilemmas 
with which the patient is confronted in clinical practice can not simply be overcome by 
focusing exclusively on the personal values and history of the patient and disregarding the 
values of medical practice. The solution is more complex, and cannot be found in the 
avoidance of one of the existing different realities. In our opinion, this means that physicians, 
as well as patients and their family members, have to deal with the combined issues of 
medical and individual values. We conclude with the statement that assessment instruments 
need to be used with caution in this interaction. They represent a starting point based on 
the societal reality of competence in medical practice, and should open the way to 
discussions about the underlying personal hopes and beliefs of the patient. 
Some alternative ethical considerations
The issue of competence is mainly discussed from the point of view of the liberal medical 
ethics of respect for autonomy, in which competence acts as a hinge between the principles 
of respect for autonomy and benevolence. The issue of competence can also be considered 
from another ethical point of view. Criticism of the liberal medical ethical tradition falls 
into two categories. The ﬁrst category criticizes the fact that autonomy is the main principle, 
and therefore proposes a different value. The second category accepts autonomy as the 
main value, but stresses life history and identity as important elements in decision-making. 
Subsequently, we will brieﬂy discuss examples from both categories of criticism, and 
conclude with a short reply to both.
The ﬁrst category deals with the ethics of care, a recently developed stream of ethics 
that challenges autonomy as the central value in medical ethics. It is argued that care itself 
should be the central value. The starting point of ethics of care is the interdependence of 
human existence, and emphasis is laid on the relational self that is connected with other 
relational selves. ‘Care for the threat of being abandoned’ has more moral meaning than 
‘the threat of interference by others’ (Hertogh & Verkerk, 2002). Ethics of care does not 
disrespect autonomy, but claims that people cannot become autonomous without the 
support of others and their care. With regard to the care of demented people, it has been 
argued that the inner experience of the patient should be the starting point of ethical 
deliberation and action, not the objective questions concerning care (Hertogh & Verkerk, 
2002). Issues of competence, according to this approach, do not presuppose that patients 
with dementia are free within the barriers of competence or cognitive impairment, but that 
patients need to be cared for in such a way that they feel that they are being approached as 
competent or free individuals (Hertogh & Verkerk, 2002).
Within the second category the criticism focuses on the fact that the liberal tradition 
deﬁnes autonomy as based on a negative meaning of freedom. Negative freedom means 
that people are autonomous if they can act free from others. Autonomy should also include 
a positive meaning of freedom, for instance in the sense that it gives a personal direction 
and meaning to a person’s life. From this perspective, different approaches to the issue of 
competence have been proposed. First, emotions are regarded as important sources of 
knowledge, instead of limiting factors in (cognitive) decision-making. In other words, 
cognitive abilities are not the only relevant factors, but the emotional and affective reactions 
of a person to a particular situation are equally important. It is stressed that an unexpected 
emotional reaction should not be considered as incompetence, but should be the starting 
point of a hermeneutic interpretation (Widdershoven & Berghmans, 2002). Secondly, it is 
argued that personal identity and identiﬁcation precede conscious decision-making, and are 
in fact guiding it, even though the personal identity of patients with dementia can be 
problematic. Agich claims, therefore, that people living in nursing homes should not be 
helped with making choices, but rather be supported to accept their life within a context 
of vulnerability, loss, and death (Agich, 1993; in Widdershoven & Berghmans, 2002). A third 
point of view focuses on the communicative aspects of the assessment of competence. 
Within this approach the emphasis lies on the process of communication that should be 
directed at assisting the patient to make his or her decisions, instead of on the issue of 
decisional authority. In the dialogue between physician and patient, attention should not 
only be paid to treatment-speciﬁc information, but the personal values of the patient 
should also be discussed. In this perspective competence is not static, but a dynamic process 
in physician-patient interaction (Widdershoven & Berghmans, 2002). This form of 
communicative ethics has recently been described by Widdershoven as therapeutic 
paternalism (Widdershoven, 2005).
Two comments are relevant with respect to these alternative ethical perspectives. First, 
the emphasis on emotion, personal values, and life history should, in our opinion, always be 
incorporated in clinical practice as well as in theorizing about competence and decision-
making capacity. A liberal view of respect for autonomy does not deny this obligation, but 
stresses the respectful attitude for the patient’s decision-making and moral capacity, even if 
the patient is cognitively impaired. Care ethics and communicative ethics, or therapeutic 
paternalism, do not deny the need for this respect for patients and their history, but try to 
classify it as secondary to the social norms of the institutional reality. Our analysis of the 
vignette method showed that physicians and family members are thereby most likely to 
reconﬁrm their own point of view instead of respecting the patient. Secondly, the emphasis 
on communication and hermeneutics almost suggests that a ‘good’ communication can 
make assessments of competence unnecessary. Although we support the idea that 
competence is not static but dynamic, we think that good communication cannot replace 
or completely solve the difﬁculties involved in the judgement of competence. The ideal of 
good communication disregards the fact that we live in social institutions that confront us 
with all kinds of norms. Furthermore, there will always be situations in which an ultimate 
assessment of competence will be necessary, and cannot be avoided in clinical practice. 
Even if there is good communication, the relationship between the care-giver and the 
patient remains in that respect a-symmetrical. Focusing on communication and hermeneutics 
may even cloud a transparent ethical assessment. The use of a method to assess decision-
making and moral capacity and an explicit formulation of the arguments regarding the 
likelihood of severe consequences must be included in the discussion with the patient, the 
family members, and other physicians. 
Societal implications
A frequently mentioned negative effect of operationalizing competence with an instrument is 
the possibility of ‘overlegalizing’ the medical daily practice. ’Overlegalisation’, or ‘juridiﬁcation’ 
points to the fear that good clinical practice may lose in quality by increasing attention to 
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formal procedures, while at the same time decreasing attention to the well-being of the 
individual patient. In our opinion, this does not apply to an instrument to assess decision-
making capacity. Of course, every instrument needs to be interpreted as a formal action, 
but the aim of such a procedure is to make essential assessments in care-giving ethically 
transparent and accessible to others. Comprehensive ethical decisions should lead to the 
best possible care for every individual patient. An assessment of competence has major 
consequences, because it does or does not allow the patient to make his or her own 
decisions. In other words, it touches the core of patient autonomy, no matter what further 
interpretation is given to that concept. The impact of a false positive or a false negative 
assessment may lead to severe problems for an individual patient. Therefore, everything 
that can possibly improve assessments of competence should be done to provide good 
clinical healthcare.
Furthermore, it is well known that the diagnosis of dementia does not imply that the 
patient is incompetent, but it is still debatable whether incompetent or partially incompetent 
patients have the capacity to make morally relevant decisions about their health and future 
life. The ﬁndings of this study may foster the further emancipation of elderly patients with 
dementia. Elderly people in general, and especially patients with a chronic psychiatric illness, 
have to cope with ageism and prejudices. An instrument to assess decision-making capacity 
may increase awareness of the fact that these people may still have the ability to make 
(moral) decisions about their own lives. 
This thesis mainly describes a method to assess decision-making capacities within the 
context of treatment decisions, making use of instruments similar to those that have been 
proposed within the context of informed consent to participate in research (Chapter 5). 
As the elderly are regarded as a vulnerable group, it is important to use a method that can 
protect those who cannot decide, and provide the opportunity to participate in research 
for those who are able to decide for themselves. Especially because the law prohibits 
scientiﬁc research on incompetent patients, unless special conditions are fulﬁlled, a closer 
investigation on the issue of informed consent is needed, and should be recommended for 
future research.
One ﬁnal implication of this thesis concerns to the decision-making capacity of elderly 
people with dementia who request euthanasia. During recent years there has been much 
discussion in the Netherlands about the question of whether or not euthanasia requests 
from people with dementia can be honoured. The question of unbearable suffering in 
people with dementia can not be solved by our ﬁndings about decision-making and moral 
capacity or competence. With regard to the question of competence, our ﬁndings indicate 
that patients with mild to moderate dementia still have the moral capacity to make such 
speciﬁc requests and the comparable treatment decisions concerning palliative care. Our 
ﬁndings do not allow extrapolation to requests for euthanasia, because the content of such 
a request is different from that of normal treatment decisions. However, our ﬁndings are in 
favour of taking euthanasia requests from patients with dementia seriously, because many 
of these patients may still be competent to make such a request. 
Implications for future research
From the above discussion the implications for future research can be subdivided into 
three categories. The ﬁrst category concerns issues with regard to rational decision-making 
and its relationship with moral capacity, based on personal values and life history. We have 
posed questions with regard to the rational way in which people are supposed to make 
decisions, and we have argued that patients are urged to adapt to speciﬁc forms of 
rationality in social institutions. It has been suggested that decision-making capacity may 
need to be placed in a broader context, in which intuitive thinking and emotions also play 
a role. More speciﬁc to the medical context, patients who do not seem to know much 
about their illness or treatment, can still be clear about what they want. Future research 
should focus on the way (medical) information is used in treatment decision-making, and 
the way in which emotion and personal values interact with rationality. More knowledge 
about these aspects may affect the importance of the decisional capacities that are currently 
included in our vignette. Within this context the data on meaning of life, social, support and 
personality, which have been gathered as part of this study, should be analyzed in relation 
to the different judgements of competence and the concept of moral capacity.
The second category concerns issues related to the normative character of both the 
assessment of competence and decisional capacities. Future research should investigate 
the assessment of competence in daily practice, in order to unravel the current normative 
arguments. We need to investigate the situations in which the question of competence 
arises (and the situations in which the issue does not arise). Factors to specify such 
situations should involve not only patient characteristics, but also situational characteristics 
such as the severity of the diagnosis and prognosis. A qualitative analysis of the arguments 
concerning assessments of competence and the role of family members is equally important. 
Within this category it is reasonable to analyse the differences in the argumentation with 
regard to different illnesses (compare assessments of the competence of demented versus 
schizophrenic patients), different choices (compare treatment decisions with euthanasia 
requests) and different cultures (compare assessments of competence in different countries 
as well as assessments of the competence of migrants). 
The third category concerns research on the effect of introducing a method to assess 
decision-making capacity in clinical practice. We assume that an instrument to assess 
decision-making capacity will improve the care given to the patient. However, research 
should be carried out to evaluate the use of such an instrument in daily practice in terms 
of positive effects for the patient and the care that is provided.
Knowledge about these three categories may hopefully promote further ethical and 
philosophical thinking and the reconceptualization of competence and moral capacity. 
Although empirical knowledge may guide ethical and philosophical thinking, theoretical 
analysis will also be necessary to interpret the ﬁndings. 
   
Practical implications for the assessment of competence in daily practice
The assessment of competence in clinical practice cannot wait for the results of future 
discussions, because we need to know how to assess competence now. Therefore, we 
conclude this General Discussion with some practical guidelines (compare the MacCAT-T 
of Appelbaum & Grisso). 
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Situation-speciﬁc character of an assessment of competence:
• starting point is the actual situation of the patient
• competence is related to a particular (treatment) decision
•  provide information about the illness, treatment, the pros and cons of treatment and 
treatment alternatives
• Remember that education may improve understanding of information
Assess decision-making capacity on the basis of:
• ability to evidence a choice
• ability to understand information
• ability to manipulate information rationally 
• ability to appreciate the situation
An assessment of competence is based on:
• the degree of decision-making capacity
• the severity of the consequences of the speciﬁc treatment for the speciﬁc patient
Keep in mind:
• decisional abilities may over-emphazise cognition
• normative character of the assessment of decision-making capacity
• personal values and life history in connection with the current situation
• consultation of family members
• consultation of colleagues
Summary
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Summary
The aim of this thesis was to identify some of the basic elements of moral capacity within the 
context of decision-making capacity of elderly patients with cognitive problems, by means of 
empirical research. The ﬁrst step was to examine the inﬂuence on decision-making capacity of 
factors that might contribute to moral capacity in elderly patients with cognitive problems. At the 
same time, in doing so we hoped to reﬁne a method to assess decision-making capacity and 
competence in the elderly. 
Knowing well or living well
We generated hypotheses (Chapter 2) in a philosophical approach to the concept of 
competence. The discussion about competence in Western societies is profoundly 
inﬂuenced by various democratic and legal theories regarding citizenship. Competent 
persons are considered to be citizens with the capacity to make decisions and bear 
responsibility. The underlying morality postulates that someone who is able to think 
rationally will act accordingly, and that his or her actions will thereby be what is deemed 
to be morally or socially good. Still, the problem of akrasia, or weakness of will, shows that 
mental competence does not guarantee that a person will always act in a morally responsible 
and rational way. On the other hand, we also argued that people who are considered to be 
incompetent can still act morally responsibly. We therefore postulated that competence 
and moral responsibility are overlapping human qualities, while the extent of overlap 
depends on the societal structure and social judgement. Within the context of mental and 
psycho-geriatric health-care it must then be clariﬁed how cognitive impairment can affect 
competence, and furthermore to what extent moral responsibility can still be maintained. 
This need for clariﬁcation is evident in clinical practice, where demented elderly can 
sometimes act as morally responsible patients, while at the same time institutional practice 
forces us to consider them as incompetent patients. 
By considering the possibility that moral responsibility partly overlaps with cognitive 
competence, it becomes necessary to reconsider theories of competence in the light of 
ability to act morally. Moral capacity can be deﬁned as the capacity to make decisions based 
on an ongoing process to transgress the world of our personal history and beliefs into the 
moral standards of public institutional life. In particular, we reconsidered elements which 
may be connected to moral capacity. Central concepts hypothesized to be connected to 
the concept of moral capacity are: the role of cognition and emotion, the meaning of life, 
health status, personality traits and social support, and the role of the family and physician 
in assessing competence. To link our hypotheses with existing scientiﬁc research we chose 
to reﬁne a method used to assess decision-making capacity (the vignette method). 
Aim and methods
In developing philosophical thinking about competence, decision-making and moral capacity, 
we argued that the concept of competence mainly plays a role at the level of institutional 
and legal thinking. By investigating various aspects of this moral capacity in relation to 
decision-making capacity in medical situations, we hope to identify some of the basic 
elements of moral capacity (Chapter 3). However, the ﬁrst step is to examine the inﬂuence 
on decision-making capacity of factors that might contribute to moral capacity in elderly 
patients with cognitive problems. Because the empirical framework we sketched is too 
extensive to be tested in one thesis, we started modestly. We wanted to investigate the 
inﬂuence of different circumstances in the assessment of decision-making capacity with the 
vignette method. Further, we focused on the inﬂuence of cognition as the most distinctive 
characteristic of patients with and without cognitive decline or dementia. Finally, we focused 
on the relationship between the assessment with the vignette method and competence 
judged by family members and physicians. 
We interviewed 142 elderly patients visiting a geriatric day-clinic (Chapter 4). An 
important inclusion criterion was a MMSE score above 16. In this way patients without 
cognitive impairments as well as patients with mild to moderate dementia were included. 
Besides patients we also interviewed physicians (n=35, giving a judgement about 124 
patients) and attending family members (n=96). They gave their judgement on competence 
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independent of knowledge about the assessment of decision-making capacity by the 
vignette method. 
The vignette method is a method to assess decision-making capacity. A vignette 
describes a hypothetical treatment choice, after which questions are posed to evaluate 
decision-making capacity. The abilities are based on standards: factual understanding, 
evidencing a choice, reasoning and appreciation of the situation. The vignettes described 
either the choice of undergoing an endoscopy for anaemia with unknown cause or the 
choice to undergo an operation for colon cancer. The vignettes were presented either in a 
hypothetical way during the interview, or presented after the physician had proposed the 
choice in reality. The 142 patients were divided in three groups. The ﬁrst group consisted 
of 37 patients who were actually proposed to undergo an endoscopy. Decision-making 
capacity was assessed with a vignette disclosing information about their actual situation. 
The remaining 105 patients were randomly divided in two groups. They were confronted 
with a hypothetical treatment vignette about either an endoscopy or an operation for 
colon cancer.
 
Instruments to assess decision-making capacity
Until now competence has mainly been operationalized as decision-making capacity. In 
comparing the various different instruments that have been developed to assess decision-
making capacity in the ﬁeld of medicine, the following was concluded (Chapter 5). First, 
the question of competence arises in a speciﬁc situation, which is reﬂected in the 
instruments by the central theme of a speciﬁc choice of treatment. The instruments have 
been also developed for use in speciﬁc patient populations. Secondly, the instruments 
presuppose that adequate medical information about the disease and treatment alternatives 
has been given to the patient. Thirdly, decision-making capacity is deﬁned as the ability to 
evidence a choice, the ability to understand information, the ability to manipulate information 
rationally, and the ability to appreciate the situation. This concept of decision-making 
capacity has been derived from the current legal standards. Fourthly, most studies report a 
high inter-rater reliability for these instruments, which means that different people using 
the instruments come to a comparable assessment of decision-making capacity in the same 
patient. Finally, two important differences appear in comparisons of the psychiatric and 
psycho-geriatric context in which the instruments were developed. The ﬁrst difference 
involves the realistic or hypothetical character of the information provided. The second 
difference involves the relationship between the scale-score for decision-making capacity 
and the assessment of competence. We concluded that, in spite of several limitations, most 
instruments to assess decision-making capacity appear to have acceptable validity and 
reliability, and therefore they do have added value for the assessment of decision-making 
capacity. 
The vignette: content and character of information 
The content of the vignette appeared to inﬂuence decision-making capacity in two ways. 
First, we compared two hypothetical vignettes which differed with regard to the severity of 
consequences (Chapter 6). Cognitively impaired patients scored lower than cognitively 
non-impaired patients on the vignette with mild consequences, whereas no difference was 
found between the scores of these two groups on the vignette with severe consequences. 
We discussed the possibility that differences in content may inﬂuence the complexity (in 
the meaning of degree of severity in consequences) of the decision. In general, individuals 
often use heuristic tools such as representativeness and availability of information in making 
decisions. Moreover, the complexity of a choice not only depends on the content of 
the information accompanying the choice, but also on the personal experience and history 
of the person who has to make that choice. We hypothesized that the difference in 
performance with regard to decision-making capacity between different (i.e. complex and 
non-complex choices) hypothetical vignettes might be the result of differences in personal 
characteristics. 
Given the context-speciﬁc character of the concept of competence, we decided to 
compare two vignettes, one with a hypothetical choice and one with a realistic choice 
(Chapter 7). A quantitative analysis showed that in the hypothetical situation cognitively 
impaired patients had lower scores than cognitively non-impaired patients for all decisional 
capacities. In the realistic situation, cognitively impaired patients had lower scores than 
cognitively non-impaired patients for understanding and the total vignette, but the two 
groups performed equally well on reasoning and appreciation. A qualitative analysis showed 
that patients gave comparable answers in hypothetical and realistic situations. The answers 
were not related to the speciﬁc standards of decision-making capacity, which may lead to 
questions about their presumed hierarchy in the concept of decision-making capacity. 
Personal circumstances were taken as a reference point for making a decision, regardless of 
the situation. Therefore, we questioned the validity of using hypothetical vignettes to assess 
decision-making capacity, and argued that the use of vignettes that refer to actual situations 
guarantees more validity. 
Decision-making capacity and competence assessed by family and physician 
Comparisons between decision-making capacity assessed by the vignette method and the 
judgement of competence made by the family and physicians showed a low degree of 
agreement (Chapter 8). The physicians were most lenient in their assessment, and the 
families were most stringent. The disagreement between the assessments suggests a 
difference in the factors emphasized by the three methods of assessment (the vignette 
method, judgement by family members, and judgement by physicians, respectively). 
Incompetence, as judged by physicians was associated with a higher degree of cognitive 
impairment, a lower degree of depression and a lower score for understanding, whereas 
incompetence judged by family members was associated with a lower degree of cognitive 
impairment, a lower level of IADL, and a lower score for understanding, reasoning and 
appreciation of the situation. The ﬁnding that the judgements made by physicians as well as 
the judgements made by family members were associated with standards of decision-
making capacity determined by the vignette method, suggests that the vignette method has 
more than a legal theoretical base and is associated with practical experience and 
knowledge.
General discussion
Based on these ﬁndings, we conclude that moral capacity overlaps with competence and 
decision-making capacity, but is not necessarily fully contained by it (Chapter 9). 
Cognitively impaired elderly people may still be able to make morally responsible decisions, 
based on different degrees of decision-making and on their personal history. By introducing 
the concept of moral capacity we were able to question the validity of the concepts of 
competence and decision-making capacity within the context of respect for autonomy. This 
may result in rejecting replacement of the concept of competence by the concept of 
decision-making capacity, favouring in this way the enhancement of moral capacity. However, 
we would stress that the medical dilemmas with which the patient is confronted in clinical 
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practice can not simply be overcome by focusing exclusively on the personal values and 
history of the patient and disregarding the values of medical practice. The solution is more 
complex, and cannot be found in the avoidance of one of the existing different realities. In 
our opinion, this means that physicians, as well as patients and their family members, have 
to deal with the combined issues of medical and individual values. We conclude with the 
statement that assessment instruments need to be used with caution in this interaction. 
They represent a starting point based on the societal reality of competence in medical 
practice, and should open the way to discussions about the underlying personal hopes and 
beliefs of the patient. The vignette method can be used for this purpose. 
Samenvatting
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Samenvatting
Doel van dit op empirisch onderzoek gebaseerde proefschrift is om een aantal elementen van 
morele capaciteit te benoemen binnen de context van de beslisvaardigheid van oudere patiënten 
met cognitieve beperkingen. In eerste instantie is onderzoek gedaan naar de invloed van factoren 
die samenhangen met de morele capaciteit op beslisvaardigheid van deze patiënten. Daarnaast 
wordt getracht tot verﬁjning te komen van een methode om beslisvaardigheid bij ouderen te meten.
Goed weten of goed leven
Vanuit een ﬁlosoﬁsche beschouwing van het concept van wilsbekwaamheid is een aantal 
hypotheses ontwikkeld (Hoofdstuk 2). Er werd gesteld dat de discussie over 
wilsbekwaamheid in Westerse maatschappijen met name is beïnvloed door verscheidene 
democratische en juridische theorieën over burgerschap. Wilsbekwame personen zijn dan 
burgers die over de vaardigheid beschikken om keuzes te maken en verantwoordelijkheid 
te dragen. De onderliggende moraliteit veronderstelt dat iemand die rationeel is ook als 
zodanig zal handelen en dat zijn of haar acties daarom ook voldoen aan het idee wat als 
moreel of sociaal goed wordt beschouwd. Het probleem van akrasia ofwel wilszwakte toont 
echter aan dat mentale (wils)bekwaamheid niet altijd betekent dat mensen voortdurend 
moreel verantwoordelijk of rationeel handelen. Daarnaast werd beargumenteerd dat 
mensen die niet bekwaam worden verondersteld, wel degelijk moreel verantwoord kunnen 
handelen. Daarom kon worden gesteld dat wilsbekwaamheid en morele verantwoordelijkheid 
overlappende grootheden zijn, waarbij de mate van overlapping wordt bepaald door sociale 
structuren en oordelen. Hieruit volgde de behoefte om nader te verklaren in hoeverre, 
binnen de context van de psycho-geriatrie, cognitieve beperkingen van invloed zijn op 
wilsbekwaamheid en in welke mate dit effect heeft op morele verantwoordelijkheid. Voor 
de dagelijkse klinische praktijk is dit een noodzaak, omdat hier de ervaring is dat patiënten 
met dementie moreel verantwoordelijk kunnen handelen, maar tegelijkertijd artsen door 
het medisch discours worden gedwongen om hen als wilsonbekwaam te kwaliﬁceren.
In beschouwing genomen dat morele verantwoordelijkheid en wilsbekwaamheid elkaar 
gedeeltelijk overlappen, is het noodzakelijk om theorieën over wilsbekwaamheid te herijken 
in het licht van het vermogen om moreel te handelen. Morele capaciteit kan dan worden 
gedeﬁnieerd als het vermogen om beslissingen te nemen die zijn gebaseerd op het 
voortdurende proces van transgressie tussen onze persoonlijke geschiedenis en overtuigingen 
enerzijds en morele standaarden van sociale institutie anderzijds. In dit proefschrift worden 
elementen die mogelijkerwijs met morele capaciteit verbonden zijn beschouwd. Centrale 
concepten die hier mogelijk mee samenhangen zijn: cognitie en emotie, zingeving, 
gezondheid, persoonlijkheidsfactoren en sociale steun, de rol van familie en arts in de 
beoordeling van wilsbekwaamheid. Om de bevindingen in het raam van bestaand onderzoek 
naar wilsbekwaamheid te kunnen plaatsen, is ervoor gekozen om wilsbekwaamheid te 
operationaliseren als beslisvaardigheid welke bepaald is met een vignet methode.
Doel en methodologie 
Vanuit deze ﬁlosoﬁsche bespiegelingen is beargumenteerd dat het concept wilsbekwaamheid 
met name een rol speelt op het niveau van institutioneel en juridisch denken. Door morele 
capaciteit te onderzoeken in het licht van beslisvaardigheid, wordt getracht enkele 
elementen van morele capaciteit te kunnen onderscheiden (Hoofdstuk 3). De eerste stap 
is om de invloed van verschillende factoren op beslisvaardigheid van ouderen met cognitieve 
beperkingen te onderzoeken. De ﬁlosoﬁsche overwegingen hebben geleid tot een dusdanig 
uitgebreid raamwerk, dat in dit proefschrift niet meer dan een bescheiden begin kan worden 
gemaakt. Het onderzoek beoogt de invloed van contextuele factoren op de bepaling van 
beslisvaardigheid met het vignet in kaart te brengen. Hierbij is cognitie als meest onderscheidend 
kenmerk gekozen. Tot slot is de relatie tussen meten van beslisvaardigheid met het vignet 
en het oordeel over wilsbekwaamheid van artsen en familieleden onderzocht.
In totaal zijn 142 oudere patiënten onderzocht, die allen een dagkliniek geriatrie 
bezochten (Hoofdstuk 4). Een belangrijk inclusie criterium was een MMSE score van 
boven de zestien. Dit betekent dat er zowel mensen werden geïncludeerd zonder cognitieve 
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beperkingen, als mede mensen met milde tot matige vormen van dementie. Behalve 
patiënten zijn ook artsen (n=35, die in totaal over 124 patiënten oordelen gaven) en 
familieleden (n=96) geïnterviewd. Hen is gevraagd een oordeel te geven over de 
wilsbekwaamheid van de patiënt, zonder dat zij op de hoogte waren van de uitslag van de 
vignet methode.
De vignet methode is gebruikt om de mate van beslisvaardigheid vast te stellen. Een 
vignet beschrijft een hypothetische behandelkeus, waarna vragen worden gesteld om de 
beslisvaardigheid te bepalen. De volgende vermogens worden hierbij bepaald: het vermogen 
om een keus uit te drukken, het vermogen om informatie te begrijpen, het vermogen om 
rationeel informatie te kunnen verwerken en het vermogen om de situatie te kunnen 
waarderen. Er zijn twee verschillende vignetten ontworpen: één beschrijft de keus om bij 
onbegrepen bloedarmoede een maagonderzoek te ondergaan, de ander beschrijft de keus 
om bij darmkanker een operatie te ondergaan.  Voorts zijn de vignetten onder verschillende 
omstandigheden afgenomen: deels werden de vignetten als een hypothetische situatie 
voorgesteld, terwijl in één groep de keus met betrekking tot het maagonderzoek de realiteit 
betrof. Op deze wijze ontstonden drie groepen. De eerste groep bestond uit 37 personen 
die de keus voor een maagonderzoek daadwerkelijk kregen voorgesteld. De overgebleven 
105 patiënten kregen een vignet over een hypothetische keus. Zij werden willekeurig 
verdeeld over twee groepen: de ene groep beantwoordde het vignet over het maagonderzoek, 
de andere groep beantwoordde het vignet over het ondergaan van een operatie bij 
darmkanker.
Instrumenten om beslisvaardigheid vast te stellen
Tot nu is wilsbekwaamheid meestal geoperationaliseerd als beslisvaardigheid. Door het 
vergelijken van de verschillende instrumenten die ontwikkeld zijn om beslisvaardigheid te 
bepalen, werden een aantal zaken geconcludeerd (Hoofdstuk 5). Ten eerste komt de vraag 
naar wilsbekwaamheid altijd naar voren in een speciﬁeke (behandel)situatie. Dit wordt 
gereﬂecteerd in de instrumenten, die altijd uitgaan van een speciﬁeke behandelkeus. De 
instrumenten zijn veelal ontwikkeld voor toepassing in speciﬁeke patiëntenpopulaties. Ten 
tweede wordt bij het gebruik van instrumenten ervan uit gegaan dat op adequate wijze 
informatie is gegeven aan de patiënt over de aard van de aandoening, de mogelijke 
behandeling, de voor- en nadelen en eventueel de alternatieven. Ten derde wordt 
beslisvaardigheid meestal gedeﬁnieerd als het vermogen om een keus te kunnen maken, het 
vermogen om informatie te kunnen begrijpen, het vermogen om informatie rationeel te 
kunnen manipuleren en het vermogen om de situatie te kunnen waarderen. Deze vermogens 
zijn afgeleid van standaarden die in Amerikaanse jurisprudentie worden gebruikt. Ten vierde 
melden de meeste onderzoeken naar deze instrumenten een hoge inter-rater 
betrouwbaarheid. Dit betekent wanneer verschillende mensen met behulp van het 
instrument oordelen, zij tot een zeer goed vergelijkbaar oordeel over beslisvaardigheid van 
dezelfde persoon komen. Tot slot bleken er twee belangrijke verschillen te bestaan tussen 
instrumenten die binnen een psychiatrische ofwel een psycho-geriatrische context zijn 
ontwikkeld. Het eerste verschil betreft de vraag of de behandelkeus die in het instrument 
wordt aangeboden realistisch of hypothetisch van karakter is. Het tweede verschil betreft 
de relatie tussen de schaalscore van beslisvaardigheid en het uiteindelijke oordeel over 
wilsbekwaamheid. De conclusie luidt dat, ondanks een aantal beperkingen, de meeste 
instrumenten om beslisvaardigheid en wilsbekwaamheid vast te stellen een acceptabele 
validiteit en betrouwbaarheid hebben. Hiermee hebben deze instrumenten een toegevoegde 
waarde in het beoordelen van wilsbekwaamheid.
De vignet methode: de inhoud en context
De inhoud van het vignet bleek op twee verschillende manieren de bepaling van 
beslisvaardigheid te beïnvloeden. Ten eerste werd de invloed van de twee verschillende 
hypothetische situaties vergeleken: de keus voor een maagonderzoek en de keus voor een 
operatie bij darmkanker (Hoofdstuk 6). Er werd gesteld dat deze twee situaties van elkaar 
verschilden in ernst van consequenties voor de patiënt. Hier bleek dat patiënten met 
cognitieve beperkingen lager scoorden op beslisvaardigheid dan cognitief niet beperkte 
patiënten bij het vignet met milde consequenties, terwijl er geen verschillen tussen deze 
groepen bestonden bij het vignet met ernstiger consequenties. Dit leidde tot de opvatting 
dat het verschil in consequenties mogelijk de complexiteit van de keus zou kunnen 
beïnvloeden. Over het algemeen gebruiken individuen heuristische gereedschappen zoals 
de vergelijkbaarheid en beschikbaarheid van informatie om keuzes te maken. Vanuit deze 
overweging werd afgeleid dat de complexiteit van een keus niet alleen van de inhoud van 
een keus afhangt, maar ook van de persoonlijke ervaring en historie van een persoon. 
Hieruit werd de hypothese ontwikkeld dat het verschil in beslisvaardigheid tussen de twee 
verschillende vignetten veroorzaakt zou kunnen worden door verschillen in persoonlijke 
eigenschappen.
Vanwege het context-afhankelijke karakter van het concept van wilsbekwaamheid, werd 
hetzelfde vignet in twee verschillende omstandigheden vergeleken (Hoofdstuk 7). Het 
vignet betreffende het ondergaan van een maagonderzoek werd bij een groep hypothetisch 
voorgesteld. Bij de andere groep kregen de patiënten dit daadwerkelijk door hun arts 
voorgesteld. De kwantitatieve analyse liet zien dat onder hypothetische omstandigheden – 
op alle beslisvaardigheden – mensen met cognitieve beperkingen lager scoorden dan 
mensen zonder cognitieve beperkingen. In de realistische situatie scoorden mensen met 
cognitieve beperkingen lager op het vermogen informatie te begrijpen, maar mensen met 
en zonder cognitieve beperkingen hadden vergelijkbare uitkomsten op de vaardigheden 
redeneren en waarderen. Een kwalitatieve analyse liet zien dat patiënten vergelijkbare 
antwoorden geven in hypothetische en reële omstandigheden. De antwoorden correleerden 
niet eenduidig met de hiërarchie van de beslisvaardigheid, waardoor deze veronderstelde 
hiërarchische structuur ter discussie werd gesteld. De patiënten namen, ook in de 
hypothetische situatie, persoonlijke omstandigheden als richtsnoer voor het maken van de 
beslissing. Met deze bevindingen als uitgangspunt kwam de validiteit van het gebruik van 
hypothetische vignetten ter discussie te staan en werd beargumenteerd dat instrumenten 
die uitgaan van de werkelijke situatie van de patiënt meer validiteit hebben.
Beslisvaardigheid en wilsbekwaamheid beoordeeld door artsen en familieleden
Een vergelijk tussen het oordeel van artsen c.q. familieleden over wilsbekwaamheid en de 
uitkomst van het vignet over beslisvaardigheid toonde een geringe overeenstemming 
(Hoofdstuk 8). De artsen waren meestal terughoudend in hun beoordeling van 
wilsonbekwaamheid, terwijl familieleden het meest uitgesproken waren. Bij alle methodes 
bleek overigens dat, ondanks cognitieve beperkingen, de grootste groep wilsbekwaam werd 
beschouwd. De beperkte overeenstemming tussen de drie oordelen (de vignet methode, 
het artsenoordeel en het oordeel van familieleden) is mogelijk terug te voeren op de 
verschillende factoren die van invloed zijn op de verschillende oordelen. Wilsonbekwaamheid, 
zoals beoordeeld door de artsen, hangt samen met ernstiger cognitieve beperkingen, een 
mindere mate van depressiviteit en een lagere score op het vermogen informatie te 
begrijpen. Daar en tegen hangt wilsonbekwaamheid, zoals beoordeeld door familieleden, 
samen met een lager niveau van IADL, en een lagere score op de vermogens begrijpen, 
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redeneren en waarderen van de situatie. De bevinding dat zowel het artsenoordeel als het 
oordeel van familieleden samenhangt met vermogens die worden beoordeeld in het vignet, 
suggereert dat de vignet methode niet slechts een juridische theoretische basis heeft, maar 
ook verbonden is met praktische kennis en ervaring.
Algemene discussie
Deze bevindingen leiden tot de conclusie dat morele capaciteit deels overlap vertoont met 
beslisvaardigheid (Hoofdstuk 9). Mensen met cognitieve beperkingen zijn nog steeds in 
staat om moreel verantwoorde keuzes te maken die gebaseerd zijn op verschillende niveaus 
van beslisvaardigheid en persoonlijke geschiedenis. Door het concept morele capaciteit te 
introduceren, kan de validiteit van de concepten wilsbekwaamheid en beslisvaardigheid 
binnen de context van respect voor autonomie ter discussie worden gesteld. Dit zou 
kunnen uitmonden in het verwerpen van de concepten wilsbekwaamheid en beslisvaardigheid 
ten faveure van het concept van morele capaciteit. Er moet echter worden benadrukt dat 
de dilemma’s waarmee de arts en patiënt in de medische praktijk worden geconfronteerd, 
niet simpelweg kunnen worden overwonnen door eenzijdig te richten op persoonlijke 
waarden en levensgeschiedenis van de patiënt en daarbij waarden van de medische praktijk 
te verwaarlozen. De oplossing is complexer van aard en kan niet worden gevonden in het 
vermijden van één van de bovengenoemde realiteiten. De conclusie moet zijn dat zowel 
artsen, patiënten als familieleden leren omgaan met de gecombineerde realiteit van 
medische en individuele waarden. Hierbij kunnen instrumenten om beslisvaardigheid te 
meten, mits toegepast met de nodige zorgvuldigheid, worden ingezet. Zij vormen een 
uitgangspunt dat gebaseerd is op de sociale realiteit van wilsbekwaamheid in de medische 
praktijk en openen de weg voor discussies over de onderliggende persoonlijke verwachtingen 
en overtuigingen van een patiënt. De vignet methode is geschikt voor toepassing van deze 
benaderingswijze. 
Appendix  
Case Report  
Competence: to Decide Well  
to Run Risks
This chapter was published in Dutch:
Vellinga, A., & Ederveen, A. (2004). Wilsbekwaamheid: kun je ’goed’ beslissen gevaar te 
lopen? Tijdschrift voor Psychiatrie, 46, 395-399.
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Competence: to decide well to run risks
A 35 year-old man with insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, alcohol abuse, an amnestic syndrome 
and dementia after a hypoglycaemic coma, is assessed twice for his competence to consent to 
treatment. The assessment of capacities and the seriousness of the consequences for the patient 
are profoundly inter-related.  We therefore stress the importance of distinguishing between decision-
making capacity and the seriousness of the consequences for the patient. 
Introduction
Competence is a complex concept. There has been much discussion about the deﬁnition of 
this concept and, maybe even more importantly, about the operationalization of the concept 
in daily clinical practice. Efforts to determine this operationalization are usually guided 
by legal or ethical argumentation. In this article we relate some theoretical aspects of 
the concept of competence to a case description. By confronting theory with practice, and 
vice versa, we hope to contribute both to the theoretical discussion and to the quality of 
assessments of competence in daily clinical practice.
In the following case-report we focus on two assessments of competence, followed by 
some theoretical considerations. Subsequently, we will discuss standards of competence 
and the severity of the consequences of a particular choice for the patient.
Case-report
Patient A, a 35 year-old man, is admitted to a rehabilitation centre with the consequences 
of a diffuse brain injury after a hypoglycaemic coma. The hypoglycaemic coma was the 
result of badly-regulated insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus (IDDM) and alcohol abuse. 
Because of disorientation and wandering behaviour the patient was (involuntary) admitted 
to a psychiatric ward. The following diagnosis was made: an amnestic syndrome as a result 
of alcohol abuse and dementia, induced by a hypoglycaemic coma.
Subsequently, the treatment is continued in the rehabilitation centre (in the legal 
context of an involuntary commitment). Although gradual recovery is reported, insight into 
the illness is totally absent. The patient does not appreciate the consequences of his current 
state for his present and future level of functioning. He also lacks motivation to participate 
in a rehabilitation programme. Several times he has refused the prescribed insulin, resulting 
in a clinical situation with a serious risk of coma, which is the reason why he has been 
admitted. 
After he has proven that he can use the insulin in an appropriate way, he is allowed to 
go home, where he receives intensive somatic and psychiatric care. His family is in charge 
of his ﬁnances, and supports him in his daily activities. His independent functioning is 
seriously limited and his self-care is minimal.
The ﬁrst assessment of competence was made because the patient acts irresponsibly 
with regard to his use of insulin and his diet. The psychiatrist is of the opinion that the 
patient seems to understand the consequences of low levels of blood glucose and the risk 
of a hypoglycaemic coma. The patient explicitly states that he does not want to die, but this 
is explained as well-considered indifference. The patient argues that he is not enjoying his 
life, because he does not have a job or any other areas of interest. This mental status is 
described as follows: level of consciousness is alert. His orientation in time is possibly 
affected, but his orientation with regard to place and person is not. His memory about 
recent life events ﬂuctuates: he does not remember the reason why he was admitted to the 
rehabilitation centre, although he seems to dismiss any questions about this topic. His level 
of intelligence seems to be lower than the mean. His thought process is described as 
lacking a general view. In answering the questions his thought process seems coherent, 
although he is not able to retain longer lines of thought. His mood is dysphoric. The affect 
modulates, but in a childish manner. He expresses a passive wish to die. The following is 
concluded: risky behaviour of a young man with a low level of intelligence and a limited 
overview, who consciously runs risks. The psychiatrist considers the patient to be 
competent. This assessment resulted in not prolonging the legal conﬁnement of involuntary 
commitment and to confront the patient with his own responsibilities.
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A further deterioration of the situation raises doubts about the competence of the 
patient in his judgement with regard to his somatic condition. He has developed an ulcus 
diabeticus, induced by irregular blood glucose levels. Because he refuses to take the 
prescribed antibiotics, an osteomyelitis develops. The surgeon prescribes drainage and 
antibiotics, but the patient refuses to be admitted to a hospital. The prognosis of an 
untreated osteomyelitis is severe: there is a considerable risk of amputation or septic 
shock.
Under these circumstances, a second competence assessment is made. The patient’s 
mental status is described as follows: the patient is defensive and coercive in contact. His 
ability to pay attention seems to be affected: only a simple conversation about daily events 
is possible. His immediate memory is affected, but there are no perceptual disorders. The 
thought content is not affected (no delusions). The patient’s mood expresses negative 
thoughts, but he cannot be considered to be depressed. With regard to suicide, it is 
reported that the patient has a passive wish to die and that he has a striking indifference 
with regard to his health. The psychiatrist concludes that the patient is incompetent, 
because of cognitive impairment caused by a diffuse brain injury. Due to cognitive 
impairment, the patient has severe judgemental disorders, in particular to his somatic 
situation: the IDDM and the osteomyelitis. In spite of education and surveillance, the patient 
refuses to accept antibiotics. He can not appreciate the consequences of his attitude. The 
continuation of this situation may result in severe somatic, persistent injury. Based on these 
criteria the patient is involuntary committed to a psychiatric ward of a general hospital, 
where he is being treated for the osteomyelitis.
Assessments of competence in theoretical perspective
Competence is often operationalized as decision-making capacity, which refers to the 
following abilities: the ability to evidence a choice, the ability to understand information, the 
ability to manipulate information rationally, and the ability to appreciate the situation (Van 
de Klippe, 1990; Berghmans, 2000). Table 1 shows the relationship between decision-making 
capacity and the two clinical assessments.
Table 1: Relationship between decision-making capacity and the two clinical assessments
Decisional abilities Assessment I Assessment II
Evidencing a choice ? Refuses antibiotics
Understanding Understanding is not affected ?
Manipulating information 
rationally
Well-considered choice ?
Appreciation of the situation Lacking a general view,  
indifferent to the risk of 
death
Cannot appreciate the  
consequences of his behaviour
In view of the theory of competence and decision-making capacity, it is remarkable that 
only the second assessment mentions the ability to evidence a choice: the patient refuses 
the prescribed treatment. However, this is not considered as an ability, but as an argument 
to start the competence assessment procedure and as one of the arguments to suggest 
incompetence. Both the ability to understand and the ability to manipulate information 
rationally are taken into consideration in the ﬁrst assessment, but not in the second. In the 
second assessment, the patient is reported to have judgemental disorders with regard to 
his health. However, the exact meaning of judgemental disorders is not described, making it 
difﬁcult to analyse whether these disorders concern the ability to understand, to manipulate 
information rationally, or to appreciate the situation. In both assessments the ability to 
appreciate the situation (or general overview) is described explicitly. 
In both judgements decisional abilities and psychiatric symptoms and diagnoses interfere. 
However, from a theoretical point of view it is underlined that a psychiatric diagnosis is not 
sufﬁcient to classify a person as incompetent. Underlying psychiatric syndromes may affect 
decisional abilities, but this does not provide sufﬁcient evidence for incompetence (Roth et 
al., 1977; Ministry of Justice, 1994). The situation speciﬁcity of a particular choice is 
emphasized in assessments of competence (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995). In other words, 
the patient is supposed to understand and appreciate his particular situation. Compare also 
the deﬁnition of competence in the Contract of Medical treatment Act: ‘a person is 
competent if he/she is considered to be able to judge his/her interest at hand reasonably’ 
(Article 446-468 of book 7BW). 
The situations in which the two judgements were made differed only in the severity of 
consequences for the patient. At the time of the ﬁrst assessment there was a severe risk of 
a hypoglycaemic coma, but this was not considered as an acute threat. At the time of 
the second assessment there was an acute risk of amputation, and possibly a septic shock. 
Remarkably, in both assessments the severity of the situation forms the starting point for 
the competence assessment procedure, as well as being an important argument in the ﬁnal 
judgement. In the ﬁrst assessment the situation does not seem to be considered as acutely 
dangerous for the patient, and the patient was therefore considered to have sufﬁcient 
overview and was expected to bear the responsibility for his own situation. In the second 
assessment, the risk of amputation or septic shock seemed to lead to the assumption that 
the patient lacked sufﬁcient appreciation of the situation. 
Theoretical discussions on competence also address this mixture of decisional abilities 
and the content of a decision and its consequences. Although a ‘reasonable outcome’ of a 
choice has been mentioned as one of the standards of competence (Roth et al., 1977), the 
general consensus is that the outcome of choice should be separated from an assessment 
of decisional abilities. The idea is that the assessment of competence should incorporate a 
decisional process, and not the outcome of choice, to prevent rationality being limited to the 
opinion of the majority. Secondly, the connection between content of choice and decisional 
abilities is also described in the sliding scale model of competence. This model indicates 
that the level of competence should be more stringent when the consequences are more 
severe (Drane, 1985). Situations with severe consequences require adequate appreciation of 
the situation or the ability to manipulate information rationally, whereas in situations in which 
the consequences are less severe adequate ability to evidence a choice may be sufﬁcient.
In theoretical discussions it is quite easy to separate the content of the choice and the 
process of decision-making (or decisional abilities). However, in clinical practice these 
arguments are mixed up. Possibly, the connection between content and decisional abilities 
is even more complex in psychiatry than in other ﬁelds of medicine subject to the legal 
context of the Special Admissions to Psychiatric Hospitals Act (1992), in which the criteria 
of danger is one of the major issues. By applying the criteria of danger, the content of the 
choice and its (presumed and estimated) consequences are decisive in the judgement of 
involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital, whereas competence (to run the risk of 
danger) is not a legal requirement.
The problem of distinguishing content of choice from decisional process can not be 
solved easily. Decisional abilities are assumed to represent a process of decision-making, 
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but they are also based on normative standards. For instance: a ‘good’ manipulation of the 
information or a ‘good’ appreciation of the situation depends on our own normative 
standards applied to the other person’s situation. Nevertheless, we stress the fact that an 
assessment of competence has two aspects: an assessment of the patient’s situation and its 
possible consequences, and the (decisional) abilities of the patient who is being assessed. 
Hopefully, by critically reviewing both aspects the assessment of competence can be 
improved.
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Ook dank voor de diverse afdelingen (geriaters en verpleegkundigen) die hun 
medewerking hebben gegeven bij de selectie en benadering van mogelijke deelnemers aan 
deze studie: de dagkliniek Geriatrie van het Slotervaartziekenhuis te Amsterdam (prof.dr. G. 
Ligthart, drs. J. van Campen), de afdeling geriatrie van het VU Medisch Centrum te Amsterdam 
(drs. J. Daal en drs. O.J. de Vries), de afdeling gastro-enterologie van het VU Medisch Centrum 
te Amsterdam (prof.dr. S.G.M. Meuwissen en dr. E. Kuipers), de afdeling geriatrie van 
ziekenhuis Gooi-Noord te Hilversum (drs. W. van Maarschalkerweerd en drs. C. Rees) en de 
afdeling geriatrie van het Medisch Centrum Alkmaar te Alkmaar (dr. C. Kalisvaart). 
Voorts dank aan de leden voor de beoordelingcommissie voor de aandacht die zij aan 
mijn proefschrift hebben willen schenken: dr. R.L.P. Berghmans, prof.dr. J. Legemaate, prof.dr. 
M. Olde-Rikkert en dr. A.F. Tholen. Eveneens dank aan de overige leden van de oppositie: 
prof.dr. J. Dekker en dr. C.M.P.M. Hertogh voor de aandacht die ook zij aan mijn proefschrift 
hebben geschonken.   
Zoals al eerder genoemd: wilsbekwaamheid is een complex concept, wat onder andere 
tot uitdrukking kwam in de grote commissie van begeleiders: Cees Jonker (bijzonder 
hoogleraar Dementie), Evert van Leeuwen (hoogleraar Medische Ethiek), Jan Smit 
(methodoloog) en Willem van Tilburg (hoogleraar Psychiatrie). De begeleiders zijn van 
diverse pluimage, wat leidde tot vele boeiende discussies waarbij de verschillende aspecten 
van het concept werden belicht. Dit onderkennende lijkt het onvermijdelijk dat het ene 
antwoord dat altijd gezocht wordt, wel eens onvindbaar lijkt. Sterker nog: het zoeken naar 
antwoorden leidt veelal tot meer vragen. Aangezien deze vorm van complexiteit me erg 
past, heb ik veelal van deze discussies genoten. Voorts heb ik wel eens cynisch opgemerkt 
dat de autonomie van een aio kleiner is dan van een oudere met dementie. Als de traditie 
van de verdediging van stellingen aan deze universiteit zou bestaan, had ik deze stelling graag 
besproken. Ik laat hier verder buiten beschouwing hoe het met het streven naar weldoen 
van deze begeleiders en het streven naar autonomie van ondergetekende is verlopen.
Ten eerste wil ik jullie als groep bedanken, omdat zonder de discussies dit proefschrift 
naar mijn idee minder rijk van inhoud was geworden. Verder ben ik oprecht blij dat ondanks 
de stoelendans aangaande het promotorschap we als groep dit project tot een proefschrift 
hebben kunnen afronden. 
Ten tweede wil ik jullie individueel bedanken: 
Cees Jonker, dank voor je enthousiasmerende coaching tijdens het veldwerk van dit 
onderzoek. Verder bewaar ik goede herinneringen aan de ochtenden voor acht uur op de 
O-gang. Ook ben ik je dankbaar voor het uit eindelijk ‘vlot’ trekken van mijn proefschrift 
tijdens de lastige laatste periode. 
Evert van Leeuwen, dank voor de wijze waarop je je analyserend vermogen hebt 
aangewend om mijn eigen creativiteit te stimuleren. Ik heb je vaak aangegeven dat ik de 
door jou geboden vrijheid wel eens te groot vond, maar je weet als geen ander uit te gaan 
van de inbreng van de promovendus. Daarvoor ben ik je zeer erkentelijk. Verder bewaar ik 
vele goede herinneringen aan onze buitenlandse ‘uitspattingen’ en hoop dat we in de 
toekomst onze samenwerkingsmodus kunnen hervinden. 
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Jan Smit, dank voor je methodologische bemoeienis met dit proefschrift. Je begeleidde 
me ondanks je aanvankelijke reserves (arts en statistiek kunnen niet samengaan, toch?) op 
mijn eerste schreden van statistiek en databeheer. Ik stel je ‘down to earth’ mentaliteit erg 
op prijs.
Willem van Tilburg, hoe kun je toch altijd weer die ene simpele maar toch altijd wijze 
opmerking maken? Dank voor het feit dat je tot het eind in meerdere opzichten betrokken 
bent gebleven: ik vind het een eer je als co-promotor te hebben (dat kunnen vast niet velen 
mij nazeggen). 
Vervolgens wil ik de interviewers Krista, Pauline, Jannie en Joske bedanken, die er mede 
voor gezorgd hebben dat de dataverzameling succesvol is verlopen. Marleen van der Horst, 
ook jou wil ik bedanken voor de interviews, de interview-training en de coördinatie van de 
dataverzameling. Ik vind het ﬁjn dat je me ook tijdens de promotie wil bijstaan.
De complexiteit openbaarde zich eveneens in het feit dat ik gedurende het onderzoek 
onderdeel heb uitgemaakt van diverse afdelingen en onderzoeksgroepen. Dit heeft me 
altijd een gevoel van vrijheid gegeven. Voordat ik deze afdelingen ga benoemen wil ik eerst 
een stapje terug in de geschiedenis om Robert Wagenaar te bedanken. Robert, jij hebt me 
enthousiast gemaakt voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek met de zoektocht naar 
rigiditeitspatronen bij mensen met de ziekte van Parkinson. 
Mijn thuisbasis vormde lange tijd de gang met onderzoekers van het LASA (Longitudinal 
Aging Study Amsterdam) project. Dorly Deeg bedankt dat je mij als vreemde eend in de bijt 
hebt geadopteerd en me proﬁjt hebt laten trekken uit de onderzoeksbesprekingen die in 
het kader van het LASA project werden georganiseerd. Ook dank aan alle andere collega’s 
van LASA: ik ben mede door jullie altijd met veel plezier naar mijn werk gegaan. In het 
bijzonder dank aan Marja Aartsen, Miranda Dik, Suzan van der Pas en Lissy Terhell. De AIO-
etentjes boden altijd een welkome vrijplaats om eens ﬂink over de promotieperikelen te 
spuien. Suzan: nu jij nog en dan kunnen we verdergaan met doctor-etentjes! Ook dank aan 
de verschillende kamergenoten met wie ik lief en leed heb gedeeld, met name wil ik hier 
Pauline Spaan en France Portrait noemen. Pauline, je was een maatje van het eerste uur. 
France, je bent met name tijdens het eindtraject tot steun geweest (weliswaar niet meer als 
kamergenoot).
Verder maakte ik onderdeel uit van de afdeling Metamedica. Dank aan alle collega’s 
voor de discussies die een heel ander karakter hadden dan de epidemiologische invalshoek 
van LASA. Arko Oderwald bedankt voor het begeleiden van mijn eerste schreden op het 
gebied van kwalitatief onderzoek. Frans Meijman dank voor je ontnuchterende onorthodoxe 
visie op de wereld. Gerrit Kimsma, ﬁjn om een mede-Fries te hebben in het ‘wilde’ westen. 
Jammer dat we dit niet meer met Dave Thomasma kunnen delen. Verder dank aan Berna van 
Baarsen. Behalve als collega bij LASA en Metamedica heb ik me met name in de laatste fase 
van dit project door je gesteund gevoeld. Tot slot dank aan Titia van Kleffens voor de vele 
discussies met of zonder inhoud en de vele (on) wetenschappelijke activiteiten die we met 
onze Fiats bezochten. Ik vind het ﬁjn dat je me tijdens de promotie zult bijstaan. 
Behalve deze afdelingen heb ik wetenschappelijke discussies kunnen voeren in gezel-
schap van vele enthousiaste collega’s in twee onderzoeksscholen: Care en de Onderzoeks-
school Wetenschap, Technologie en Moderne Cultuur. Dank hiervoor. 
Geheel toegespitst op het onderwerp wilsbekwaamheid bij ouderen was de multi-
disciplinaire discussiegroep van de Leo Cahnstichting. Froukje Boersma wil ik bedanken voor 
het gemeenschappelijk voorzitterschap en tevens wil ik alle deelnemers bedanken die allen 
(soms van grote afstand komend) de moeite namen om over dit onderwerp van gedachten 
te wisselen. 
Dit brengt mij op een aantal mensen die behalve onderdeel van deze groep ook op 
andere wijze een inspiratiebron vormden. Ron Berghmans, vanaf het eerste moment (een 
Medilex bijeenkomst in 1998) heb je me geïnspireerd. Je zienswijze op de problematiek 
dwong me om de geijkte paden van de liberale ethiek los te laten. Ik ben vereerd dat je in 
mijn oppositie wilt deelnemen. Ruud van Beest, met plezier denk ik terug aan onze discussies 
in Canada. Sander Welie, het is ﬁjn om een ‘brother in arms’ te hebben. Ik hoop dat jij ook 
spoedig jouw proefschrift over wilsbekwaamheid kunt afronden.
Er is ook werk na en naast het proefschrift! Robert Schoevers wil ik bedanken voor zijn 
vertrouwen door mij in opleiding voor psychiater aan te nemen bij Mentrum. Ook dank 
voor je belangstelling en betrokkenheid bij de totstandkoming van dit proefschrift. En ja: het 
is inderdaad een jaar later. Ook bij Mentrum waren er de nodige discussies over 
wilsbekwaamheid in de psychiatrie in de werkgroep onder leiding van Albert Blom. Alle 
deelnemers dank voor de zinvolle aanvullingen uit de dagelijkse praktijk aan mijn theoretisch 
geschoolde geest. Met name wil ik Hans Nusselder bedanken, ook in zijn rol als werkbegeleider. 
Tja, wat betekent autonomie op een gesloten afdeling? Ik wil je in het bijzonder bedanken 
voor het niet bespreken van de proefschriftperikelen. Je wist me altijd in de realiteit van het 
SPDC te houden, waar je me stimuleerde tot het ontdekken van mijn eigen stijl als 
psychiater. Tot slot dank aan alle collega’s van Mentrum voor het ﬁjne werkklimaat, maar in 
het bijzonder nog Marië Nijpels en Bas Frelier, mijn maatjes in opleiding van het eerste uur.
En last but not least er is ook leven na het werk! Ook al leek deze vrijheid menigmaal 
te worden ingeperkt door het proefschrift, juist degenen die deze aspecten van het leven 
met mij delen hebben de uiteindelijke afronding mogelijk gemaakt. Lieve familie, vrienden 
en vriendinnen dank voor jullie bereidwillig oor en acceptatie voor alle momenten dat ik 
weer eens niet contact met jullie opnam. Verder dank voor de gezellige etentjes (Michiel & 
Tanja, Jeroen & Catelijne, Berna & Mark, France & Erik, Isis & Femke, Carla & Ron), ﬁjne uitjes en 
vakanties (Maarten, Renate & Timo), spelletjesdagen en weekenden (Petra & Manje), en 
sportactiviteiten (ja beste waterpoloërs: ik zal nog trouwer komen trainen, en Judith 
Franssen bedankt voor de mooie lay-out).
Ik wil besluiten met de kleinste kring van naaste betrokkenen. Malu en Martijn het lot 
heeft ons samengebracht en ik ben blij dat jullie onderdeel zijn van mijn leven. Martijn en 
Jellie ik ben blij dat jullie weer van de partij zijn. Malu dank voor je steun de afgelopen jaren 
en meedenken over het (knal) feest. Overigens je te zien opgroeien van een wijsneus van 
elf tot een mooie zelfstandige vrouw was ook al een feest. Fijn dat je samen met Remco van 
de partij bent. Ma, dit is nu het resultaat van de afgelopen jaren werk naast het werk. Dank 
voor je altijd onvoorwaardelijke medeleven. 
Mijn ouders, dank dat jullie me altijd gestimuleerd hebben om datgene te doen dat mijn 
belangstelling had. Ook dank voor het medeleven én de praktische ondersteuning de laatste 
jaren, al besef ik dat oppassen ook niet geheel onbaatzuchtig is. Pa, je hebt er een mooie 
voorkant van gemaakt!
De laatste woorden zijn bestemd voor mijn ‘ventjes’. Florian niet geheel volgens plan 
heb je toch nog het besef van het ‘boekje maken’ meegekregen. Het is nu klaar: tijd voor 
vele spelletjes mens-erger-je-niet! Verder heb je met je komst een behoorlijke dosis aan 
relativering gebracht: iets wat zeker het afronden van een proefschrift bevordert. Murk ik 
ben je met name dankbaar voor de vele jaren die we nu al gezamenlijk genietend en met 
passie doorbrengen. Met jou aan mijn zijde heb ik uiteindelijk de grenzen gevonden en het 
proefschrift weten af te ronden. Wat een vrijheid in afhankelijkheid én simpliciteit (als 
tegenhanger voor mijn hang naar complexiteit)! 
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